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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the role of technology as a resource in the
structure of medical domination of birth and death, stressing
technology's pivotal position at the intersection of control and
uncertainty.
Based in Intensive Care and Obstetrics (between which the health status
of patients diverges sharply), it notes the convergence of technology
used and examines the contest for control within the labour process.
This includes using technology to facilitate a 'standardized' birth or
death; a more retrospectively defensible event. In general, the
'burden of proof' is concluded to lie with those wishing not to
intervene rather than the reverse.
Given the (cognitively male) biomedical model, mind-body dualism is an
assumption embedded in medical technology: this is especially
significant in childbirth, where it fractures the woman's ontological
experience of giving birth.	 Its positivistic and pathological
emphasis is associated with a reification of processes and a
commodification of their 'solution': which becomes located in
technology. It is argued that commodification in health provision will
increase with the further application of market principles to the NHS.
It is concluded that 'uncertainty', endemic to medicine and a possible
challenge to control, is proactively manipulated and pressed into the
service of medical domination. Technology is used to mask uncertainty
and aid the medical profession's control of patients/relatives, and
subordinate work groups.
A technological fix may be viewed as the opposite to re-discovering
societal dreams and myths, however, more paradoxically, it is concluded
that dreams and myths have become attached to technology. Thus, the
symbolic role of technology is: to provide hope of continued survival
(or cure), the veiling of existential uncertainty and the offer of
'absolution' - should all efforts fail (a freedom from guilt in the
assurance that "everything possible was tried"). Its 'heroic' project
is viewed as an existentially 'masculine' health provision and
'feminized' health care is posited as an alternative.
"Don't be afraid, you can do it. It's your baby. Not ours, not the
doctors', not some strange product of medical knowledge, technique, or
power. . . There seemed to be no end to the extent to which a baby
could belong to someone other than its mother. And these baby-
snatchers, dressed in white, these mysterious figures who talked out
loud and made the decisions - what were we hiding behind our gauze
masks? Fear of death, fear of women? Can't we find another way? Are
we really so reassuring? How can women actually believe that we know
more about these things than they do? So now, take off the masks! Let
the roles be reversed!" (Odent, 1984, pp.111-113 - extract from a
section by Dominique Pourre, a Midwife at Pithiviers)
"(there should be a). . . recognition that dying and death are not
separate states of being, but phases of the process of living and life."
(Feifel, 1963, p.14)
INTRODUCTION; Why don't more women enloy childbirth? 
During the last five years I have had two babies. One birth involved a
considerable amount of obstetric technology (1984); the other virtually
none (1987). Following C. Wright Mills (1959, p.216) who maintained;
III . . . you must learn to use your life experience in your intellectual
work: continually to examine and interpret it." and Liz Stanley (1984)
in her assertion of the need to construct an 'intellectual
autobiography' in adopting a reflexive approach to sociological
research, I propose to give some account of these birth experiences.
Both births took place in the hospital where I later conducted the
maternity part of this study (1989/1990). As well as feeding into my
views and experience of birth and technology, they give some flavour of
the hospital, as it impressed itself on me on the two occasions when I
was a patient there.
Half way through my first pregnancy, despite the resistance of my G. P.,
I changed the booking for the birth to a different hospital because a
particular Consultant had been recommended to me by friends as less
prone to using routine technological intervention. This involved being
'booked' at a hospital twenty miles from where I live and in a different
Health District, rather than the local hospital two miles away.
The local hospital had a reputation for submitting all women delivered
in the Consultant Unit (and my age precluded my admittance to the G. P.
Unit) to internal electronic fetal monitoring with its invasion of the
body and necessity for immobility. I was already concerned about the
-1-
possible over-dependence on technology that could arise in high-tech
medical situations and research in Intensive Care had taught me that
the interpretation of electronic monitor readings were not always clear-
cut and that such readings were sometimes spurious and best not acted
upon. The hospital also routinely intervened in other areas of
childbirth, such as induction of labour which was routinely carried out
if the woman failed to go into spontaneous labour within two weeks
following her confinement date. I was not opposed to Obstetric
technology per se, but I was opposed to its routine use where no
specific indication was present. I considered its routine use to
present a potential iatrogenic hazard (doctor caused disease or trauma,
see Illich, 1976) to both mother and baby rather than representing a
preventative measure. At the same time, I wanted, as far as possible,
to experience birth with as little external interference as possible.
After a very straight-forward pregnancy, my daughter's birth, in the
event, proved to be highly interventionist. The baby was in a
posterior position (her backbone was facing my backbone) which meant
that the labour was very long and very painful. Although still in early
labour (not "established labour" when the uterine contractions tend to
regularize in frequency), I had already lost a night's sleep, the
contractions being too painful to doze through. On the second day in
hospital I was asked whether I wanted the labour accelerated by rupture
of the membranes; I said that I did not.
Prior to the second sleepless night my membranes had ruptured
spontaneously and the pain had become even more intense. I spent most
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of that night wandering the corridors of the Delivery Suite and
Observation Ward, stopping to breathe through contractions. Outside
there was torrential rain which seeped in through the glass roofs of the
covered walkways.	 I had two minimum doses of Pethidine (a synthetic
narcotic) and managed to doze for a couple of hours. Although I had not
wanted Pethidine, the midwife told me that there was nothing else she
could offer me so early in labour and so I took what was on offer.
After the Pethidine had been administered it was a routine procedure
that I be connected to an external electronic fetal monitor to record
any effect on the fetal heart rate (since Pethidine makes the baby
sleepy and may depress its heart-rate).
On the morning of the third day the Registrar said that because my
cervix was still only 3.5 cms dilated (10 cms. represents full
dilation), hospital policy (1984) dictated that it would be necessary
to accelerate the labour with Syntocinon (a synthetic form of oxytocin
which is produced naturally by the pituitary gland and promotes uterine
contractions).	 The view at that time was that babies had to be
delivered within 24 hours of the rupture of membranes because of the
risk of infection. Given my exhaustion and despair (at my apparent
absence of progress), a lack of continuous one-to-one support from a
midwife, together with the intense pain of a 'posterior labour', at that
point I requested an epidural anaesthetic (lumbar epidural anaesthesia
administered through a catheter inserted into the extradural space
outside the last of the three membranes which cover the spinal cord).
Acceleration would add to the pain and I was, as I told the Registrar,
'at the end of my tether both physically and emotionally'.
After the epidural was fitted (this takes about 10-20 minutes), the
remainder of the labour was spent in a light, airy delivery room, eating
lemon sorbet, discussing the midwife's marathon running, my research,
the medical student's training (most of which had been at a hospital at
which I had previously carried-out research) and the student
midwife's forthcoming marriage. 	 I had a drip of dextrose (sugar in
water - used if an epidural-induced fall in maternal blood pressure
needs to be rapidly reversed), a Syntocinon infusion and a fetal scalp
electrode on the baby's head (to continuously monitor her heart-rate
which might have become depressed if my blood pressure had fallen due to
the epidural - internal electronic monitoring is 'compulsory' in this
hospital once an epidural is fitted); my contractions were also
monitored electronically. The best stategy seemed to be to detach
myself as much as possible from this situation.	 The epidural worked
very well (which is not always the case), the pain disappeared and we
had a rather pleasant, sociable time. Within four hours I was fully
dilated. Since I was anaesthetised I had no urge to push and could not
In any case feel where I was pushing. Two hours later a short forceps
delivery was performed because the baby was diagnosed as distressed and
my blood pressure had risen. Despite the alleged fetal distress (based
on monitor readings), Jennie was in excellent condition when she was
born and given a high Apgar Score (all babies are scored along certain
dimensions relating to colour, respiration, and so on, immediately after
birth and then once more in the following few minutes - this is a means
of codifying and standardizing neo-natal observations) but she had a
graze on one side of her face from the forceps and a mark on her scalp
where the electrode had been attached to it. (I was alarmed at the
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delivery to hear that this was only the second time that the attending
Houseman had wielded forceps - he was supervised by a Senior Registrar).
I also had a post partum haemorrage, losing two pints of blood and
requiring a transfusion.
Despite this, my feelings were all I hoped they would be at the birth of
my baby. Prior to this experience I had thought that if the labour
was difficult I would not enjoy the actual birth. However, I felt I had
been consulted and informed throughout the labour and that nothing had
been done without the midwifery and medical staff first discussing the
matter with me. So that, despite such traumatic circumstances and being
in lythotomy (prone with legs in stirrups) I wrote of my daughter's
birth, just after the event:
"Finally I was told to push on the next contraction - and the head was
born. 'Do you want to feel the head?' Ann, the midwife asked. I wanted
to and she guided my hand down to a wet, furry, hard dome. Another push
to assist the pull of the doctor, and she was born. This small creature
was put on my tummy and covered with a towel. She was crying and
looking around, super alert with fear and shock. My heart went out to
her and I immediately started to talk to her, trying to comfort and
reassure her. Everyone and everything else receded into the distance.
It was an amazing moment. I was so absorbed with this small being that
I forgot to ask the sex. Ann suddenly said 'Oh, we don't know what it
Ann stayed quite a time beyond the end of her shift to ensure that I was
alright and visited me the following morning.
Afterwards, I did not feel defeated or that I had failed because I had
had a technological birth. On the other hand, I did not exactly feel
that technology had served me well. Posterior labours can be
notoriously long and painful, especially when a prima gravida (first-
time mother) is involved, since first labours, in any case, tend to be
longer than subsequent births.	 I wonder now if the course of events
might have been different if I had had an experienced midwife to
support, comfort and inform me through the long and painful latent phase
of labour. Apart from the occasional use of Pethidine, this hospital
tends to leave mothers at this early stage rather to their own devices
(this is reflected in my research data as well as my own experiences).
This partly seems related to staff shortages and partly to the fact that
they feel there is little they can do (i.e. physically) at this stage.
Added to which, staff change every eight hour shift. This means that
one sees a lot of staff, particularly a lot of midwives during a long
labour. One is also shunted around the hospital depending on the
adjudged stage of labour and whether and what type of pain relief is
required. If complications appear to be developing this will also
affect the location. I was moved from the Antenatal Ward to the
Observation Ward to the Antenatal Ward to the Delivery Suite, back to
the Observation Ward and then back to the Delivery Suite (see Rosengren
and Devault, 1963, on the use of space in the Obstetric Hospital). On
the Antenatal Ward because I was in considerable pain, I found the lack
of privacy distressing. Although an epidural might be thought
appropriate to a posterior labour, it does tend to feed into what
MacLennan (1978) has called a 'cascade of intervention' and, ironically,
one might speculate from two diametrially opposed positions either
-6-
'What a good thing I was in hospital if I was going to have such a
difficult labour, culminating in a post-partum haemorrage' or, 'if I had
been at home in the security of my own environment with a great deal of
continuous emotional support and practical information I might never
have become involved in the spiral of intervention which just may have
contributed to the haemorrage in the first place.'
My desire to do a PhD grew out of Jonathan's birth and the period of
hospitalisation immediately before it. Thirty-two weeks pregnant, my
blood pressure rose. Thereafter, it fluctuated significantly but was
always higher than average. Elevated blood pressure during pregnancy
can be (in association with other symptoms) a sign of pre-eclampsia
(eclampsia is a life-threatening condition involving maternal
convulsions>. It may also be associated with growth retardation in the
baby. I had no other 'symptoms' of pre-eclampsia but in order to
monitor my blood-pressure (and urine for protein), I spent five of the
last eight weeks of pregnancy as an in-patient. From the time my blood
pressure rose, I always saw the same Registrar at the Antenatal Clinic
(this was an individual initiative by the Registrar and is not hospital
policy). My file was, therefore, marked 'see W.
I had long felt it might be fruitful to compare the dynamics of
technology use in Intensive Care and Obstetrics. I even discussed this
proposition with some of the Ward staff when a patient. The response
was largely positive and I considered the possibilities interspersed
with finally reading long-possessed copies of 'The Hobbit' and 'Lord of
the Rings' (I eventually went into labour on page 753 with 300 pages to
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go!	 Babies never come to order, as was underlined time and again when
I actually started the research).
My G.P warned me that with raised blood pressure I might be induced at
38 weeks, given an epidural to depress my blood pressure and a forceps
'lift-out' to avoid the 'stress' of pushing. In the event, I
progressed to a full term 'Normal Delivery' of a 81b 14 oz baby, born
after a 27 hour labour with Entenox (Gas and Air) for the last four
hours, supplemented by TENS*.
I 'wrote-up' the birth shortly after leaving hospital. I have tried to
select some extracts which reflect something of the environment in which
I was labouring, attitudes to technology, attitudes of the staff and
some of the ways I saw technology fitting into my birth experience:
. . About 11 p.m. (Sunday) the twinges began to regularise and occur
at 10 minute intervals, increasing in strength as they did so. I spent
the night wandering along the long central corridor between my bed in
the ward and the T. V. room. 	 I dozed but the contractions were too
strong to actually sleep through. The midwife in charge that night
seemed unconvinced that I was actually in labour. I knew I was. She
left me to my own devices (which I felt alright about). She seemed
rather unsympathetic and this culminated in her giving me two
Paracetamols (she was on duty again when I returned to the Ward with my
* (Transcutaneous Nerve Stimulation, a non-invasive technique,
controlled by the mother. Provides a counter stimulous to labour
pain. Four pads on the mother's back are connected to a small battery-
driven output unit, strapped to the waist. This does not restrict
mobility. When activated, the pads produce a soft pulsating throb,
concentrated on the nerves serving the uterus. The intensity is
adjustable and can be boosted during constractions.).
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baby: "the Paracetamols didn't work", I said to her). She didn't give
me an internal (I felt obsessed to know whether I was progressing
quicker than last time) but was sufficiently 'put-out' by her apparent
indifference not to ask and I waited for the shift change. . • (Monday)
Howard (my partner) and I walked the ward corridor all afternoon, then
into the T. V. Room and up and down the adjoining stairs. This eased the
contractions. . . I felt quite secure and confident in the hospital
environment by this time. After all, I had been there rather a long
time! Because I knew so many of the staff they were interested to see
that I was in labour and offered encouragement . . . Sister D., in
charge that day, advised me to wait as long as possible before going to
Delivery; once there, she said they would artificially rupture the
membranes. . . Again we saw Dr. M. (the Registrar I'd seen throughout my
raised-blood pressure period). • . "Leave it 'til the last minute to go
down to Delivery," he said. "Once they get you down there they'll put
you on the altar and tie you up to monitors." 	 He suggested I had a
bath and that afterwards I start to use TENS (by this time I was 5 cms.
dilated). I took my second bath of labour. . . (when I told one midwife
that the Registrar had suggested this, she laughed and said, "Oh I
expect he was only joking." I knew he was not. Submersion in warm
water can be very good pain relief in labour). . . At 8 p.m. I went to
Delivery. I was 7 cms dilated. I was greeted by E., a Student Midwife
I knew from the Ward who had recently transferred there. On arrival at
the Delivery Suite the contractions slowed down (this is not uncommon).
E. assisted my midwife until the shift changed at 9.30 p.m. 	 I
requested not to be continuously monitored unless there was a specific
indication.	 I was intermittently, externally monitored. . . Until
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about 10 p.m. I continued breathing through contractions and using TENS
. . My blood pressure was monitored regularly but did not worsen. 
•
I sat cross-legged on the delivery table. I found this the most
relaxing of the 'yoga' postures I had been practicing. I also knew that
an upright posture would help to dilate the cervix by putting more
pressure on it.
	
. . I decided to use 'gas and air' before I perhaps
needed to. I felt I wanted to get used to it before the going got
really rough. I'd tried it at the Anaesthetics Lecture the previous
Monday, so I knew I preferred the mask to the white tube attachment for
breathing and I knew what the gas 'felt' like. I knew I should breathe
from the onset of the contraction to its peak and then 'come down' on
my own breath and the residue of Entenox. They were about to send for
the white tube attachment for me 'to bite on' when breathing but I
specifically requested the mask. I thought 'biting' was a very bad idea
and would introduce tension. A Medical Student (who appeared
periodically) said I was the first person he'd ever heard request the
mask. He said women generally felt that they couldn't see when using it
because it covered part of the face and that they wanted something to
bite on, but I wanted to labour with my eyes closed anyway - to
concentrate on what was happening to my body. . . 	 The contractions
were now very strong. The Sister Midwife (I still do not know her name)
asked me about their strength and then cross-checked again by
palpating the uterus manually; she did this despite my being
electronically monitored at that time. She then told the Registrar to
disregard the contraction readings on the monitor beceause they were not
registering properly and were much stronger than they appeared. . . It
became easy to recognise the 'peak' of the contraction, to stop
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breathing the gas and air and come down with my own breathing - often
with the feeling of riding a roller coaster (another woman later used
this analogy to me in describing her labour). Towards the end of second
stage the contractions felt more like hugh waves* which washed over me
and then carried me back with them into a sea of oblivion. If this
sounds 'frightening', it wasn't; it was exhilarating, mysterious, with
a sense of the 'self' as merging with something more universal. . . R.
(the Student Midwife) massaged my back. I rested my head on her
shoulder after some of the stronger contractions. H. (my partner) wiped
my face, massaged. I was fed iced-water. The Sister massaged my leg.
Encouragement and support flowed. My eyes remained largely closed which
meant that although the Delivery Rooms are highly clinical environments
I was unaware of this . The lights were turn down. I lay back for the
occasional blood pressure reading but knocked all aside to resume my
seated posture for the contractions. I felt very in tune with my body,
very in control and going out to meet and move with the pain. TENS was
woven-in too and all seemed sychronised and in order. Dr. M. appeared;
"Do you think you're in control?", he asked, "Yes I think so", I
answered. "Well I know so", he said, "I've seen women here screaming
the place down with Epidurals in." . . . (He told the midwives they
* "And that's when I became one with the sea. . . It felt so good to let
my body go in this sea of sensations. . . the sea (is) interwoven among
the infinite strands of space and time which mark Nuria's birth" (Odent,
1984, p.54 - account by 'a mother from Latin America')
"It felt like riding the summer waves at the shore in New Jersey. . ."
(Odent, 1984, p.66 - account by 'a mother from the United States).
would soon be delivering women in baths - they were amused - but water
births were being offered when I returned to conduct the research). .
The membranes were artificially ruptured towards the end of first stage
(the stage where the cervix is still dilating prior to the second stage
of 'pushing') - about 24 hours into the labour, to "quicken it up".
This procedure was discussed with me and was the main technological
intervention of the labour. I don't remember the contractions being any
stronger following the rupture of the membranes. But in quite a short
time I was fully dilated, except for an anterior lip (a slight lip on
the front of the cervix - if pushed against, this will swell and delay
the birth). The baby's head had also not rotated into the face down
position, desirable for delivery, he was lying on his side. . . The
urge to push was almost irresistable - I constantly felt it would
overwhelm me . . . Now encouragement and support became crucial (this
for me was the most difficult part of the labour). I lay on my side and
panted through contractions. I felt like Ferodo (in 'The Lord of the
Rings') resisting the power of the ring - the enticement to slip on the
ring became the seduction of pushing. This analogy fleetingly slipped
into my consciousness and disappeared again. It was the most enormous
mental battle and feat of concentration, I turned the TENS to full
intensity, full frequency and permanent boost - like Harry Palmer's
rusty nail which he dug into his hand to distract him from 'brain-
washing' in 'The Iperess File'. A counter stimulus even to the point of
pain, felt imperative. Anything to distract me from the pressure on my
cervix. . . At the same time I started demanding an epidural, insisting
"I can't go on like this". .. I knew an epidural at that stage would
mean I would have a forceps delivery but I felt that I would soon push
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and damage the baby and myself. There then followed what I can only
describe as a period of 'stage management' while the Sister and the Dr.
M stalled my request. I was told the Anaesthetist had 3 or 4 other
epidurals to perform before she could come to me. She was even brought
into the room to discuss an epidural with me; she said she would come
back as soon as she could. I never saw her again. They were playing
for time but trying to see that I didn't get too agitated by just
refusing my request . . . The Sister kept regularly examining me but
announced, to my despair, that the 'lip' was still there (apparently
this went on for about 2 hours). This was the only time I lost faith:
faith that the baby's head would rotate (and rotational forceps wouldn't
be necessary) and faith that I would have the energy and strength to
push him out after all this mental struggle and exertion. . . Eventually
I was given the 'all clear' to push. With no pain but great effort and
exhilaration I gave birth to him 15 minutes later.* Our baby was
handed to us and we were left to discover his sex for ourselves. In
reply to my thanks to my midwives and obstetrician, Dr. M. passed the
emphasis back to my role, saying "Thank you for sharing it with us."
I regretted I never again saw the Sister and Student Midwife. It seemed
strange and unnatural they should have shared one of my most intimate
and monumental experiences only to disappear immediately. When I later
told Dr M. how much I had enjoyed the birth (apart from the anterior
*I had an intraveneous injection of Syntocinon following delivery of
the placenta to help prevent haemorrage.	 I found this re-assuring as
I feared another post-part urnhaemorrage."
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lip!) he said, "We enjoyed it too, we don't see many' normal'
deliveries." He also told me that an epidural at that late stage would
certainly have culminated in forceps and added: "Sometimes the most
difficult thing is to do nothing." My Consultant also came to see me.
I thanked him profusely. "I didn't do anything," he said. "You did
It." In a sense this was literally true. That had been his strength
for me.	 He had not intervened, Just monitored me very carefully at
the end of the pregnancy. On one occasion when I had been very down
because my blood pressure was not falling, he had put this in good
common-sense perspective by saying, "No, but it's not going up either!"
I could see how it could so easily have been a different 'birth story',
given a different policy and approach. I am reminded of Obstetrician
Peter Dunn's (1976) remark that: "We must never forget that it takes
more experience, more judgement and more courage, often, to stand back
and do nothing" (cited in Sally Inch, 1982, p.35).
After the birth I immediately felt I wanted to do it all again.
Research was in a sense a way of 'revisiting' the experience but also
making more 'sense' of it intellectually. My second birth, in
particular, had been a very moving, creative and Joyous experience for
me; it had also been very empowering. It again made me question the
necessity for widescale routine technological intervention in the birth
process. I wondered whether many women were being denied the
opportunity to experience their own creative possibilities. I wanted to
go back and investigate the dynamics of the birth process in this
technological setting and ask women how they felt about it. For myself,
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I had never experienced such an intense fusion of the mental and the 
physical as during the labour and birth of my second child.
Much of my previous health research had been in Intensive Care. This
had indicated that technically feasible options, such as the
surveillance of electronic patient monitoring from a central console or
the application of closed-loop systems of drug infusion (where a change
in the patient condition triggers an automatic administration of
corrective action) had been consciously rejected in favour of a
philosophy of bedside nursing (Child, et al 1984, Harvey 1984,
Loveridge, et al 1990). Therefore, it appeared, that the technically
feasible would not necessarily be adopted but might be mediated by
medico-nursing philosophy. It was also apparent that nurses did not
view technically derived information uncritically; viewing it in a wider
context.	 I was interested, therefore, in the rationales around
technology use in Obstetrics, an area where, in contrast to Intensive
Care, the patients are generally in good health.
A PhD also seemed to fit well with two small children - Jono then a few
months old and Jennie just three. It promised a great deal of hard
work but with autonomy and flexibility, so important with young
children. The main problem was: I wanted to get started right away. It
took a year to set up. Not only had Jono been born on page 753 (of
'Lord of the Rings') but he'd been born in June, a month too late to
submit a proposal! However, thanks to the E.S.R.C. the research soon
..
became viable; in a sense, synthesising two areas of my life: the
personal - becoming a mother - and that of the professional researcher.
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The disturbance
by Marge Piercy
A baby is crying at a concert.
Down the aisles of the poetry
reading, children run. Folks
scowl at the mother, pretend
collective deafness. Afterwards
they say, "We felt terrible
for you", not, "We will demand
child care next time.
How seldom babies cry
In the university. Where
are they? Why don't fathers
bring them to work in baskets?
Have you ever studied while nursing?
Have you written a speech while cajoling
a baby raging with colic?
A visitor from Alpha Centauri
assumed humans are born full sized
after examining our public places.
Should we really Just cram mother
back in the broom closet with baby
and go on with our business, grateful
for all the mothers crouching in closets
with babies chewing and weeping
talking to walls quietly
and disturbing no one else?
from: "Stone, Paper, Knife", Pandora Press (1983).
Reproduced with the permission of the publishers.
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CHAPTER 1 
Medical Technology and Medical Power: the 'achievement' of control, 
manipulation of uncertainty and regulation of birth and death 
Control is the mobilization of power. Medical power rests on a number
of assumptions; the orthodox view that the determinants of health and
illness are biological, that medicine is a science untouched by
ideology, together with the medical profession's legally sanctioned
monopolistic right to practice. Doctors enjoy a high social class
status and this is underwritten by the power of gender relations, since
medicine remains predominantly a male sex-typed profession.
Doctors in Western society practise on the basis of a biomedical model.
This is a positivistic paradigm based on notions of mind-body dualism
and individual pathology. In its origins, both methodologically and
emotionally, this is a male model of the world (Bordo, 1986). The
widespread acceptance of the biomedical orthodoxy has led to the
medicalization of increasing areas of social life (Mich, 1976). Over
and above this doctors have become imbued with the possession of
curative powers out of all proportion with the knowledge and remedies at
their disposal (see, Freidson, 1970). They have become, in effect,
modern-day priests (see, for example, Szasz 1974; Oakley 1981a; Hart
1985).
Particularly from the 1950's, there has been a substantial proliferation
of medical technologies. Notwithstanding any criticisms these have
received in the 'quality' media, they have been more generally the
subject of 'celebratory reporting' which has de-emphasised their
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limitations and often swept under the carpet detrimental side-effects
and social implications (Karpf, 1988). The British Medical Association
and the Royal Colleges have demonstrated a significant commitment to
high-technology medicine. This is reinforced by the domination of
eoctors from the acute sector over medical decision-making and the fact
that it is medical practitioners located in the ultra-scientific
specialities who are awarded the most distinction (Bruggen and Bourne,
1976). More generally, doctors are trained to view themselves as
scientists and the majority derive the greatest job satisfaction from
the scientific and technological aspects of their work (Doyal, 1979).
It follows, therefore, that scientific and technical interests, and
considerations of prestige and power, lead doctors disproportionately to
aspire to high-technology Specialities (McLaughlin, 1974). This
technological emphasis is both reinforced and often initiated by capital
as represented by commercial firms producing drugs and medical equipment
for profit. In maternity care the now extensive use of surveillance and
monitoring equipment has been termed "the new order of social control"
(Arney, 1982, p.152). Both Foucault (1977) and Arney and Neill (1982)
have pointed to the impact of placing the individual in a 'field of
visibility' in order to enhance her/his susceptibility to control. This
may be achieved both by the continual presence of a professional
attendant or from dissection or testing methods employed on the body,
but also arises in the use of electronic monitoring equipment which
makes visible its inner physiological workings.
Medical technology in this study is examined particularly within the
context of the Intensive Care Unit (I.C.U., or Intensive Therapy Unit -
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I.T.U., as it is variously known) and the Maternity Hospital. In
Obstetrics, male medical practice was from the beginning intimately
bound-up with the use of obstetric instruments (see, for example, Oakley
1976, Donnison 1977). In Britain 90%+ of births now take place in
Consultant Units and Obstetrics has for the last twenty years
represented a high technology area of hospitalized care. In I.T.U. its
very raison d'etre was to provide a concentration of technology, used in
conjunction with specialised health care expertise. If there was no
high-technology, there would be no Intensive Care Unit.
In the I.T.U. patients are critically ill and, in some cases, dying,
whilst in maternity care they are usually in good health. Consequently,..
those who are cared for in these two areas, will generally vary sharply
in terms of health status. There is, however, much commonality of
technology (the definition of which is seen to include drug technology),
especially in relation to continuous electronic monitoring and the
emphasis on pain relief. The latter technologies will, therefore, be a
particular focus within this study. Birth and death are biological and
cultural events but in modern industrial society they are also
technological events.
Technology is a resource within the labour process around which there is
a struggle for control. Technology does not determine the social
details of its use and outcomes but it does set some limits on the range
of options and strategies available to those involved in its operation
(its non-use may, of course, be 'achieved' in some cases). Technology,
like medicine, is rooted in a positivistic, empiricist model of the
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world: that a task or event can be reduced to its constituent parts, a
number of mechanical operations. Technology is also, male-gendered, in
its design origins, built-in world view assumptions and in its on-going
social construction (Cockburn, 1985).
	 Part of the social relations of
technology are, therefore, patriarchial. The other set of social power
relations permeating technology in Western industrial society are
capitalist. Technological determinism, on the other hand, presents
technology as neutral, imbued with its own logic. It is thus viewed as
producing 'hard data' which is 'objective', 'rational' and, therefore,
superior; often rendering it of special legal status. The work
relations technology engenders are similarly, often depicted as
'given', flowing 'naturally' from the technology.
Since medical technology has been strongly employed by the medical
profession to achieve entry and domination of maternity care and to
create Intensive Care, for subordinate health care professionals in
these areas (in particular female sex-typed nurses and midwives) this
raises questions of control in relation to job regulation, involving
such issues as: fragmentation of competence, de-skilling and the
exercise of discretion, together with more general questions of
professional autonomy. These issues relate in turn to the overall
division of labour and the general organisation of work. Following
commentators such as Freidson (1961), Roth (1963), Hughes (1971),
Fagerhaugh and Strauss (1977), Strauss et al (1982) and Stacey (1984),
the centrality to the division of labour of the patient (or, in somes
cases their relative or birth partner) must be recognised. 	 The impact
of technology and work organisation also, therefore, raises questions of
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autonomy, choice and skill for the patient (and their relative).
Ultimately these issues are even more fundamentally crucial to these
groups since they are caught-up in major life-events.
Technology in these areas has been associated with an attempt to
regulate birth and death, whereby technology is available to help
achieve a controlled, standardized birth or death, 1. a. a birth or
death that falls within certain perameters. Such a 'standard' birth or
death is more easily legally defended, should the need arise. (In
Obstetrics, uncertainty of outcome, both 'real' and exaggerated, may be
used in justification of this strategy). In I.T.U., for example, the
withdrawal of active support (except in the case of 'brain death' which
will be discussed later) is managed in such a way as to attempt to mimic
'natural' death which is generally gradual. At the same time, attempts
are made to standardize birth, to produce what is seen as the optimum
care package, expressed in terms of Obstetric guidelines and protocols.
In this sense, control is the overall goal but regulation is the means
prescribed to achieve that end. Regulation, therefore, involves
enmeshing the action in procedural rules laid-down from above with
varying degrees of formality.
More generally, the pathological emphasis of the medical model has led
doctors to present a reified image of the processess of ill health,
leading to a commodification of its solution: the remedy becomes an
object to be consumed (making profit for commercial drug and technology
producers and enhancing the power and control of the medical
profession). This process also involves absolution from feelings of
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guilt and inadequacy, since the doctor-priest-magician, using scientific
ceremonial and technological icons, convinces the patient's relative
that "everything has been tried", "they can do no more", "nothing has
been left to chance" (this may simultaneously afford the professional
absolution under the Law from threat of prosecution). The problem and
the solution are defined within the same paradigm (a specific cultural
representation of 'reality' arising in a distinct cultural milieux -
Kuhn, 1970); ensuring control and ownership for the defining experts: in
this case the medical profession.
Control, however, finds a potential enemy in uncertainty. Medical
sociologists have pointed-out the extent to which uncertainty permeates
medical practice (Parsons 1951; Fox 1957, 1979; Davis 1960; Scheff
1963). Doctors must, therefore, find some way of managing uncertainty.
Davis (1960) argues further that uncertainty ('functional uncertainty')
may be used strategically by doctors in the management of patients and
their relatives to avoid time-consuming and potentially emotionally
distressing encounters. Here uncertainty is used as an avoidance
strategy to prevent situations which doctors define negatively occuring
between themselves and their patients or patients' relatives. I would
suggest further that uncertainty may, paradoxically, be proactively
pressed into the service of medical control. In Obstetrics, for
example, uncertainty, in the guise of open-ended risk has been used to
gain Obstetric control of the whole childbirth enterprise (see Oakley,
1984). Meanwhile, technology has been promoted as a major weapon in
reducing uncertainty, to the point where the display of technological
'control' may be more illusory than 'real' and its iatrogenic effects
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either ignored or de-emphasised. 	 Overall, I will argue that, in the
battle for control, 'uncertainty' is a resource which the medical
profession manipulates along a continuum towards or away from greater
uncertainty and that technology, the operationalisation of positivism,
is pivotal to this process.
In this way, the medical profession, through the use of technology,
exerts as much, sometimes more, control over subordinates working with
and subject to the technology, than it effects a proven beneficial
outcome on the course of events. Control within the labour process is,
of course, never totally achieved. It is the subject of continual
contest. Control is a dynamic process, constructed and reconstructed
over time. To every 'thesis' of one power interest group there is a
possible 'antithesis' around which a struggle for control may be
mounted. Control in the workplace will, therefore, be socially
negotiated around what Goodrich (1975) has called 'the frontier of
control'. In this case the point of production of health care.
This thesis then attempts to explore the role of technology as a
resource in the structure of medical domination of birth and death,
stressing technology's pivotal position at the intersection of control
and uncertainty. Here we might ask such questions as: is the biomedical
model associated with certain forms of control and if so how and which?
Although women are subject to the biomedical view of birth, do they
share this perspective? Similarly, do relatives of ITU patients feel
the body can be mended as a machine? If not, what images do they hold?
Is care and cure commodified, as Illich (1976) has suggested? If so,
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what are the mechanisms promoting this process? In view of the
uncertainty (both 'real' and exaggerated) within the health labour
process, how is this 'managed' by health care professionals and patients
- and how and to what end can it be seen to be promoted or suppressed?
I am arguing that technology use is central to the management of
uncertainty - in practice what effect does technology use have on the
illusion of certainty/uncertainty? What functions does this serve for
the medical profession and other groups? 	 How has the belief in
technology grown to iconoclastic proportions? What fuels this process
and what interests are served? It is to these and associated questions
that we now turn.
CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCHING MAJOR LIFE EVENTS •
Entering 'the field', one is carrying certain biographical and
conceptual "baggage" which is as 'real' and, indeed, more consequential
than the note books, tape recorder and other 'tools' of the sociological
trade (Middleton, 1978). In the preface I discussed my biographical
imperatives. This chapter outlines the methodological background to the
study, describing negotiation of access and how I conducted the
research. In relation to access, it considers the critique of sociology
as 'unscientific' made by some doctors approached to participate in the
research; their objections emphasised the tenets of the medical model -
an analysis of which was later to form a major element of this work. I
also consider the relationship of theory to data and the epistemological
and ontological questions this raises. 	 Since the study involved
observing and interviewing maternity patients and the relatives of ex-
Intensive Care patients concerning major events in their lives, some
detailed consideration is given to research ethics. The social relations
of the research act, which this implies are examined from a feminist
perspective.
i) Background Assumptions 
Many of the more recent books of readings on the research process have
called for a reflexive approach to conducting sociological research
(Bell and Encell, 1978; Bell and Roberts, 1984). Feminist ethics is an
aspect of such relexivity (see, for example, Oakley, 1981b; Stanley and
Wise, 1983; Finch, 1984). The call for a 'reflexive sociology'
initially stemmed from Gouldner (1970, 1975), drawing attention to the
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need to explicate the formulation and conduct of research and analysis.
Gouldner looked at the way in which sociologists not only studied
society but conceptualised and ordered their view of it:
"To say that sociologists are in the business of creating concepts means
that they are in the business of proposing and fashioning ways of
looking at, thinking, and talking about - and hence contributing to the
very constitution (author's emphasis) of - social objects and social
worlds. They are not simply studying (author's emphasis) a social
world-apart, but are contributing to the construction and destruction of
social objects." (Gouldner, 1975, p.105).
More recently such concerns have taken the form of applying 'textual
analysis' to sociological accounts (see, Atkinson, 1990).	 Reflexive
accounts of the research act are epistemologically a far cry from the
approach of Cartesians and neo-Cartesians, who believe that knowledge
is, in principle, independent of the conditions of its production.
Thus, knowledge is seen as a separate objective entity, devoid of the
social relations and social processes, including theorizing, that
attended its production. As Atkinson (1990, p.175) puts it:
"There may be few unreconstructed positivists amongst contemporary
social scientists but there are many for whom the contrasts of tact and
fiction, of rhetoric and science remain tacit articles of faith."
Given such diverse thinking concerning 'the research act'; I feel I
should outline my own position.
I did not enter the field with formal hypotheses, since I intended to
generate theory from the data by means of inductive rather than
deductive logic (c.f., Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978). Having
said this, I share Stanley and Wise's (1979) reservations concerning
dichotomised understandings of the relationship between research and
theory, represented as either 'deductivism' or 'inductivism'. In
'deductivism' theorising attends research as well as precedes it and in
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s inductivism' it is clear that researchers do not arrive 'in the held'
in an atheoretical state of grace. More generally, research is produced
within particular political and economic circumstances by researchers
with particular autobiographical features, social characteristics and
methodological perspectives.	 Thus, Stanley and Wise make the point
that although 'deductivism' and 'inductivism' are analytically valid as
'ideal type' constructs, they do not in practice describe the conduct of
research or the production of knowledge.
This proposition is certainly underlined in my own case, since my
approach to research is essentially eclectic. It employs a
naturalistic, ethnographic approach which I hope is illuminating and
sensitizing and shows, to quote Geertz (1988) that I have indeed 'been
there'. The views of the subjects are reported and reconstructed via
extensive quotations and observational excerpts. This being said, I
produce the final 'text' and the interpretations it contains. Thus,
this sociological text (like any text) can be seen as "an
accomplishment, grounded in the conventions of textual performance"
(Atkinson, 1990, p.4) - shared encodements between the writer and
reader.	 Sociological accounts, therefore, share with other texts the
status of artful products and, in this sense, they are highly contrived
(Atkinson, 1990).	 They are reconstructions of social life, dependent
on 'literary' and 'rhetorical' persuasive devices. Leading on from
this, Atkinson argues convincingly for the notion of the "collaborative
text" constructed between the sociologist, the reader and the social
actors represented in the setting. Stanley (1990a, p.625) describes
this as hollows:
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u . . . ' description' is necessarily a gloss on the actuality it
describes, and a gloss which constructs a 'point of view' on this
actuality."
Thus, interpretations are not justified by the accumulation of 'facts'
but by an active and involved understanding and representation of the
social world (Schutz, 1963, describes this as an "adequate
reconstruction"), together, I would argue, with an exposition of its
relationship to social structures and social relations. By this I mean
that in dialectical complementarity to an examination of the micro
level of social life, I favour an approach which is located in a
structural analysis of power relations and political economy. These
imply a particular theoretical framework, since they are embedded with
systematic background assumptions about the nature of the social world.
At this point, for the purposes of this discussion, I wish to follow
Harding (1987) and Stanley and Wise (1990) in drawing the distinction
between methods and methodology: methods to refer to the 'techniques'
of data collection and 'methodology' to mean the perspective or broad
theoretical framework from which its collection derives and relates.
The details of the 'methods' employed will, therefore, be dicussed in
Section 2.Tv. 'The Conduct of the Research', while issues concerning the
implications of the adoption of a methodologically eclectic approach
will be discussed in Section 2.11. 'Methodological Perspectives'.
Ii) Methodological perspectives 
My adoption of what may be seen as an eclectic approach is directly
related to the problematic of the subject/object in sociological
analysis. I have used an approach which contains elements of an
ethnographic symbolic interactionist perspective but also of a
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structuralist, Marxist feminist analysis. This needs some explanation.
Symbolic interactionism whilst capturing the subjectivist elements of
social life, has problems in dealing with issues of social structure and
historical perspective and remains rooted at the micro-level.
At the same time, it gives, an inadequate description of power
relations. In Weberian analysis, for example, power is expressed as
the probability of individuals realising their wills despite the
resistance of others. I am more persuaded by a view of power which
takes into account collective forces and social arrangements, which are
not always associated with observable conflict and in which the
individual has objective as well as subjective interests (this model is
basically Lukes', 1974, p.35, three dimensional view of power).
Furthermore, meaning is not infinitely or randomly negotiable, there
are some structural constraints, strictures and conventions that at
least limit the parameters beyond which the debate cannot be pushed:
"Men (sic) make their own history but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from
the past." (Marx and Engels, 18th Brumaire, 1962, Vol. 1, p.247).
Thus, Lukes (1974, p.54) argues:
n . . . although the agents operate within structurally determined
limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could
have acted differently."
This relates to the recurring debate within social theory about the
relative emphasis that theorists place on determinism as opposed to
voluntarism, for example, Althusser's is a Marxist approach which
stresses structural determinism and scientific materialism, while 4e-
-
emphasising the subject(ive). Voluntarism emphasises the 'humanist' and
'subjectivist', for example, Sartre, Lukacs and Hegel.
It, therefore, becomes a question of emphasis between the object(ive)
and the subject(ive) and the relationship between the two. 	 The concept
of social relations, derived from the Marxist tradition, avoids this
separation of the subject and the object, spanning both and emphasising
their dialectical relationship. 'Subjects' actively construct their
daily lives and engage in the production of social worlds and
'realities' and yet these are shaped by social forces which have a
structured effect. Concern with material conflicts will lead to a
structural analysis and an ethnographic approach will explore how these
are played out and negotiated at a micro level and the meta-theories
that attend this.	 An analysis rooted in social relations avoids the
notion of a reified social structure, apart from and constraining of
individuals and groups, and moves away from a dichotomised
understanding of the world <Acker, et al, 1983). Following Smith (1979)
and Acker, et al (1983), I would argue that one starts with what actors
do and say and how they view their social lives, later locating those
individual explanations in a societal and historical perspective,
embedded within sets of social relations. This is to imply that
Individual explanations and structural aspects can only be fully
understood in relation to each other. In terms of feminist analysis, no
general agreement exists on what constitutes a feminist methodology
(Clegg, 1975; Bowles and Duelli Klein, 1983; Stanley and Wise, 1983,
1990; Ramazanoglu 1989) and feminists are still divided over
epistemology (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Stanley and Wise, 1990). However, like
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Dorothy Smith (1986, p.6), I feel that, actors' own experiences alone
are not sufficient to "explain the actual processes and practices
organizing people's everyday experience", since, as she points-out,
exploring how social phenomena are organised as social relations are
beyond the scope of individual perceptions.
Furthermore, I would argue, following amongst others Bordo (1986) that
to separate the subject(ive) from the object(ive) in sociological
analysis or elsewhere in academic or social life is to create false
dichotomies which derive from the male psyche (Chodorow 1978, Fee 1986).
The separation of the subject from the object, the micro from the macro
also tends towards a de-politicisation of the situation. That is to
say, that analysing how the personal is political allows the analysis to
be pushed beyond individual experience to an understanding of "its
determination in the larger socio-economic structure" (Smith, 1977). In
a similar vein, writers such as Sandra Farganis (1986) and Barbara
Marshall (1988) have argued for an approach which combines feminist
structural analysis with a 'critical theory' account of 'social action'
associated with a critique of positivism and a view of theory as praxis.
In pursuing a Marxist feminist analysis, I share the view of writers
such as Hartman (1979, 1981); Cockburn (1984); Walby (1986, 1990),that
patriarchy and capitalism are two separate social systems in
articulation with each other, which can neither be reduced to each other
nor conflated into one system. Patriarchy and captialism, therefore,
interact and affect each other whilst being analytically distinct
(Hartmann, 1979, 1981; Cockburn, 1984, 1985, 1988; Walby, 1986, 1990;
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Mark-Lawson and Witz, 1988, 1990; Witz 1992). By 'patriarchy' I mean
the broader use of the term, to refer to gender relations in which men
are dominant and women subordinate. It, therefore, describes a societal
level of social relations of male-dominance, not one merely located in
the domestic sphere (Millett, 1972; Hartmann, 1979, 1981; Cockburn
1983, 1985, 1988; Walby 1986, 1989, 1990; Witz 1992). Following
Hartmann (1981), I believe that patriarchy has a material basis. Many
analyses of patriarchy (with exceptions such as Hartman, 1979, 1981;
Cockburn, 1983, 1985; Walby, 1986) have put little emphasis on
patriarchial relations in the workplace and have concentrated on the
domestic sphere. It is important to explore gender relations in the work
place and how the system ot patriarchial relations articulates with the
system of capitalist social relations in this setting. 	 Patriarchial
practices may be seen as a form of social closure (see, Parkin, 1979;
Kreckel 1980; Witz 1985, 1992). Overall, it may be said that social
structure presents different strictures and opportunities to women
depending on the particular articulation between patriarchy, capitalism
and race in which they are located. In recognition of this, several
writers in the feminist tradition have pointed to the differences within
feminism and between women (Walby, 1986; Ramazanoglu, 1989; Stanley,
1990b). Some have gone on to argue from this that women's experience is
ontologically fractured by their particular location within a specific
social context and that academic feminist writing typically reflects the
experiences and analyses of white, middle class, heterosexual, First
World women only (Stanley, 1990b); this critique has been termed
'feminist deconstructionism'.
The main focus of this research is medical technology. Given the
methodological perspective outlined above, I view technology, like
science, as permeated by power relations: capitalist and patriarchial.
I, therefore, propose to pursue an analysis rooted in the labour process
and the social relations of production. Discussing the power relations
infusing technology, Cynthia Cockburn (1985, p.8) has argued:
". . . technology as a medium of power, will be developed and used in
any system of dominance to further the interests of those who are on
top".
Cockburn (1985) following Genevieve Lloyd (1984) points-out that gender
constitutes part of our means of categorizing and understanding the
world. Lloyd (1984) explores the way 'Reason' (which she argues is the
underlying concept of modern science, technology and industry) is itself
gendered male: men, therefore, become both conceptually and
historically constructed as the originators and inheritors of
scientific and technical rationality. What might be taken to constitute
'scientific rationality' became an issue, and an area of some dispute,
during the negotiation of access to fieldwork sites; and it is to this
question that we now move.
iii) The Negotiation of Access 
"The negative responses to the research
proposal themselves became grist to my research
mill". (Feifel, 1963, p. 13)
This is the way Herman Feifel described the various negative but
Illuminating reactions to his proposal to interview dying patients by
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people purporting to protect them. I too found that gaining access was
not merely a technical matter of facilitating the research, it actually
drew attention to important methodological differences between medicine
and sociology and, in the maternity part of the study, spoke
significantly about the way in which some obstetricians and midwives
view pregnant women.
The negotiation of access proved to be more straightforward in Intensive
Care than Obstetrics. In Intensive Care it was possible to make a
direct approach to the Consultant in charge of the Unit. In both
Units, this led to access being granted, although other groups involved
were informed and asked if they had any objections to the research
proceeding; none did.
Gaining access to a Labour Ward proved more complicated. Wendy Savage
(1987) argued that obstetricians are the the most emotional doctors in
existence, making Labour Wards very tense places. She attributed this
to the fact that	 Obstetrics takes you back to your own birth. My
negotiations to gain access to the Labour Ward were certainly tense and
emotional. Nevertheless, the protracted, and at times heated,
negotiations did provide some useful data. Comments were made not just
about the value doctors placed on sociological research and the
boundaries of 'the scientific method', but the level of 'rationality'
of pregnant women came under scruitiny. During negotiations both
obstetricians and midwives at times called into question the validity
of the research because they viewed pregnant or parturient women as
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irrational:
"all pregnant women are hormonal anyway" (Senior Midwife).
"they're not at their most rational" (Paediatrician) - she felt
pregnant women had to be protected against revealing this to other
people (especially social scientists) who might take such information
"and use it as if it were true" (Paediatrician)
This imputation of irrationality to pregnant and parturient women had
obvious implications for their views being taken seriously by health
care professionals or others. If the pregnant or parturient woman is
considered incapable of rational judgement then her views and wishes
may be seen as tainted with irrationality and worth little
consideration. She may thus be treated paternalistically (sic.) rather
in the way of a recalcitrant child. Smith (1981) makes the point (in
relation to infanticide), that although all women are deemed to be
unstable, this is especially the case at times of childbirth.
In addition, one Consultant Obstetrician felt that working class women
would agree to my presence at their labours despite their true wishes
(I did not need to defend this point as another Consultant snapped 'Come
on X, working class women know whether they want someone at their labour
or not!'). The same Consultant later commented: "you'll only get the
views of the middle class women". This again seemed to imply a negative
assessment of the working class, either indicating that working class
women were inarticulate to the point of being unable to communicate or
without opinions; presumably carrying implications for the Consultants
own communications with this group.
To gain access to a Labour Ward, it was necessary simultaneously to
convince the hierarchy of two professions - midwifery and obstetrics -
of the value of the research. In the former, the Director of Midwifery
Services was pivotal. In the latter, all Obstetric Consultants had to
agree individually. This involved attending (in one case more than
once) hospital Research Committee Meetings to argue my case. My
application was vetoed by the midwives at one hospital because I was not
'medically qualified' and so, they argued, 'you won't know what you're
looking at'; and yet this had not been an issue in Intensive Care. It
seemed that obstetrics carried far more politically sensitive overtones.
At the hospital where the research was eventually conducted, the
Research Committee comprised a wide range of representatives from the
medical, nursing, midwifery and paramedical staff. All other research
proposals considered during my attendances were submitted by employees
of the Health Authority who wished to conduct medical or nursing
research.	 I felt very much an 'outsider', although I did enjoy the
support of two of the Consultants, who had agreed by letter prior to the
meeting that their patients might take part if they wished to. One was
the Consultant who had cared for me during my pregnancies. He acted as
something of an unofficial sponsor during the period of negotiation.
In such a multi-disciplinary and hierarchical meeting, the risk of
becoming embroiled in cross-professional politics and Jealousies was
high. At one meeting my research design was used as a vehicle for
further conflict between two of the professional groups present and an
argument broke out along group lines concerning an aspect of the study.
I remained silent not wishing to become involved in a dispute which
obviously had an independent history.
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The area of the research itself, 'social' rather than 'medical', seemed
to be viewed as inherently contentious.	 In terms of social research,
the doctors appeared more favourably disposed to large epidemiological
research projects. They were unhappy that the numbers interviewed would
be small. They questioned my objectivity, especially in relation to
observation; despite the fact that observation is a technique used
constantly within medicine. One Paediatrician said, with some
exasperation, "41/let are you measuring anyway?"	 This led into a debate
about the scientific method within sociology and differing types of
sociological approaches. The thrust of the comments of several of the
medical profession present was that medicine operates on the basis of
'hard' objective data, whilst sociology produces 'soft' subjective data
(again we see the problematic of the subject/object).	 Thus, they
feared that the evidence I would produce would be "anecdotal",
"subjective" and politically sensitive. Such exchanges must be kept in
perspective both emotionally and intellectually.
	
The 'medical'
judgements which doctors see as 'objective' and 'measured' are embedded
in the social relations of the wider society and the paradigmatic and
textual conventions of their own discipline.	 Notwithstanding all
these comments; they agreed in the end that the research should proceed.
Having successfully gained access, I was required to seek the approval
of the relevant District Research Ethical Committees, since I wanted
to interview patients or their relatives. Submissions had to be made
jointly with a Medical Consultant employed in the participating
hospital.	 In all three cases these applications were successful
without the necessity to amend the research design. Initially in
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relation to Obstetrics it was suggested by some members of the Research
Ethical Committee that if I wanted to attend births it might be
necessary for me to obtain the permission of the baby's father. This
suggestion (which was opposed by the Chair of the Committee) was later
withdrawn, in recognition of the difficulties that might be involved in
establishing or contacting the putative father and given the woman's
right, in principle, to have whomever she wishes at the birth of her
baby (if the hospital is agreeable - in fact, the putative father has no
legal right to be present if the woman or the hospital does not wish
it). In relation to one of the Intensive Care submissions (the two were
covered by different Districts), I had to satisfy a representative of
the Ethical Committee that I recognised the sensitive nature of
interviewing bereaved relatives. More generally, in both areas I agreed
to adhere strictly to the length of time agreed for interviews of
hospital staff (generally no longer than three quarters of an hour) and
at one of the Intensive Care Units, I agreed to give written feed-back,
focusing on ex-patients' relatives' reactions to the Unit and
communication issues; which I did.
iv) The Conduct of the Research 
Interviews and observations were carried out for two Intensive Care
Units, reflecting the tendency for Units to have either a Specialised or
General orientation.	 One Consultant Labour Ward was selected, given
that the vast majority of babies are now born in Consultant Units. In
general, comments relating to Intensive Care refer equally to both
Units, where variations exist between the two, specific attention is
drawn to the fact. Quotations from staff or relatives from the
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respective Units are attributed to that Unit for purposes of information
only (and not necessarily for comparative purposes unless this is
specifically alluded to). Observations and interviews with Intensive
Care staff took three months on average to complete in each Unit. The
ex-patient relatives' interviews went on beyond this time and were
eventually completed in tandem with the Obstetric research. The
Obsetrics research entailed about eight months in the field. All
fieldwork was conducted between January 1989 and October 1990.	 This
was prior to the House of Commons' Health Committee's Second Report
(1992) on the Maternity Services which recommends a move towards home
births and a wider role for midwives. The vast majority of the
interviews were tape recorded.	 All tapes were transcribed verbatim.
I constructed open-ended questionnaire (See Appendix I) for all the
groups interviewed (See Appendix II) and used them in practice as
interview schedules. This allowed me the flexibility to follow-up
emergent data. I spent, therefore, varying amounts of time on
individual topics with different interviewees, in terms of follow-up
questions. I also built-up more rapport with some interviewees than
others, since interviewing is a social situation with its own set of
social relations.
I particularly wanted the research to include interviews with maternity
patients and ITU relatives (I did not attempt to interview ex-ITU
patients, since the majority remember little of ITU - see Asbury, 1985),
since I wanted to explore their perceptions and I wished to avoid
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merely objectifying the relatives by reflecting them only through the
eyes of professionals, including myself. This is related to the
methodological endeavour to retain an emphasis on the 'subject' and
'experience' as a route to theory.
Parallel to the interview data, I also carried out observation, and on
the Labour Ward a certain amount of participant observation, for
example, helping in basic care and emotional support of the labouring
woman and assisting the staff in various minor ways. 	 Participant
observation, whilst a mainstay of ethnographic procedure has seldom been
used exclusively, usually being employed in combination with other
approaches.	 In addition I collected relevant documentary material
where appropriate, for example, the written guidelines used on the
Labour Ward by medical and midwifery staff. I also kept a fieldwork
journal, which I maintained with varying amounts of diligence throughout
the research. Spradley (1979) suggests this should contain experiences,
ideas, fears, mistakes, confusions, breakthroughs and problems that
arise during fieldwork and this broadly relects what I wrote about,
The Obstetric interviews: I approached selected patients (see Appendix
III) in the Antenatal Clinic, explained briefly the purpose of the
research and said I would give more information should they decide to
take part. The vast majority agreed. Reasons given for non-
participation included, previous stillbirth, moving to another
town/hospital. A small number merely said they would prefer not to take
part and gave no reason. The women approached were those who were
'normal' (according to Obstetric definitions). Therefore, there was no
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'medical' reason to suppose they might not expect, and be expected by
staff, to have a 'normal' (vaginal, non-instrumental delivery) - I
wanted to see what sort of expectations such 'normal' women held and how
they were treated in labour.
Initial interviews were conducted when the women were between twenty-
eight and thirty-four weeks pregnant. By the twenty-eighth week the
'fetus' is 'viable' and I interviewed the women when they arrived for
what was usually their second antenatal check-up. I usually interviewed
between the time the women were weighed/urine tested and their seeing
the doctor. This period represented the longest wait for the women and
some seemed glad of the diversion, although I had to offer firm-
assurances that they would not miss their turn. My relationship with
the clinic staff was good, so this was not a problem. The interviews,
conducted in a private interview room, lasted twenty to thirty minutes.
At the first interview I asked if I could attend the birth. This
question formed a sub-section on the consent form which the Research
Ethical Committee required every patient to sign before the interview
proceeded (See Appendix IV). 	 I made it clear that I would still
welcome their involvement whether I attended the birth or not. In
retrospect, it would have been preferable to have had separate consent
forms relating to permission to observe the labour as opposed to a
willingness to take part in the research. This would have made it quite
clear that the two issues were completely separate and also I could have
waited until the end of the interview before asking to attend the
birth; by which time, hopefully, a greater rapport had been established.
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I found it a rather humbling experience asking women if I could attend
the birth of their child; I felt I was asking a lot. Some of their
replies made me feel even more humble (although they do feed into the
tendency of women to be apologetic), one 18 year old woman commented:
"Yes, if you want to. If you don't mind. It might not be very nice for
you." Women in agreement were seen again (at the Clinic), in the form
of a contact interview involving a brief, informal chat about their
continued progress and feelings about the forthcoming labour. I checked
that they still felt happy that I attend the birth.
Nearly half the women agreed to my attendance at their child's birth.
In practice the following occured:
OUTCOME OF REQUEST (IN ADVANCE) TO ATTEND LABOUR 
Response
Initially	 Agreed	 .0	
..	
0.	 ft	 00 .0 .. .. .	 . 14
Refused	 ..	 ..	 ..	 .•	 .0	 0. ft 00 60 06 16
Following Initial Agreement
Changed their mind when they went into labour 0. 04 00 .. 7
Hospital telephoned me but were unable to contact me .0 $6 $d 4
Attended the labour and delivery* .. 	 ..	 ..	 .0 .0 f6 00 2
Arrived at the hospital post-delivery	 ..	 .. 66 .. 00 04 1
*I also attended ten 'top-up' labours - defined and described later.
Thus, half the women who initially consented to my attendance, changed
their minds when they actually went into labour. 	 At the post-natal
interview, the main explanations given were either that they felt more
self-conscious in labour than they had anticipated or that it felt more
of an ordeal (more painful or more traumatic) than they had expected and
did not want more people than absolutely necessary to be present.
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_Of the seven cases where I was telephoned, on four occasions the
hospital could not reach me. In three of these cases I simply did not
hear the telephone downstairs when it rang during the middle of the
night. A bed-side extension was installed, One delivery took place
while I was away for the weekend (despite telephoning the Labour Ward
twice, the labour was a quick one and took place during the intervening
hours). In retrospect, given the 'on call' nature ot this situation,
and the fact that babies rountinely arrive two weeks either side of
their projected delivery date, it would have been preferable had I
borrowed or hired a 'bleep' which I could have carried about with me
during the research.
One woman whose birth I failed to attend had me telephoned on several
occasions during the labour and when I saw her post-natally seemed
genuinely sorry I had missed the event, which she described as
'ecstatic'. Another said her husband had been ill in hospital when she
went into labour, since the Labour Ward was busy and she was labouring
'normally', she was left alone for long periods. She said she would
have welcomed my presence to give her support. Another said she had
felt "upset" when the staff could not contact me. I felt, therefore,
that where the women had not reversed their initial decision, there was
a considerable degree of commitment to my presence.
The hospital staff succeeded in contacting me on only three occasions
and even then I managed to attend only two of the labours. In the third
case I left home within ten minutes of notification, travelled the
forty minutes journey to the hospital and still arrived ten minutes
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after the baby was delivered. I walked into the delivery room to be
greeted by the new mother with the words: 'I'm sorry!'.
There were other logistical difficulties too. Women were frequently
admitted in labour in the middle of the night, when this happened I
could not travel by public transport. 	 Labours often end in the middle
of the night, so that I had to be sure I had private transport home or I
had to spend the rest of the night at the hospital. In addition, as a
woman, I was not prepared to risk my own personal security by travelling
alone on public transport at times when I would not be prepared to do so
in my non-work life.	 This was doubly complicated, since I had to be
sure my own children were cared for during such periods and that the
car, if not myself, was available to take them to school or child-
minder.
The 'agreed' labours I succeeded in attending gave me the opportunity
to observe and record first-hand labours and deliveries that would later
be described to me; so allowing some comparison of the two accounts.
The post-natal interview started with the woman describing in detail her
labour and birth experience. This resulted in a narrative - a' birth
story'. This seemed desirable, in that Ardener (1978) has argued that
women's experiences are especially resistant to depiction through
'answer-size' pieces of information, while Graham (1984, p.118) argues
that the use of narrative, which she terms 'story telling' allows
informants: ". . . to participate as subjects as well as objects" and
avoids ". . . the tendency of surveys to fracture women's experience."
(Graham, 1984, p. 119). Narrative is also especially fruitful in
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suggesting supplementary questions. Narrative was also elicited by one
of the prompts in the midwife interviews: "Can you tell me about the
last labour you attended?" (and Intensive Care nurses: "Can you describe
to me what you did on your last shift?").	 This resulted in a concrete
description rather than an abstract appraisal of their work.	 I had
considered using the diary-interview method (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977)
to capture such information but decided this entailed too much 'work'
(note-keeping) for my interviewees.
During labours, I sat wherever in the delivery room seemed suitable,
having consulted those present. Later I ran errands or became involved
to the extent I judged appropriate (taking into account my relationship
with the woman, demeanour of the midwife, and so on). I took notes
during the labour which I completed later if I became more actively
involved. On several occasions I was asked by staff to wear a theatre
gown as they felt this made me 'less conspicuous'.
From the beginning it was clear that, given the logistics, I would only
succeed in attending a proportion of the labours of women who had agreed
to this in advance. It was necessary, therefore, to observe other
labours where I would not meet or interview the women before or
afterwards. These births, nevertheless, gave me further insights into
the working of the department and the management of labour. I could,
therefore, view this information alongside the accounts of other labours
by mothers and midwives.
My attendance at such 'top-up' labours (ten) usually took place when the
Labour Ward was too busy for midwives to be interviewed. The attending
midwife would convey my request to be present to the woman. I decided
that I would only get involved in a 'top-up' labour if I knew I could
follow it through and stay for the delivery, otherwise I felt it was
.
unfairly disruptive to the mother, to build-up rapport, show interest
and then leave prematurely. This meant, if necessary, being prepared to
spend the night at the hospital (this often, therefore, precluded my
involvement in such labours). On one such occasion when I had stayed at
a labour into the early hours of the morning, I was offered a spare bed
in the Observation Department to sleep the rest of the night. I note in
my Journal that it is strangely disorientating to wake-up in bed in the
Maternity Hospital where one has given birth and not have produced a
baby; both a liberation and a sadness.
During observation of labours, several midwives, trying to 'make sense'
of my presence, even when told I was 'a medical sociologist', enquired:
"But do you know the couple socially then?" or "Have you met them
before?". Usually I had not but then, in the majority of the cases
neither had the midwife. And yet, their question seemed to be asserting
that it would have been more culturally appropriate for a prior
relationship to have existed. Although I too was there in a
professional capacity, this often <initially at any rate) did not seem
entirely credible to the midwife. This is partly, of course, that they
think that health care professionals have more business attending births
than sociologists but, nevertheless, the criteria and values reflected
are, interestingly, ones they do not fulfil themselves. To the midwife
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who had Just come on shift with the labouring woman's cervix at 9 cms.
dilated, I resisted the inclination, when asked "Do you know the
couple?", to reply: "Better than you do"; I, at least, had been with
them for several hours.
Witnessing birth, even on television, always makes me want to cry. The
fact that I have given birth myself has made me more not less tearful in
this situation so that, I was rather wary of bursting into tears when
the baby arrived and being Judged (within this culture) unprofessional.
I note from my journal that one of the first births I attended did leave
me with tears in my eyes. I suddenly became aware that the Senior House
Officer (S.H.0.) was watching me very intently. Fortunately, he
obviously thought it was 'touching' because he was smiling and studying
me closely. When he saw I was aware of his gaze he looked somewhat
embarrassed himself, seemed as if he was about to say something and
then looked away. I suppose he had seen many births. This had been a
delivery by rotational forceps; a difficult maneouvre with the baby
apparently in a particularly unfavourable position, requiring the
Registrar to be supervised by the Senior Registrar. Perhaps the S.H.O.
had experienced it as a resolution of a medical crisis but he was aware
I had become caught-up in the parent's experience of their new baby. I
felt he might consider this 'unprofessional' until I realised that he
W86 probably looking at me with the same expression that I was looking
at the new parents; he was caught-up in my experience of them.
A selection of patients of all Obstetric Consultants in the hospital
(except one, who did not wish her patients to particpate - no reason
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given) took part in the research. I regularly checked the Admissions
Book on the Labour Ward to discover when the labours I was not due to
attend took place. I then (where possible) telephoned to make a home
interview appointment (interviews lasted between half an hour and an
hour). Where women did not have a telephone, I called without an
appointment, since I had found in the ITU research that, people do not
respond well to being asked (by letter) to initiate a contact time
themselves. As far as possible, I interviewed women three weeks
following the birth. I chose this time-lapse because memories of the
birth are still fresh but some domestic organisation has been possible,
hopefully making an interview not too disruptive.
Interviewing in the home proved highly time-consuming (both mothers and
ex-patient relatives). The maternity interviews were scattered
throughout various suburbs of a large city but the time-dictate of
conducting interviews 3 weeks post-delivery, meant that women who lived
relatively close to each other, usually could not be interviewed on the
same day. Added to which, the 'unannounced' calls at the houses of
those without telephones were usually fruitless - in some cases numerous
return visits were necessary. In addition, some neighbourhoods I
visited raised concern for personal safety.	 Interviews in high-rise
flats, which were partially derelict with boarded-up windows, deserted
walk-ways, graffiti and missing or defaced information boards,
presented me, particularly as a woman, with some worry in terms of
assured safe-access.
Midwives were interviewed on a one-to-one basis in a room adjacent to
the Labour Ward.	 Interviews were not arranged in advance because
workflow was unpredictable. I would interview whoever was free;;
sometimes no-one was available. It was necessary to be infinitely
flexible. I interviewed all levels of qualified midwives. Interviews
lasted approximately forty-five minutes.
Interviews with consultants, lasting approximately one hour, were
arranged in advance and took place in their offices.
In the Intensive Care, relatives were chosen (see Appendix V.) using
Intensive Care Admission and Discharge Books. There were a number of
problems with this approach. For example, all the information I needed
was not necessarily recorded. At the second research site the next of
kin and their telephone number was not shown. 	 I eventually located
these details on the computerized hospital patient information system.
I intentially included a proportion of bereaved relatives <to the extent
that they reflected the death rates in the Units), in order to address
the full range of research issues. Studies within the sociology of
dying (for example, Field,1989) suggest that between three and six
months is the optimum time to interview bereaved relatives, for example,
this is the conventionally accepted point at which bereavement
counfelling begins, and all such interviews fell within this time
period.
Prospective interviewees were contacted by letter. Four types of letter
were constructed (dependent upon whether the patient survived and
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whether the relative had a telephone: See Appendix VI). Where
possible, I said I would telephone within the 'next few days' but that
they should not feel any obligation to take part in the resarch if they
would prefer not to. 	 I adopted this strategy to keep the initiative, in
order to guarantee some momentum and, indeed, where I made contact by
letter only (no telephone), few accepted my invitation to telephone me
at the University. When they did, this too proved problematic. I was
rarely in the Department to receive calls, since I was largely out doing
fieldwork. Despite indicating that prospective respondents might
telephone and asking office staff if they would mind recording details,
one departmental secretary told relatives: "She doesn't work here.
She doesn't come in very often. She's only a student." I explained to
her, this made my task rather difficult, since I was seeking to build up
their confidence in me as someone they could trust with their feelings
about a life-crisis and she seemed to be conveying notions of
inexperience and casual attachment.
In the cases where the patient had survived (and was not a minor), the
Research Ethical Commitees required their agreement that their relative
take part in the research; none objected. Relatives were interviewed
either at the hospital (in a private interview room) or in their own
homes; in the majority of cases it was possible to give them a choice of
these two locations. Five of the interviews were conducted by telephone
(by prior arrangement), as a result of financial constraints on my part
concerning long distance travel. 	 Interviews lasted between thirty and
forty- five minutes.
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Interviews with the Intensive Care nurses (lasting approximately thirty
- forty-five minutes) were not pre-arranged, in view of the fluctuating
workload. Given, that the Units were usually full to capacity and that
sometimes several patients were particularly unstable (even by ITU
standards), on numerous occasions I was unable to do any interviews at
all. At such times, where possible, I carried-out observation.
Interviews with Consultant staff, lasting approximately one hour, were
pre-arranged and conducted in their offices. Interviews with other
medical staff on the Units were conducted on the basis of availability.
Both ITU's allowed me free access to their Units (I had researched in
one of the Units five years previously) but suggested that I carry out
observations from the Central Nursing Station, Had I sat at the
bedside, in addition to being (possibly) in the way if treatment was
taking place, this might have raised issues of informed consent, where
patients' relatives might have needed to agree to my bedside presence
(the semi-conscious or unconscious patient would have been unable to
give such permission and this in itself raises possible ethical
dilemmas). Furthermore, to have spoken to nurses at the bedside about
the patient or treatment, since the working assumption in Intensive Care
is that the patient may be able to hear what is being said even if they
do not appear conscious, would also have been problematic. My position
at the Central Nursing Station, however, allowed me to listen to
conversations at that location and gave me a vantage point from which to
view the whole Unit. The extent to which screens were put round
patients either while they were treated or if there was a particular
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crisis varied between the Units (screens were used less in the
Specialised Unit). Observation afforded me the opportunity to observe
the work organisation of the Ward and staff/patient, staff/relative,
staff/staff, patient/relative, and patient/staff (where patients were
conscious) interactions. Telephone calls were also conducted from the
Central Nursing Station both with other professionals and with outside
relatives; so that these were audible to me. The staff changeover
reports also took place at this location.
During observations in ITU I witnessed cardiac arrests and 'brain dead'
patients. On the Labour Ward I attended a considerable number of
labours and births; with attendant Joys and crises. Ethical dilemmas
are present in all research but since this study concerns the use of
medical technology around the major life events of birth and death, it
addresses an area where people are potentially highly vulnerable. Birth
is seen to be associated with pain and sexuality and is seldom
unpackaged in detail publically. Death poses even more of a threat.
People often engage in the denial of death, and pain, as aspects of the
human condition. Pain is probably, ultimately, more feared than death,
in fact, death is sometimes viewed positively when it is seen as a
release from pain. This research is, therefore, located firmly in the
realms of the taboo subject (see Feifel, 1963). It may place the
researcher at the emotional cutting-edge of life. The next section,
therefore, considers research ethics and, in particular, feminist
research ethics. In so doing, it will develop the theme of the
subject(ive)/object(ive) problematic and relate this to the power
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relations ol the research act which constructs women/interviewees as
either 'subjects' or 'objects' in the research process.
v) Research Ethics - where to 'draw the line' 
At times it was neither realistic nor desirable to 'keep my distance'
from people assisting this research. From my 'journal' I note:
Sitting holding someone's hand while they tell you about how their
husband died in Intensive Care is not just a research situation, it is a
human situation. So is taking them for a cup of tea afterwards and
chatting to them in more general terms, to move them away from talking
about their crisis. During this research I have been kissed by women
whose births I have attended. I have been kissed by fathers in the
first flush of parenthood. I have been kissed by a woman whose
desperately ill husband eventually survived Intensive Care, We had
spent what turned out to be most of the afternoon in the sun on her
terrace with tea and cake, discussing what had been one of the greatest
crises of her life. She insisted on driving me to the station and
kissed me goodbye as I left. I have helped wipe women's faces in
labour. I have taken photographs of their new babies for them. I have
on occasion supported their legs while they tried to push out the baby
(only one midwife being present and no birth partner). I have held
labouring women's hands and offered comfort and encouragement along with
everyone else. How could one do otherwise when spending long hours
together in this most intimate of situations? I've wondered about my
own Insurance position when I've been left alone with a woman in second
stage whose baby was displaying signs of fetal distress. I've answered
endless questions about the research. I have answered, where I've felt
able, many questions about birth and childcare and have referred them
elsewhere when this seemed more appropriate. In post natal interviews I
have recommended possible remedies for cracked nipples and sleepless
babies! I've answered numerous questions about my own babies, my own
births and about myself. In the Delivery Room, I've turned on taps to
stimulate women's bladders, run errands for birth partners, been sent by
midwives to call for paediatricians, answered telephones and, at times,
become extremely anxious about the outcome of labour."
However, positivist sociology cautions against what is termed
'overrapport' (Moser, 1958, p.187). What was I to make of this in the
context of researching major life events and where was I to 'draw the
line' in order to maintain the integrity of all concerned?
Stanley and Wise (1990, p23) have suggested five aspects which must be
addressed in a feminist epistomology:
: the researcher-researched relationship;
: emotion as a research experience;
: the intellectual autobiography of the researcher;
: managing the differing 'realities' and understandings of the
researcher and the researched;
: the complex question of power in research and writings;
In this section, I now propose to address these issues in more detail.
Just before the ITU interviewing started I experienced some trepidation.
I had never interviewed ITU patients' relatives before, added to which,
some of whom would be recently bereaved. I had never interviewed 'the
bereaved'. I was also very threatened by the thought of becoming
involved in observation which might involve child-death. During
previous ITU research I had no children; now that I had, given the
identification this afforded, I was not sure how I would cope.	 Feifel
(1963, p.13) researching 'the dying' commented:
0 . . • another facet of work in this area - the researcher's own
sensibilities about dying and death. One's own willingness to face or
avoid the thought of death can be a relevant variable in the ensuing
data. Few undertakings in psychological research, I think, are more
emotionally exacting."
In the event, I was not confronted with child-death but I did talk to
ITU staff about this in order to 'air' my feelings. They were very
responsive. Child-death is, not suprisingly, one of the areas which
causes most distress for Unit staff too.
.
At its worst, ITU can, in a sense, feel like a war zone. If, as in one
case, the patient is a young girl and she has had both her legs
amputated at the knees and several fingers amputated too, the results
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can seem very like a war injury. To push the analogy further, the
researcher in the role of observer and documenter of so much grief and
suffering can feel rather like a war correspondent. The fact that my
role in ITU was confined to observer and documenter (in Obstetrics it
was not), meant that I provided no practical help, which could at times
leave one exposed to fears of neo-voyerism. I felt, however, I had
learned an important lesson in previous ITU research:-
A young girl had been brought into the Unit unconscious having left for
school earlier that day obstensively in good health. A brain haemorrage
was suspected. The first her parents knew about this was when they were
summonded to the ITU. I was sitting observing at the Central Nursing
Station when they arrived and took up their distraught vigil beside
their daughter. The curtains were not drawn round them and their degree
of distress was such that I felt I could no longer remain seated nearby;
especially not while taking notes. I got up and left and went off the
Unit into the nearby staff kitchen. I arrived there to find the Nursing
Auxiliary from the Unit in tears about this situation. I made her a cup
of tea and tried to console her; at this point, unsolicited, she talked
at length (in effect emotionally unburdening herself) about the major
impact of child death on the Unit. It was then that I realised that I
had not stopped collecting data.
It was clear that I could not get myself off the ethical 'hook' Just by
mounting an impulsive, ill-thought out retreat.
Although the research had been vetted by hospital Research Ethical
Committees, I felt a great deal of personal responsibility when the time
came to contact patients' relatives. It was not Just a question of
remote and abstract 'ethics' but the overwhelming feeling that these
people had been through enough distress. The last thing I wanted to do
was to add to it.	 Further ethnical worries around contacting relatives
arose because several of the ex-ITU patients had died following
discharge from the Unit; either on the Ward or at home. Since at the
first site I gained contact information exlusively from the ITU Ward
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Book I had no way of detecting this and on occasion contacted relatives
of people who had by that time died. I was naturally very concerned to
avoid this thereafter and at second Unit I cross-checked with the
computerized hospital patient information system that the patient at
least left hospital alive.	 This underlines an important point:
Intensive Care is concerned with seeing a patient through a severe
medical crisis; the patient may not survive in the longer term. Where /
knew the relative to be bereaved I constructed the contact letter
especially carefully (Appendix VII), closing with the comment:-
"Finally, may I say, that I hope that you do not object to my writing to
you in this way and that this letter has not in any way added to your
distress. We did consider the situation very carefully before
contacting bereaved relatives and if you feel we took the wrong decision
in contacting you please accept our sincere apologies."
Furthermore, making contact and finding the potential interviewee
bereaved was not confined to Intensive Care. In Obstetrics, where I
had not attended the labour, I checked the Labour Ward Admissions Book
for birth details. I telephoned one woman, only to find that her baby
had died before discharge from hospital.	 I felt mortified by this
experience; the baby's funeral was planned for the following day and I
had telephoned to arrange to talk about his birth. The exchange that
followed may best be described as 'mother-to-mother'. I fail to see
what help orthodox interviewing techniques could contribute to dealing
with this situation.
Ethical questions unrelated to bereavement also presented themselves
around the interview-situation:
One woman interviewed post-natally appeared to have been physically
assulted. The bruises, around her eyes and nose, were fairly old and
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turning yellow.	 She did not refer to the bruises. 	 She was not on
the telephone and I had, therefore, called unannounced. 	 She was very
unhappy about her birth experience and how it had been handled by
hospital staff. I had to decide whether to raise the question of the
bruises with her. I felt I could only ethically defend doing this if I
felt I could improve the situation in some way.
In the end I did not mention them, although I tried to give her every
opportunity to do so. While she tended the baby, I helped dress her
toddler and asked about the birth. Apart from this being a response to
his bringing clothes and shoes to me, I felt this helped render me
accessible if she wanted to talk. I made this decision for a number of
reasons.	 She made comments that suggested she was not socially
Isolated and did not appear depressed. Her other small child and the
baby both appeared well-cared for. A new baby would mean she would have
contact with a Health Visitor either because she attended a Baby Clinic
or had failed to do so. I felt that she had agreed only to my entering
her home to talk about the birth of her second child. In so doing, I
felt she was already giving me an insight into a very personal part of
her life.	 I had also entered into an agreement with the Research
Ethical Committee that I would stay within a certain framework of
questioning and conduct. I was also aware that I entered her house as a
middle class woman, and by age and association with the hospital
potentially an authority figure (especially to a working class 18 year
old). She was in her nightdress; I arrived with a brief case - this
seemed to underline the inequality between us in terms of power (see
Oakley, 1981b; Finch, 1984). I, therefore, felt I should respect her
silence on this issue.
Another moral dilemma arose when / interviewed the mother of a five
month old baby who had been in Intensive Care:
It was an incredibly hot day when I arrived mid-morning to find the
mother asleep on the settee with the curtains drawn, the fire on and the
baby in a bouncing cradle in front of the television. The mother had
three other children. She told me in the course of the interview that
they had all been in Intensive Care at some point. 	 The mother smoked
throughout the interview despite the fact that the baby had respiratory
problems and given that the room was already airless and unbearably hot.
I became alarmed when she said that the baby had on occasion again
stopped breathing (the reason for his previous admission). She said she
had 'smacked him' to make him breathe again. (She recounted this as
part of a story about passers-by wondering why she was hitting her
baby.) I asked if she had subsequently taken him to a doctor; she had
not. She said she might mention it at his next Clinic appointment in
two weeks time. I said I thought she should take the baby to her G.P.
Afterwards, I decided to break the guarantee of anonymity and
confidentiality given to the mother and I spoke in confidence to the
Director of the Intensive Care Unit asking his advice. We agreed that
he contact the Consultant Paediatrician in charge of the case and it
was arranged that the baby's G.P. call at the house, ostensibly with a
routine enquiry about how the baby was progressing.
It is undeniable that I am making value judgements and engaging in
uncomfortable moral decisions here. I cannot claim that they are the
'correct' decisions and they are certainly not the only possible
'solutions'. In both cases a decision had to be made: whether I should
go beyond the boundaries of the social researcher role and indeed to
decide, what were the boundaries (see Oakley, 1981b). Deciding
unquestioningly to do nothing would not have been a neutral act. In the
first case I felt, on balance, it was in the interests of the mother I
should not comment on her bruises or break our agreement of
confidentiality by contacting an outside Agency. In the second case,
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I felt it was necessary to act as an advocate for the child who seemed
to me potentially at risk through his mother's inactivity. This evokes
Becker's famous question: 'Whose side are we on?' (Becker, 1967 - see
also Gouldner, 1973; Barnes 1979) and illustrates that at times it may
be impossible or undesirable to 'sit on the fence' either during
fieldwork or in writing-up research,
These examples, specify the more general ethical question of the power
relationship between the interviewer and interviewee. 	 The interviewer
tends to have more power than the interviewee.	 However, this is
mediated by the social relations of the wider society and where in those
relations the participants may be located.	 In some cases the
interviewee may be of higher social status with greater power than the
interviewer: class, gender and race are all relevant (see Scott, 1984;
Smart 1984). In general, however, the situation tends to be the reverse
and the social status and situational power of the (usually white)
middle class interviewer is greater than that of the interviewee.
	 The
interviewer sets the basic agenda and usually initiates and terminates
the interview. The interviewer determines the questions. The
interviewee can refuse to answer, although this in itself takes some
self-confidence (this again depends on the relative social status of the
Interviewer/Interviewee in wider society). The interviewee can, of
course, seek to fudge or mislead and, in any case, still holds the
discretion about how they actually answer the questions. 	 At the end
of the day, the interviewee does not own the data and, for example,
Stanley and Wise (1983) suggest that it is the production of written
texts that gives (feminist) researchers ultimate power over their
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research subjects. The interviewee should therefore, have some rights
and the interviewer some responsibilities.
At the outset the interviewee should be told the aims of the research
and how it is anticipated the data will be used. They should be told
roughly what areas will be covered in the interview, roughly how long it
will last, where it will be held, who will be present, how the data will
be recorded and what will happen to the record (for example, whether
tapes will continue to exist after transcription and who will listen to
them) and whether there will be more than one interview. They should
be guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity at all levels of the
analysis. They should be told, in other words, what they are letting
themselves in for. Any questions about the research or the researcher
should, as far as possible, be answered. 	 They should have reason to
feel they can trust the interviewer and have confidence in their
professionalism and sensitivity not to abuse the situation;
particularly if the interview material itself is of an intimate and
'high risk' nature. Since this research fell into that category, I
tried to ensure that interviewees discussing major life events felt as
comfortable, interesting and valued as possible. Interviewing ex- ITU
relatives, it was almost a question of providing a 'safe environment'
in which they felt free to talk. I also tried to ensure that the
interviewee did not appear to get out of their emotional depth.
The maternity research involved multiple interviews, leading to the
increased possibility of emotional involvement between interviewer and
Interviewee. Laslett and Rapoport (1975) view the repeated-interview
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situation as especially 'interactive' and 'collaborative', requiring a
more developed relationship between interviewer and interviewee. I felt
similarly, that detachment on my part may lead to a termination of the
womens' on-going commitment to the research. However, such intimacy may
lead to exploitation.	 Oakley (1981b) argues that ethical dilemmas
are most acute when there is least social distance between interviewer
and interviewee; particularly between women interviewing where a special
trust and identification may arise (see also, Stacey, 1983; Finch 1984).
The majority of my interviewees were women, so I had to bear this in
mind, particularly with those giving birth from whom, in principle, I
had the least social distance.	 Hobson (1978), Oakley (1981b) and
Finch (1984) all report being located as a woman by women interviewees,
who elicited personal information and used this to relate to them along
the woman-to-woman dimension:
". • • being 'placed' as a woman has the additional dimension of
shared structural position and personal identification which is, in my
view, central to the special character of the woman-to-women interview."
(Finch, 1984, p.78)
From my observations and midwives' comments, maternity patients also
sought to 'place' them in this way, often asking questions, such as
"Are you married?", "Do you have any children?" Does this mean that the
closer the woman's identification with the midwife as a woman, the
greater the potential for exploitation too? Was this identification a
safeguard or a potential hazard?
Finch's contention (1984, p.85) concerning the identification of women:
n . . • the basis upon which the information has been given is the trust
placed in one woman by another" (Finch, 1984, p.85),
does not, I feel, describe the interviewing of women as I experienced
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it. Certainly, the woman-to-woman element was significant but it was
not the only dimension to the exchange. Age, class, culture and race
are also factors which may create solidarity or barriers and inhibit or
promote identification (see, for example, Walby, 1986, Ramazanoglu, 1989
and Stanley, 1990b, on the differences between women); whereas Finch,
(1984, p.78), stresses women's "shared structural position". Although I
believe all women are oppressed by patriarchial structures and
individual men, they are not all oppressed in exactly the same way or to
exactly the same extent and the amount of power varies between women, as
does the amount of power women have over other women. Their
identification with the woman interviewer will not, therefore, be a
'complete' identification; there are likely to be some elements between
the two that will promote social distance. Furthermore, the women were
aware and, I believe, continued to be aware on some level that I was a
social researcher <this was after all my introductory status) and women
are capable of some circumspection in social situations - they are not
hapless victims of possible manipulation. Like McRobbie (1982) I feel
that there is no reason why the research process has to be exploitative
of its subjects.
Although recognising the potential for exploitation in close
identification between the interviewer and interviewee along the 'woman-
dimension', Finch (1984, p.79) notes that in order to gain maximum
identification:
n . . . the interviewer has to be prepared to expose herself to being
'placed' as a woman and to establish that she is willing to be treated
accordingly."
Risks and trust are to some extent an issue, on both sides. This makes
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for a more equal relationship and as Oakley (1981b), Duelli Klein (1983)
Du Bois (1983) Miles (1983) Reinharz (1983), Stanley and Wise (1983),
have argued, research strategies which avoid creating a hierarchical
relationship between interviewer and interviewee are particularly
appropriate for a feminist interviewing women. This directly
contradicts:
". . . the paradigm of the 'proper' interview (which) appeals to such
values as objectivity, detachment, hierarchy and 'science'. .
(Oakley, 1981b, p.38)
Completing the field-work does not complete the circle of ethical
dilemmas, we are now confronted with: 'Whom are we writing for?'
(Roberts, 1984) when we describe our research findings. 	 There is also
the exploitative potential that the researcher may lose control over the
data and the way they are used; resulting in it being employed against
the best interests of those interviewed (Morgan 1972, Finch 1984 and
Roberts 1984). Thus, Finch (1984, p.83) comments:
"The sociologist who produces work about women, therefore, has a special
responsibility to anticipate whether it could be interpreted and used in
ways quite different from her own interpretations".
Within this research there are implications for the treatment of women
in labour.
	 In Intensive Care there is great sensitivity and contention
around withdrawal of active support, brain-death and organ
transplantation (for example, a 'Panorama' programme on brain death,
October 1980, led many people to rip-up their organ donar cards).
Furthermore, media depiction of research findings may not always be
accurate (see Morgan, 1972) and may lead to complaints from those who
participated in the research. Stanley (1990b, p.12) argues that
feminists should address the 'conditions of women in sexist society' and
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that the feminist writer should be located within her script, while Du
Bois (1983, p.108) argues for a "passionate (feminist) scholarship". At
a practical level, it would be reasonable to feed positively into
debates about policies and practice in the areas concerned.
Dissemination through health care professional journals allows good
access to that readership. 	 More generally, sociology should be
concerned with a radical critique (Gouldner, 1973) and
political praxis (Stanley and Wise, 1990).
It seems entirely reasonable that Bell and Encel (1978, p.4) conclude
that social science is not "like it is presented and prescribed in those
(standard social science) texts. It is infinitely more complex, messy,
various and much more interesting." Women being interviewed by women
may, as commentators describe, increase their vulnerability in some ways
but it is also a protection, since, potentially it reduces their chances
of being mis-understood or mis-represented. It also protects against
the gender social relations of wider society being replicated in the
interview situation.	 Oakley (1981b) talks of the male-myth of the
hygienic scientific interview with the accompanying mystification of the
researcher and the researched as objective instruments of data
production. In practice, the power relationships built intomany
'textbook interviewing techniques' <for example, Goode and Hatt, 1952)
keep the interviewee not only at a distance but at a disadvantage.
Thus:
"The commitment is to a sociology in which women are subjects and not
objects in the research process; a sociology which enlightens and
emancipates (Graham, 1984, p.122)
This applies equally to women as researchers as to the women with whom
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they engage in the research act. Women researchers should not allow
themselves to be objectified into an instrument of data collection;
forced into an alienated male form. Feminist researchers should resist
this appropriation of their contribution and pursue a methodology which
enlightens and emancipates themselves as women as well as their
interviewees. Thus employing:
H . 
• • a sociology which places a particular emphasis on experience and
subjectivity as the route to theory. The questions we ask of women
relate to our own lives as women. . ." (Graham, 1984, p123)
This chapter has considered the methods and methodology employed in this
study, together with the politics of the negotiation of access. In the
next chapter I shall examine the origins and background assumptions of
the medical model - which arose earlier in this chapter during access
negotiations, in the guise of a critique of qualitative research
methods. The implications of the medical model for medical methods and
technology will be addressed and the theme of the subject-object
problematic will again be raised - this time in relation to the medical
model and the scientific method in the 'natural' sciences. Its
theoretical implications will then be considered in terms of medical
practice and technological implementation in Intensive Care and the
Labour Ward.
CHAPTER 3 
THE MEDICAL MODEL AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
"Are biology and chemistry and physics an adequate,
appropriate and complete basis for a science of
healing human beings? If not, what is the basis 	 (0r
what are the limitations) of scientific medicine?"
Ehrenreich (1978, p.30)
In this chapter I want to look in more depth at the origins and
development of the subject-object problematic in the scientific model
on which medicine is based; and the implications this has for Intensive
and Maternity Care. Before that, it may be useful to outline the major
features of the medical model.
The medical model is typified by a dualistic, positivistic approach
which systematically over-values one type of knowledge whilst de-
valuing another. It emphasises the physical nature of sickness and
disease, precluding a central focus on experience, feelings, emotions or
the patient's interpretations of events, which it holds to be
subjective. Hart (1985) has identified five aspects of the medical
model used by doctors, in summary:
1. A concern with the organic appearances of disease, ignoring or
dismissing the link between mind and body, between physical and mental
well-being (even psychiatry is seen predominantly to seek organic
causes).
2. A concern to cure which, in practice, is often impossible. Hart
links this with a 'conjuring trick orientation', shared by religion and
magic. The patient tends to have a considerable emotional involvement
with this dimension.
3. Disease is seen as a temporary condition (in practice, often it is
not), almost superimposed on the patient.
4. An individual focus is taken, an emphasis on the isolated
individual.
5. The medical environment, i.e. the hospital, is the best place for
treatment.
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Medical technology is linked to all aspects. "A concern with the
organic appearance of disease. . •" (1), suggests that it can be
observed visually either photographed (by X-rays, gamma cameras and so
on) or measured by electronic monitoring devices and visually displayed
numerically. A concern with "cure" (2), may lead the patient to make a
considerable emotional investment not only in the doctor but in medical
technology to provide salvation from life-threatening disease or trauma.
(I would further argue that where cure cannot be effected, medical
technology can assist in absolution, in that, "they tried everything.")
Since disease is seen as "almost super-imposed" (3), this makes it
observable and measurable in some sense 'apart' from the patient;
medical technology is central to this surveillance and quantification.
Medical technology may also be seen to reflect an "individual focus"
(4), in that it concentrates attention on individual cure through
technological detection and/or support, rather than focusing on the
causes of disease in the community and workplace. Finally, the
proposition that the "medical environment" (5), that is, the hospital,
is the best site for treatment is associated with technology and
technological expertise.
The 'medical model' has been extensively criticised during the past
twenty years. This critique began in psychiatry. The counter-claim was
made, for instance, that there is no such thing as mental illness
(paralleling physical illness), only unhappiness or deviance (Szasz,
1971). Similarly, Illich (1976) noted that 'suffering of all kinds' had
become the subject of hospitalization. Childbirth too became medically
Imbued with a 'pathological orientation' (Haire,1978). This is related
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to the increasing medicalization of life (Zola 1972; Illich, 1976).
The possibilities afforded by the medical model (and the hospitalization
that accompanied it) for reclassification, regulation, control and
domination have been noted by a number of commentators (for example,
Szasz, 1971; Scull, 1979; Foucault, 1977).
i)The Scientific Method as applied to human curing and caring 
All branches of medicine adopt a highly mechanistic model of the
patient, whereby the body is viewed as a machine - a set of mechanical
parts (known as 'mechanism'). This view replaced the earlier
Aristotelian image of the world and the body, as an organically
integrated whole (known as 'vitalism'). 	 The mechanistic view
developed in the Seventeenth Century and is rooted in the theory of
Mind-Body Dualism propounded by Descartes. 	 Mind (soul) body dualism
appears linked to Descartes' desire to prove the independence and,
therefore, (possible) immortality of the soul. Given its separate
existence the soul will not (necessarily) be destroyed with the body.
Descartes saw the physical body as subordinate to the mind (as will be
seen, the mind is conceptualised as male, while the body is identified
as female).	 Only the mind, he argued, can be experienced directly.
Everything else (including the body) is experienced only through the
perception of the mind.	 The body is divisible; the mind indivisible:
". . . although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body,
yet, if a foot, or an arm, or any other part, is separated from my body,
it is certain that, on that account, nothing has been taken away from my
mind." (Descartes, 1968, p.164)
Mind/body dualism revolutionised anatomical dissection and
experimentation, facilitating the use of the human body. Doctors no
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longer had to rely on comparative anatomy. This represented a move from
'observation' to 'active intervention' (Doyal, 1979, p.33).
Institutionally, mind/body dualism facilitated a division of labour
between the Church, which continued to administer to the soul and
medicine, whose province became the body.
The emergence of 'scientific medicine' represents "a shift from a
person-oriented to an object-oriented cosmos" (Jewson, 1976, pp.225-244
- see also, Reiser, 1978). 	 It is associated with a widening of the
social and conceptual gap between doctors and patients. By the
nineteenth century patients were gathered together in large hospitals
caring for the working classes.	 Patients were no longer seen as
individuals but 'cases' and the disease had become more important than
the person (Figlio, 1977). At the same time, disease came to be seen as
'localised pathology' rather than the disturbance of the total system
(Doyal, 1979, p.31).	 Doctors became concerned to correlate verifiable
external symptoms (those reported by the patient became less important)
with those internal malfunctions they could discover by, for example,
autopsy or exploratory surgery.	 A variety of instruments had also
been developed, for example, the thermometer, stethoscope, laryngoscope,
enabling the doctor to examine the inner workings of the body.
'Laboratory medicine' finally consolidated the mechanistic world view in
the latter half of the nineteenth century with developments in histology
and physiology and the individual cell became the focus of attention
(Sewson, 1976). Such developments reinforced the notion of the patient
as an 'object' and the view of the 'expert' came to form the social
definition of health and illness (Doyal, 1979, p.34):
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"Thus scientific medicine ultimately became curative, individualistic
and interventionist, objectifying patients and denying their status as
social beings." (Doyal, 1979, p.30)
On the other hand, the move away from the Aristotelian view of the body
ultimately made possible such procedures as vaccination, anaesthesia and
antibiotics.	 It also paved the way for the development of high
technology medicine.
Thus, medical science is a specific cultural representation of 'reality'
(a paradigm) rooted in a particular time and culture (Kuhn, 1970).
This bears further scrutiny, which it has been given by feminists in
particular.	 Philosophers have pointed to the Cartesian doubt and
epistemological insecurity evidenced in the early Descartes' Meditations
(Bordo, 1986). This has been described as the great "Cartesian anxiety
over the possibility of intellectual and moral chaos" (Bernstein, 1980,
p.762). Bordo (1986) links this anxiety to the separation from the
organic female universe of the Middle Ages. Thus, Bordo sees Cartesian
objectivism as a defense mechanism to separation-anxiety, resulting in
"an aggressive flight from the feminine . . . (and) a Cartesian re-
birthing and re-imaging of knowledge and the world as masculine" (Bordo,
1986, p.441). Feminist Philosophers, such as Sandra Harding (1981) have
argued that the scientific model represents a "super-masculinization of
rational knowledge".
	
Here 'masculine' describes not a biological
category but a cognitive style; an epistemological stance. Typically
described as 'detached' (Bordo, 1986), Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) sees it
epitomized in modern science as the ideal of 'objectivity' (dependent on
a Cartesian separation of the physical world from the self). Thus (and
here we are reminded of the Consultant Paediatrician who during access
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negotiations asked: 'What are you measuring anyway?'), Cartesian dualism
implies that knowledge can only occur: "by measurement rather than
sympathy" (Gillispie 1960, p.42).
Dualisms and dichotomies are, therefore, masculine epistemologies. They
are also ontologically male. Post-Freudian psychoanalytic object
relations theory (see, Elizabeth Fee, 1986) argues that boys and girls
grow-up forming different kinds of ego boundaries (relationships with
the world and other people). This is related to women being primarily
responsible for child-care, which necessitates boys forming their (male)
gender identity by denying and depressing their early identification
with the mother (the primary love object); while girls are able to
continue this identification. Thus, formation of gender identity for
boys becomes based on disjuncture and for girls on continuity and
connectedness. Chodorow (1978, p. 169) explains this as follows:
"Feminine personality comes to be based less on repression of inner
objects and firm and fixed splits in the ego, and more on retention and
continuity of external relationships.
	 Boys come to define themselves
as more separate and distinct. • . The basic feminine sense of self is
connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is separate"
This cognitively male commitment to a rationalist rather than an
existentialist view of the world is reflected in the orthodox scientific
method and the medical model.
The Rationalist tradition, of which Descartes, Comte (the founder of
positivism) and Bacon were a part, was from the beginning concerned with
the rational conquest of Nature.	 Francis Bacon saw the task of
science as controlling and ordering the chaotic threat of Nature which
was conceptualized as female (Lloyd, 1984) (See also Caroline Merchant,
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1980, Keller, 1985, Harding and Hintikka, 1983).* Thus, science and
the rational conquest of Nature were themselves socially constructed as
male gendered processes (Easlea, 1981; Lloyd, 1984; Cockburn, 1985).
This flight from the perceived organic chaotic engulfment by (female)
Nature resulted in the period 1550-1650 being particularly obsessed with
bringing female procreative powers under cultural control (see
Ehrenreich and English, 1973; Oakley, 1976; Merchant, 1980; Easlea,
1981).** In various forms this suppression of the feminine has
continued to the present day.	 Dorothy Dinnerstein (1977) and others
have argued that this tendency lies at the deepest root of our current
cultural troubles and they call for a re-assertion of the female in
ethics, epistemology, science, education and politics - we might extend
this list to specifically include health care. This would emphasise
connected-ness and empathy, rather than detachment and distance (Bordo,
1986). Thus Rose (1987, p.279> argues:
"Unlike the alienated abstract knowledge of science, feminist
methodology seeks to bring together subjective and objective ways of
knowing the world."
Wajcman (1991, p.22) has criticised this type of position as
"essentialist", since she feels it is based on "women's innate values";
she argues for what she terms an "historical approach". However, I do
not see this approach as rooted in biological but ontological
In Greek thought too the female was symbolically associated with the
non-rational, the disorderly, the unknowable.
**This included the Malleus Maleficarum (the famous medieval witch-
hunting manual) and the fact that midwives were often accused of
reproductive crimes, such as, infanticide or abortion and declared
witches. Male obstetrics may be seen as an aspect of this.
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imperatives.	 I feel it is concerned with the experiential 'being in
the world' of women (which is rooted in historically specific material
conditions), and is fundamentally different to that of men (whatever the
differences between the experiences of different women).
Technology is applied science, and, as Cockburn (1985, p.179) points-
out: "It is not men but masculinity that has this bond with machinery".
Masculinity is the binary opposite of femininity.
	 Women have been
constructed in opposition to men. In orthodox terms, for example, this
means that men are rational/women irrational, men are strong/women weak,
men are hard/ women soft, men are active/women passive. These are
not Just indicators of difference but positive or negative evaluations
are attached to each side - women attracting the negative (Harding,
1986; Cousins, 1986; Smart, 1991).	 Cockburn (1985) identifies one of
these dichotomies - hard/soft - as pervasive in the way men she
studied (engineers) represented Jobs and people. Lucas (1983) has
traced the concept of women as 'soft' and men as 'hard' back to, at
least the sixth century A.D. and, for example, the seventeenth century
Cartesian philosopher, Malebranche, maintained women were intellectually
inferior to men because their 'cerebral fibre' was 'soft' - lacking the
solidarity and consistency of male fibre (Easlea, 1981, p.71). 	 In
relation to medical technology, I found that doctors, repeatedly
referred to data as either 'hard' or 'soft' (I have also noted this
phenomenon in academia). It seems that not only machinery but certain
kinds of data also have a special bond with masculinity.
Like Cockburn, Sally Hacker (1981), studied engineers. She found
'mind/body' dualism central to their ideology, which identified the
masculine (the engineer) with the mind, and the feminine with the body.
Similarly, Easlea (1983) notes that in disciplines or sub-
disciplines, the more theoretical (mental) are seen as less contaminated
with 'female' matter and worthy of greater prestige. Similarly in
Sartre (1990) 'immanence' - an immersion in physical life which
threatens to engulf the self - is seen as epitomised in the female body
(contrasted with male 'transcendence' - 'being for self', based on
'projects' and 'exploits').	 De Beauvoir (1972) sees childbearing as
the ultimate expression of 'immanence'. 	 Lloyd (1984) and Cockburn
(1985) have noted the male perspective of the very concepts of
'transcendence' and 'immanence' (and 'being for self'). They
dichotomise the world and experience and elevate what is taken to be
essentially male knowledge above female experience.	 Some feminists
have pointed-out that men would benefit from more active involvement in
physical nurturing, for example, Hilary Rose (1988) insists on the
value of experiential knowledge. This is knowing as part of labour, and
particularly women's labour, which is historically based on caring:
"As a profoundly sensuous activity, women's labour constitutes a
material reality which structures a distinctive understanding of the
social and natural world" (Rose, 1988, p.72)
It is possible, therefore, to criticise neutrality and objectivity not
only in social science but also in natural science. This is equally
open to patriarchial (and other political economy) definitions and
usages of 'knowledge'.	 At the same time, the 'scientific text' is as
much dependent on conventional textual devices as any other (Atkinson,
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1990, p. 7):
"The text - the research paper or the monograph, say - is just as much
an artefact of convention and contrivance as is any other cultural
product"
Refutation of such propositions may be taken as tantamount to a denial
of the labour processes involved in the production of knowledge
(Stanley, 1990b). 'Scientism', therefore, is 	 essentially centred on
Cartesian notions of 'science', 'knowledge', 'the research process',
'theory' and 'expertise' (Habermas, 1984, Stanley, 1990b). This
involves the separation of knowers and what (who) is known; subjectivity
and objectivity; and, science and nature (Stanley, 1990b). Thus,
Cartesian dualism is at the centre of the separation of subject and
object in medical science as well as sociology.
The implications of a positivist perspective for the bodily/emotional
division of labour - located in the context of Intensive Care and the
Labour Ward - will be the theme throughout the remainder of this
chapter. This will illustrate how the medical profession have 'carved-
up' the body in line with the background assumptions of their particular
paradigm and in order to facilitate greater professional control by
Specialisms. The contention is that these concerns will be reflected in
technology design and reinforced by its use.
ii) Measurement and Display 
The medical model, concerned as it is with the organic appearance of
disease leads to the proposition that this can be observed visually and
either photographed (for example, by X-rays, ultra sound waves, gamma
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rays), or measured by electronic monitoring devices and visually
displayed numerically. Disease is seen as "almost super-imposed" (Hart,
19bb), making it observable and measurable - in some sense, 'apart' from
the patient. Medical technology is central to this surveillance and
quantification. Electronic monitoring which is used extensively in
Intensive Care and the Labour Ward is essentially in the positivist
mode: concerned with those aspects which can be measured and visually
displayed.
The need for close monitoring is a minimum requirement for admission to
an ITU. Electronic monitoring is used to display continuously the
patient's physiological status and aid the recognition of any changes
taking place, either in the patient's underlying condition or as a
result of treatment they are receiving. Information from monitoring
equipment can also be used for diagnostic purposes. All electronic
monitoring in Intensive Care involves attaching lines to the patient and
some forms are highly invasive; the procedure itself carrying
considerable dangers for the patient. In Obstetrics, electronic fetal
monitoring is used routinely to monitor continuously the fetal heart
rate and the mother's uterine contractions. This may be done invasively
by attaching a fetal scalp electrode and inserting auterine pressure
cathetar via the vagina, or externally be means of a belt around the
mother's abdomen.
On a day-to-day basis in Intensive Care and Obstetrics the tension
between methodological positivism and practical uncertainty (see,
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Parsons, 1951; Fox, 1957, 1979; Davis 1960; Sheff, 1963) is managed and
manipulated by the promise of control through the application of
technology. Monitoring technology aids the management of clinical
uncertainty by providing what is seen by doctors as 'hard data', to
inform or back-up medical opinions.
Electronic monitoring aids surveillance of the patient (in obstetrics
there are, in effect, two patients - the mother and the baby - see
Arney, 1982), by making visible to the physician's gaze the
physiological processes of the body (or at least some of them).
	
This
may be seen as part of the process of creating "a field of visibility"
(Foucault 1977, p. 203; Arney and Neill 1982) wherein every move of the
subordinate may be monitored by the superordinate.
	 Such techniques,
allied with tests, such as blood gas results, give a continuous
physiological profile of the patient, expressed in a quantifiably
numerical form. This form has a special credence::
"That's why you try and use the gases because it's difficult to say to
everybody, 'Well, subjectively, he looked as if he needed to go on to a
ventilator', while the blood gases are still within the bounds of what
Is considered acceptable. Once you've got the hard data it's much
easier on the Ward round the next day to say, 'Not only did he look bad
but these are his gases'. So I think sometimes you suspect something is
wrong but you wait until you've got hard technical evidence." (Senior
Registrar Anaesthetist, General Unit)
Thus, 'hard data' produced by medical technology, such as electronic
monitors, is hard currency in negotiating with one's superiors or
defending a clinical opinion to the wider medical fraternity (used
advisedly). Intensive Care nurses were also aware of the bargaining
power of 'hard data' and reported using monitor print-outs to prove
points. For example, if they informed doctors that a patient's blood
pressure had dropped but by the time the doctor arrived it was normal,
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they could produce a trend print-out. Midwives also used 'hard data'
in their negotiations with doctors about patient care, for example, a
midwife talked of using 'a nice trace' (print-out from an electronic
fetal monitor of the baby's heart rate) to 'bat away doctors from the
door', making less likely their involvement In a labour she considered
'normal' - this is a 'radical' use of 'hard data', counter to the
organisational culture.
'Hard data' usually involves measuring some element of the situation
and, ideally, expressing the result in numerical form. As we have seen,
Cartesian dualism implies that knowledge can only occur: "by measurement
rather than sympathy" (Gillispie 1960, p.42) and that it 	 is
cognitively male. This may be compared (as in access negotiations) with
qualitative 'soft data' which may carry overtones of being subjective,
anecdotal, intuitive; this data is cognitively female. 	 It is seen as
subjective in two respects: both because it reflects the view of 'the
subject' but also because the investigator is seen to have
'contaminated' the data by socially engaging with the subject. By
contrast,	 the machismo of 'hard data', is characterised by: emotional
detachment, the use of numbers rather than words, 'objectivity' and
'rationality' (see Lloyd, 1984, concerning the male-gendered nature of
'Reason'), and the de-emphasis of the personal experience of the
investigator and the investigated in the research act. Positivism sees
both its methodology and the data it produces as not only different, but
superior to that of the 'soft' data approach it criticises. This
reflects the hidden agenda of gender relations: that is, men and women
are constructed not only as 'different' but unequal, since more value is
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placed on the characteristics that men are supposed to possess. As
Lloyd (1984) has pointed-out, the equation of maleness with superiority
goes back at least as far as the Pythagoreans.
Jordan (1987) has argued that the use of technology introduces a
hierarchy of competence and decision-making power. I wish to argue that
it also institutes a hierarchy of data: that produced by technology is
considered 'harder' /superior. 	 Those who are competent in
interpreting the readings produced by electronic monitoring of the body
become those who are able to pronounce on what is happening and what, if
anything, should be done about it.
The fact that 'hard' data is constructed as 'detached' is used as a
solace both to those who have to make difficult decisions and those who
are the subject of them. This is interesting in itself. Why should
something uncontaminated by human emotion be viewed as a more balanced
judgement, more reliable? Why are we invited to feel more assured by a
decision arrived at by detachment rather than empathy? Why should
subjectivity be presented as obscuring the right decision, rather than
informing it? Certain highly complex decisions in Intensive Care,
involving questions such as 'withdrawal of active support' and 'brain
death' (where the brain stem having suffered some massive injury,
results in there being no communication between any neuronal activity
occuring in the brain and the rest of the body) are put forward as
'hard' or 'firm' decisions, seemingly belying the degree to which they
appeal to specific analytical frameworks and involve the active
interpretation of the participants to the decielon (in practice 'brain
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death' has been the subject of some controversy, for example, in the
media). For example:
"That's the kind of decision (withdrawal of active support) which is
taken in the daylight hours and that is quite a hard, objective decision
and there's never the need to take a decision like that at night (here,
the night appears to carry overtones of irrationality). You can always
tread water over-night. You must take that decision after a full
consultation between all medical staff and say 'right, well, time to
pull out'. . ." (Registrar Anaesthetist, General Unit)
Here, "hard, objective decision" appears to refer, at least at the level
of articulation, to "a full consultation between all medical staff" (the
standard-bearers of objectivity), rather than a numerical analysis.
Supposed 'detachment' appears to serve a dual function, It suggests the
data is 'objective' but also 'detaches' the medical profession from the
decision. 'Distancing' themselves from the decision in this way renders
the decision a handed-down quality, imbued with a logic of its own.
This is reassuring to both the medical profession and relatives, given
the esteem in which 'objectivity' is held. 'Brain-death' criteria are
also presented as very 'hard' data indeed:
"They are very firm criteria" (Senior Registrar Anaesthetist, General
Unit), which can be viewed with "absolute confidence" (same
interviewee), so that, "they're very hard guidelines" (Consultant
Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
It seems the more ambiguous the situation, the more necessary the need
for the data to be 'hard' and the decision derived from it to be
'objective'. Thus, 'hard' data is used as a way out of ambiguous
situations which must be moved-on. In brain death, you can 'demonstrate
the criteria' (a term regularly used on Units) in an empiricist,
behaviourist, positivistic fashion, culminating, if affirmed, in the
diagnosis of 'death'. Indeed, brain death criteria are sometimes
demonstrated to the relatives directly, in their presence.
	
Distancing
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the decision from those who make it by using a methodology which
purports to objectivity and is imbued with the authority of its
'maleness', acts as a reassurance to all concerned that they are
absolved from the burden of existential uncertainty which an
acknowledgement of the paradigmatic nature of the decision might
involve.
At the same time, 'hard data', whilst of elevated status was not
necessarily viewed in isolation. This is especially so in the case of
nurses and midwives, who tended to cross-check it with data more
perceptually derived or manually obtained (or using simpler
technology).* They also tended to view the data more holistically and,
in childbirth, in the context of the labour overall. For example,
midwives, on occasion, would delay reporting monitor readings of 'fetal
distress' because in context they felt them not to be genuinely
'abnormal'.
	 Sometimes, midwives would overtly contradict 'hard data',
for example, the midwife would tell the doctor that from manual
palpation, the uterine contractions were stronger than they were
registering on the monitor print-out and doctors tended to accept such
statements.
The majority of midwives continued to palpate the labouring uterus
manually even if the women's contractions were being electronically
monitored. Several continued to listen to the fetal heart with a
Pinnard stethoscope, although that was being recorded electronically.
Similarly, the Intensive Care nurse often checked the blood pressure
manually 'on the cuff' despite it being recorded by electronic
transducer. In both areas if a monitor reading was giving cause for
concern, this would be cross-checked manually.
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The role of electronic monitoring equipment in the production of
increasing amounts of physiological data about the patient must, indeed,
be viewed with some circumspection. The possession of more and more
data about a situation does not automatically guarantee that one will
come to the optimum conclusion in terms of patient care (the notion of
'optimum conclusion' is itself highly contentious). Any data has to be
analysed and interpreted.	 Results may be debatable and the best
strategy in the light of the results may also be questionable. The
emphasis on 'hard data' de-emphasises the possibility of 'false-
negatives'/'false-positives' and glosses over possible difficulties and
ambiguities involved in the interpretation of results. Ultimately,
regardless of the amount of 'hard' data produced, it is paradoxical
that what is arrived at is termed a medical 'opinion'. There is then, a
tension between the claims of the methodology in epistemological terms
and the ontology of doctors.
iii) The Body Divided Against Itself 
Positivism is associated with a mechanical view of the body. In
Intensive Care this is linked to the notion that the body, being
comparable to a machine, may be mended in much the same manner. In
childbirth it leads to a concentration on the physical mechanics of
birth and the association of these with 'pain'.	 Pain relief was, in
fact, the principle entree of obstetricians to the active control of
labour and delivery (Arney, 1982).	 Arney distinguishes between one and
two-dimensional pain. The latter, is defined positively as: ". . • pain
that women experience as their own pain, the pain that accompanies
active participation •" (limey, 1982, p.218). Experiencing pain in
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different ways does not, however, square easily with positivism.
Positivism is related to behaviourism and behaviourism proceeds on the
basis of a stimulus triggering a response: as opposed to stimulus -
interpretation (of meaning) - response. In relation to labour pain,
the stage of interpretation of pain, its context, meaning and how it may
be experienced in childbirth is often bypassed. Pain is felt and
related to only as a painful stimulus, to be feared and despised; and
the response is to attempt to stop such pain in its tracks.
This may also be contrasted with the view of Odent (1984) who maintains
that birth is a powerful, primitive experience which in its final stages
takes over the whole being. Odent promotes the notion of instinctual
birthing, where the woman contacts primal instincts, deep within
herself, in order to give birth with satisfaction and without
complication. The ability to contact such inner primal instincts is
associated with relational aspects of the woman's being, for example,
the relationship to her own body, her support in labour, her own birth,
the birthing environment and so on. Conversely, positivism takes pain
out of its social, intentional and relational context and reifies it
into an entity, a stimulus to be eradicated.
Despite increased knowledge about the physiological processes involved
in childbirth, many aspects concerning subtle interactions of the body
at such a time remain unknown. It has been observed that the artificial
disruption at any stage of these natural processes may disturb the flow
of the subsequent co-ordinated sequence (see Odent, 1984). The purpose
of many interventions during labour has, in fact, been an attempt to
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redress the harmful consequences of earlier interventions. MacLennan
(1978) has termed this spiralling process a 'cascade of intervention'.
The medicalization of childbirth has meant that 'pain' in birth has come
to be seen both by health care professionals and labouring women as well
met by chemical pain relief. Recourse to medication is reinforced by
the medical emphasis on the pathological potential of childbirth and its
location in the hospital. The knowledge that artificial pain relief is
readily available (on demand in the Obstetric Hospital - notwithstanding
any contra indication), may of itself weaken and undermine the woman's
confidence and determination to cope from her own inner resources and
the emotional support of others. It may also weaken the professional
carers' resolve to provide a high degree of emotional support.
At the Obstetric Hospital, technological solutions to pain in labour
were to the fore; a typical reassurance to the fearful woman being:
'we have got all the equipment' (Staff Midwife).
n . . . it can be painful but there is analgesia. Tell them the
different forms and see what she would like." (Staff Midwife)
The view expressed repeatedly within the Obstetric Hospital was that
women had 'different pain thresholds', for example:
n . . . you can explain to women that they do have different pain
thresholds and that we do have a range of techniques that are readily
available for them to chose from which will accommodate the particular
kind of pain threshold they have." (Consultant Obstetrician).
Many of the women also felt they had a certain fixed pain threshold and
many who perceived labour to be difficult and distressing felt that
their pain threshold must be low. The notion of a 'pain threshold' is
again a reified physiological category and carries very different
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implications to seeing pain as relational to the woman's 'being in the
world', the environment in which she is labouring, her relationship with
her supporters, and so on.
Technology used in childbirth reflects the mind-body dualism of the
medical model. In contrast, for example, Chinese thought is profoundly
non-Cartesian. Chinese traditional medicine integrates the spirit, mind
and body, diet/dreams, energy flows/physical sensations. A dualist
orientation is evidenced by much of the pain relief given in labour
(see Appendix VIII for a detailed description of these); for example,
Pethedine disorientates the mind, epidural anaesthesia paralyses the
body; one is, therefore, left with one or the other intact but not both.
Pethedine is injected into the body by the attendant. The labouring
woman is not, therefore, in control of the delivery of this method and
once the drug enters her body, the effect (which the woman may perceive
as helpful or unhelpful) lasts for several hours (this is to be
contrasted with Entenox, 'gas and air' which is self-administered and
the effects of which last one minute following exposure). It is clear
that many women find Pethedine mentally-disorientating and, for some,
its administration may complete their loss of control, rather than re-
establish coping. Pethedine, in any case, since it is a narcotic,
prevents the woman from being mentally alert.
An epidural, on the other hand, if working effectively, allows the
woman to feel nothing from the waist-down. She cannot, therefore, be
said to be in control of her body, even if she is being consulted and is
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in agreement about what is being done to it. Her likelihood of needing
a forceps delivery is greatly increased and, even if she does succeed in
pushing the baby out herself, she may well feel neither the expulsive,
bearing-down contractions, nor the birth itself.
	 It typifies an
approach rooted in mind-body dualism that two of the three major pain
relief agents in labour (here I am refering to drug technology, so do
not include TENS. I have also excluded general anaesthetic where the
woman is totally unconscious and a medical operation is performed, i.e.
a Caesarian Section), leave one either mentally engaged and physically
dis-engaged, or physically engaged and mentally dis-engaged.
It seems, therefore, that Pethidine, in its effect on the mind and the
epidural's effect on the body, serve to ontologically fracture the
experience of giving birth and are antagonistic to an experience of
oneness in childbirth. One is driven to the conclusion that in order to
keep some control in the birth process the woman must, where feasible,
confront pain and find some autonomous power to cope with it. Pain, in
a sense, welds together the emotional and physical side of childbirth;
it is in the concentrated effort to meet pain that she may enter into
the flow of the birth process. If she can become at one with that, then
'pain' may not be experienced as 'pain' but simply as an overwhelming
and all-consuming process of life. This is not to deny that in some \
instances, for example, the way the baby is lying, may result in labour
being exceptionally painful and pain relief highly desirable. 	 The
mind-body dualism of industrial medicine mirrors the separation of
physical and mental labour in the production of commodities; a division
of labour which divorces conception from execution; intellectual from
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manual work. Arguably the dislocation of these two areas in childbirth
leads to further schisms and disruption of the birth process about which
we still know so relatively little.
Having used this illustration from obstetrics to explore mind-body
dualism and its possible effects, I now propose to explore this further
by looking at the way in which the medical model involves a more general
mechanistic carving-up of the body, in terms of 'systems'; on which
professional, medical Specialisms are often based. Specialisms
represent medical interest groups which are often highly politicised,
involving rivalry, demarcation and conflict over scarce resources and
prestige. To examine the implications of the systemic approach to the
body for patient care, I shall shift the primary focus to Intensive
Care, where the emphasis on 'shared-care' between the ITU Consultant
(usually an Anaesthetist) and the Admitting Consultant (who may be from
any Specialism) provides an especially sensitizing example.*
The ITU medical team were primarily responsible for supporting the
patient's ventilation (breathing - lung function) and cardio-vascular
system; together with emergency resussitation should this be necessary.
*These dynamics also apply to maternity care, where obstetrics is
concerned with the reproductive system and where, for example, there is
an emotional division of labour between doctors and midwives but the
emphasis will be as described above for the reason given.
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The Admitting doctors remained responsible for treating the condition
that caused the patient to be hospitalized in the first place. Since,
in practice, this distinction is often difficult to draw or sustain,
'shared' or 'joint care' remained "a very thorney business, which can
ruin more relationships than anything else" (ITU Consultant, General
Unit). For example, the ITU doctors would normally be in charge of
respiratory therapy for a patient who had a respiratory problem but, if
they were already under a Chest Physician s/he would continue to assume
respiratory care, even whi]e the patient remained on ITU.
This approach reflects not merely mind-body dualism but a fragmentation
of the body into different systems which are the preserve of cross-
cutting professional rivalries, such that:
"They'll (ITU) ring us for anything from the waist down" (Renal
Registrar).
"The Surgeons are here only to look at the surgical side, you know,
their wound and that's it." (Sister, Specialised Unit).
This carving-up of the body is mirrored in obstetrics by the fact that
the woman becomes synonymous with her reproductive organs - wi .th an kkva
irrationality that is culturally implied by that, i.e. women's bodies
are seen as irrational and unreliable, given their relationship to
chaotic nature (see, Smart, 1991). It is not surprizing, therefore,
that although obstetricians considered childbirth to be a natural
process, they felt that nature was imperfect, should be 'watched' and
could be improved upon (by [male] obstetric intervention).
In ITU, matters that could not readily be separated out as the province
of one particular discipline or sub-discipline presented a particular
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problem, for example, whether the patient should have a tracheotomy or
whether antibiotics should be stopped to allow bacterial growth for
examination purposes. These were viewed as multi-disciplinary decisions
and, in practice, presented considerable potential for communication
break-downs and political wranglings. Included in this category of
multi-disciplinary decision was 'withdrawal of active support' from the
patient whose death was deemed inevitable or whose quality of long-term
survival was considered untenable. The decision to withdraw active
support is taken at Consultant level with both the Admitting Consultant
and an ITU Consultant involved. The Admitting Consultant has the final
say, although it is unlikely that withdrawal would be carried-out in the
face of peer-opposition.	 Like treatment, withdrawal of active support
is also organised on a systems basis, normally support for the cardiac
system is withdrawn first; in death, as in life, the patient is not
treated holistically.
Despite 'joint-care', the Admitting and ITU Teams never carried-out
joint ward rounds, nor did they hold 'case conferences' on individual
patients. Depending on the degree of instability in the patient's
condition, the Admitting Team visit the Unit on one or more occasions
during the day:
. • . and will then make contributions in the management of the
patient, for instance, the surgeons may decide when the patient's drains
(draining blood from the wound) can be removed, or they will inspect the
wounds. . . also the Pharmacists come round and there is also the
Nutritional Support Team. The Renal Physicians come round too, if the
patient finishes-up with renal failure." (Senior Registrar, Specialised
Unit)
The patient may, therefore, finish-up being cared for by several
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different Teams, which address different bodily fucntions. 	 In both
Units there had been past attempts to institute an ITU Ward Round with
all interested medical parties present. In both cases this quickly
foundered and the different Teams continued to arrive at their separate
times. Thus, although there is 'shared-care', decisions are usually
made separately: "we make them very independently" as one Renal
Registrar put it. This is related to concerns and conflicts around
clinical autonomy, the 'ownership' of the patient (which remains with
the Admitting Consultant - related to the presenting disease) and the
systemic division of the body. These are all related to Specialization.
In this situation, the employment of a lower-status 'go-between' as a
mediating, defusing device is unsurprising. This role devolves to the
nurse who remains constantly at the patient's side: the Admitting Teams
use the nurse to find out what the Anaesthetic Team are thinking, the
Anaesthetic Team use the nurse to find out what the Admitting Team are
thinking, both Teams use the nurse to find out what the relatives are
thinking and the relatives use the nurse to find out what the doctors
are thinking. The nurse is, therefore, pivotal in the communication
network of the Unit and this is related to the bodily, including the
emotional, division of labour.
In this situation, communication break-down remains a constant
possibility. When this occurs the nurse becomes not so much pivotal as
'piggy in the middle', for example:
u . 
• . being 'piggy in the middle' when they're admitted under one, then
the Anaesthetists get involved. Then they go into renal failure, so the
Renal Team get involved and then they might start fitting, so the Neuro
people get involved. Somebody asks you to do something. Somebody else
asks you to do something else. Start this. Stop this. Start something
else. You name it, they all come in. Parties! • . . like the (pioneer
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team), they don't speak to the Renal Team so when one of their patient
goes into renal failure, they won't ask the Renal Team to go and look at
it because they don't speak to each other and they treat it themselves
and they don't do it properly and the Anaesthetists get involved because
this has happened . . . " (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit)
"We tend to get stuck between the two (the Anaesthetic and the Admitting
Team). . . they (the Admitting Team) start complaining and you try to
say what the Anaesthetist said, they say 'I don't care, it's my patient
and I'll this, that and the other.' You often offer to get the
Anaesthetist to discuss it and they say 'No, I don't want to talk to
them but	 " (Sister, General ITU),
This rivary and specialization based on different aspects of the
patient's body sometimes leads to decisions being delayed or left in
limbo:
• • . no-one will make the decision and you're left nursing what is
Just a corpse at times, and thinking 'you could have let them go ages
ago'" (Sister, Specialised Unit).
The body of the patient has been objectified, divided into systems and
shared out between the Specialists and the sub-Specialists. These
operate with a partial view of the patient. 	 It is not unusual, for
doctors from a particular Specialism to arrive at the ITU and pronounce
contentedly that the organ in which they have an interest is "now
working perfectly", while, in the meantime, "everything else has gone"
(as one Staff Nurse put it), and the patient is dying. 	 This
compartmentalization is a variation on the theme of the old adage 'the
operation was a success but the patient died'.
The mechanistic carving-up of the body allows the building of
Specialisms, medical reputations and empires, while it is increasingly
difficult for the patient/patient relative to keep control in the face
of such expert, fragmented knowledge, which may speak little to their
own 'being in the world'. The problem of different and conflicting
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information from different medical teams was experienced by some
relatives in the study. One, a policeman, used to interviewing people,
talked of 'different stories' from different Specialisms when he 'tried
to get a few answers out'. Another relative experienced some distress
when she perceived conflicting accounts around the decision to withdraw
active support from her dying husband. Nurses (women) are left to
manage the ontological disJunctures of this type of epistemology.
Strauss, et al (1982) term the type of work carried-out in hospitals,
'sentimental work'. This is necessitated by a work object which is
alive and may respond, their response potentially forming a central
component of that work. They identify seven types of sentimental work,
which are summarised below:
1. Interactional work: orienting, explaining, introducing oneself,
pacing the situation and upholding moral rules within the situation.
2. Trust work: spending time with the patient, talking to the patient,
demonstrating competence, subtle gestures.
3. Composure work: helping the patient to retain or regain self-
control.
4. Biographical work: gaining information about the patient's social
relationships and social support; often involving giving out information
about oneself.
5..-1dentity work: addresses psychological problems, maintaining the
patient's identity in the face of extended and difficult illness.
6. Awareness context work: holding-back information about
deterioration or probable/inevitable death.
7. Rectification work: the repair of emotional upset caused by another
health care professional.
Sentimental work is required because of the patient's reaction to what
is done to them: they thus demand, sometimes 'force' health care
professionals to fulfil their emotional needs in order that
'instrumental care' may proceed.
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In Intensive Care, either as a result of disease or trauma, or resulting
from sedation, the patient is usually unconscious or semi-conscious.
Nevertheless, nurses continue to talk to the patient, attempting to
orientate them to their environment and treatment regimes: within
Strauss et al's mode/ this may be seen as interactional work (and
composure work when the patient is semi-conscious). Identity work is
also involved, as patients in ITU often suffer from 'ITU-syndrome',
whereby they become disorientated and mentally confused. ITU nurses
also do identity work around the patient to orientate themselves to the
unconscious patient, that is, they actively seek to construct a
'personality' for their unconscious charge, largely on the basis of
clues and cues from the patient's relatives: this helps them relate
their care to a living 'subject'.
In ITU, the most overt sentimental work is carried out with patient's
relatives (given the patient's lack of consciousness), in order to
facilitate the relatives' co-operation in the continued instrumental
work on the patient. In analysing sentimental work, Strauss, et al
(1982), do not detect any structural divides - based on class or gender
- around who does and who does not do sentimental work. Although they
do mention in passing that nurses often do the majority of certain types
of sentimental work, their position is essentially:
"Since, however, sentimental tasks get intertwined with other kinds of
tasks, everyone may do some sentimental work in relation to carrying out
technical tasks, or undertake or have forced on them sentimental tasks
regardless of occupational position." (Strauss, et al, 1982, p.276)
This does not explain why some occupational groups spend much more time
doing sentimental work than others and, indeed, that in some occupations
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it is seen as an integral part of their role performance, while for
others this is far from the case. Doctors saw nurses very much as the
main communicators with the patient's relatives and, in general, nurses
saw doctors as not being very sensitive (with significant exceptions) in
their dealings with this group. As one Consultant Intensivist put it,
doctors must remain 'more distant' since they are required to be 'more
objective', in order to decide 'major policy directions' for the
patient. We are reminded that the masculinization of rational knowledge
in the form of the scientific model (Harding, 1981), is typified by an
epistemological stance which may best be described as 'detached' (Bordo,
1986). On the other hand, the female nurse is expected to become
subjectively, emotionally involved.
Doctors are expected to convey information to relatives about any major
changes in the treatment or condition of the patient, while nurses are
expected to give emotional support to relatives, reinforcing and
explaining medical communications more simply and keeping them
informed about the patient's general daily progress. In other words,
doctors/men are in charge of imparting medico-scientific facts at the
intellectual level and nurses/women are responsible for decoding such
messages, rendering them intelligible and dealing with the emotional
repar,cussions thereof. (This is not to deny that in practice there will
be differences in style and degree of sensitivity shown by different
doctors).
Although doctors reserved the prerogative in the explanation of
Intellectual data about the underlying condition of the patient and the
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likely prognosis, both of which derive from their expert scientific
knowledge, a nurse was almost always present, especially if this
involved 'bad news' for the relative. As we have seen in the bodily
division of labour, the nurse mediates in communications between
various medical groups caring for different parts of the body. In the
context of the emotional division of labour the nurse mediates between
the doctor <who often has something difficult to say) and the patient's
relative (who often has something difficult to hear). The willingness
of doctors to leave the emotional content of the work to nurses, was
mirrored by a willingness on the part of nurses to carry out this role,
since they feared doctors would carry it out insensitively:
"It's very bad but doctors are notoriously bad at actually talking to
people." (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit)
Relatives frequently felt similarly:
"I don't think doctors can really talk to people. . . all they know is
medical facts and they can't even put them over." (Relative, Specialised
Unit)
Often nurses felt that doctors frequently 'fudged' difficult issues with
relatives in order to avoid emotional confrontations, being
alternatively euphemistic, vague, obscure or leaving space for hope
where there was none (this would be viewed by Strauss, et al (1982), as
"awareness context work" - holding-back information about inevitable
deterioration and death). The nurse would often make the situation
explicit to the relative after the doctor had left:
PI 
• • • doctors quite often don't say what they mean, they say, 'well,
you know, your mother's very poorly. I don't think we can really do
much more. If anything happens now, we're not going to be able to get
her back'. . • they haven't said, straight down the line, 'Your mother's
going to die and it will probably be today', so quite often you have
to." (Senior Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
because sometimes doctors don't say what they should. . • they
,
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tell some bits and not others, . . others still, although they're
giving bad news they're still very hopeful, which you can't be if you're
telling them 'we're going to withdraw'. . . we're more honest with
them." (Sister, Specialised Unit)
Echoing the words of Oakley (1981b) concerning ethical issues in social
research interviews, a Staff Nurse felt:
"I think you've got to be truthful and honest with them at all times
and if they question you, its no use saying, you know, if they say,
'well, is my mother going to die?', you can't say 'well, you'll have to
see the doctor about that'. You have to answer them truthfully, 'no, I
don't think they will', 'there is a chance they will survive' or 'yes, I
think there's a strong possibility' and everyone says it isn't the
nurses' responsibility to tell the relative that their parent or whoever
is going to die. It's the doctors' responsibility isn't it? But if
someone asks you face to face, you can't say that."
Similarly:
"A lot of the time they'll openly ask you, 'well, are they going to
survive or not?' and it's usually a nurse they'll ask that and in that
case, then we may be the first person to actually tell them because you
can't lie to them." (Sister, Specialised Unit)
It transpired, therefore, that in practice nurses were reluctant or felt
unable (given relatives' questions) to leave doctors the task of
disclosing distressing information. In general, the amount of 'new'
information that the nurse was willing to give depended on how much
nursing experience she had; the newly arrived nurses preferring to
merely reinforce doctor-given information. In addition to their worries
about whether and how 'bad news' would be conveyed by doctors, many
nurses felt that their own experiential knowledge of the relatives
enhanced their ability to carry out this role sensitively:
"When you've been nursing them for a few days you can really get to know
them and the family and it makes it that little bit easier for you if
you have to give them bad news. We never leave the doctors to do it,
never, never, we wouldn't dare. We'd tell them, if anything before the
doctor, because we do have that closeness. We are very close to the
relatives, I'd say, very close". (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
Several of the nurses emphasised that 'closeness' - connectedness -
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made the task easier, were it necessary to give distressing information:
(she begins by saying that if a patient comes from theatre and dies, and
she has no social knowledge of them that this is less upsetting than
the death of known-patients): 	 II . . . you've no rapport with them.
But, having said that, it's difficult to deal with the relatives like
that because you've got no rapport with them either and it's very
difficult to try and comfort somebody who you've never even met before.
So in a way it's more upsetting when you know the patients and the
relatives but in a way that's easier to deal with than those you don't
know."
They felt they were more aware of the social context in which the
communication would be received (having undertaken 'biographical'
sentimental work at the bedside with patient's relatives) and felt they
already had an established relationship with the relative (based on
'trust work'), which could assist both in this difficult situation.
The length of time the patient had been on the Unit was obviously
relevant to the amount of experiential knowledge the nurse felt she had
about the relatives (in some cases where the patient was very short
stay, the main continuity of relationship might be with doctors from the
Admitting Team). Relatives often alluded to the social interest
(biographical sentimental work/trust work) they perceived the nurses to
have taken in them, for example:
u . • • and the nurses were so marvellous.. . . so nice, so reassuring,
so friendly. They treated you as if you were somebody belonging to
them, not just a patient's wife or whatever. It was cups of tea. Cups
of coffee. The one sat down at the side of me the one day and was
chatting about my family and my grandchildren. . . It was lovely.
That's what you need." (Relative, General Unit)
Patient relatives also did emotional work for each other, both within
family groups and between families. Some interviewees were still in
contact with friends they had made during this period.
The amount of information relatives received from nurses also depended
on cues the nurse received from relatives about how much they 'wanted to
know' in terms of detail or prognosis (see for example, Glaser and
Strauss, 1964, in relation to awareness of dying). 	 Waiting for cues
from patients' relatives before giving further detailed information was
not always positively evaluated by relatives and could be interpreted as
rather grudging: some said that the nurses did not 'volunteer
information', others stressed the need to 'perservere' in acquiring the
necessary details. 	 This presented difficulties for relative who did
not feel skilled and confident in such matters.
Nurses underlined the ability of doctors to 'walk away from the
situation', leaving any ambiguities and emotional miasma to be taken
care of by nurses/women (this may be seen as 'rectification work' in
Strauss, et al's, 1982 model), for example:
H . . . then it's the same old story, it's the nurses Job to clear-up the
mess afterwards. . . Quite often it's more harrowing for the nurse, They
(doctors) can walk away but nurses can't. . •" (Senior Staff Nurse,
Specialised Unit)
Thus, "the nurse is left to mop-up the tears" (Sister Specialised Unit).
Doctors have used their techniques and if these have 'failed', this may
be the point where they see their role as essentially at an end. This
is reinforced by their epistemological stance being rooted in mind/body
dualism and their essential province being seen as the body. Part of
the role of the nurse, however, is the care of the dying, while the
role of the ITU nurse is holistic, care of the whole person (they are
not subject to the fragmented division of labour of the general wards).
Given that medicine is a male sex-typed profession, this reinforces the
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tendency to bequeath the care of distressed relatives to nurses, the
vast majority of whom are women; and it is women who are primarily
expected to offer emotional support in this society. The division of
labour, therefore, replicates the social relations of the wider society
and women/nurses are left to manage the ontological disiunctures of an
epistemology which separates mind from body, intellect from emotions and
one bodily system from another. Having said this, it is not only the
division of labour that is determined by social relations, so too is the
form taken by science and technology (since these are located in a
particular historical and social context) and this is the subject of the
next chapter.
CHAPTER 4 
THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Classical sociologists, such as Comte, Durkheim and Weber, believed
science to be an independent, objective form of knowledge which
furthered the development of society. Merton (1949) was the first
sociologist to look at science as a social institution. From his
functionalist perspective, he saw science as asocial and independent,
operating according to a set of prescribed norms which constituted a
scientific 'ethos'. The Mertonian view of science has been termed 'the
standard view of science' (Mulkey, 1979). It is the orthodox image of
science held by lay people. This construction of science has become
increasingly challenged. Kuhn <1970) points to the socially grounded
nature of science, while Mulkey (1976) argues that the 'norms' and
'ethos' of science are better seen as an 'occupational ideology'. Other
studies have examined the social aspects of scientific controversy (for
example, Nelkin, 1979) showing that it is not a simple step to move
from the 'evidence' to the 'decision': there is no necessary consensus
on 'facts' and supposedly scientific decisions are affected by wider
social and economic considerations. Drugs or chemicals, for example,
may be banned in one country and not in another, 'safe levels' of any
given substance in the body varies over time and between different
countries. It becomes clear that:
". . . science was 'achieved' through social and technical negotiation,
interpretation and recognition, just as other systems of knowledge are"
(Webster, 1991, p.13)
Over and above this there has been a fundamental critique of 'objective'
science by feminists, Marxist and neo-Marxists. The feminist critique
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of science (see, for example, Easlea, 1981; Lloyd, 1984; Cockburn, 1985;
Rose, 1987, 1988) was discussed in the previous chapter.
The Marxist and neo-Marxist critique argues that science is knowledge
generated to aid capitalist production and capital accumulation, and is
also facilitative of the maintenance of social control by promoting the
current social order. Furthermore, the dominant mode of production of
scientific knowledge under capitalism involves its production in a
commodified form; marketable as a cash value. Such that "The market
In scientific goods has its laws and they are nothing to do with ethics
or norms. . ." (Bourdieu 1975, p.40) Medical technology, including
pharmaceutical products, are produced by commercial companies which are
driven by profit motive. Their interests lie in promoting the widest
possible use of these commodities at the highest possible return on
Investment. They employ agressive marketing techniques which may
Include, for example, the financial sponsorship of Consultants
attending prestigious international conferences at which their wares
are displayed.
There has been some disagreement amongst Marxists about the degree of
potential optimism or pessimism with which science should be viewed.
Bernal (1939) argues that despite science generating profit and being
used in the maintenance of State power, it remains ultimately in
contradiction with capitalism, since it carries the potential for human-
good. More pessimistically, the Frankfurt School of critical theorists
hold that the domination of nature involved in the scientific
enterprise, extends itself into the political domination of the masses.
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The oppressive nature of science and technology under capitalism is
reflected not simply in the commodities produced, but the ideological
role played by scientific theories in the maintenance of existing power
relationships. Marcuse (1964) describes the extent to which
technological rationality has pervaded the social world. He sees science
and technology as a particular mode of rationality aiding human
oppression by reducing political questions into technical issues (which
must be resolved by experts). This position is also reflected in the
writings of Habermas (1971) who sees technology and science as
'ideology'.
Technological rationality is promoted as the ultimate rational
discourse. Scientific and technical knowledge are elevated to a level
of status-authority which defies legitimate criticism. It is not simply
one way of looking at an issue, it is 'the truth' of the matter, based
on 'the objective facts' of the situation. The apparently 'impersonal',
'neutral' rationality of science, extends into the administrative sphere
in the form of Weberian notion of 'bureaucratic rationality'.
Bureaucracy is typified by a close documentation of events, a minute
division of labour where the sphere of competence of participants is
closely defined and hierarchically organised; allowing 	 legal-rational
control to be exercised. As Gorz (1976, pp. 62-63) states:
"Hierarchy in production and society over all can be preserved only if
expertise is made the preserve, the privilege, the monopoly of those who
are socially selected to hold both knowledge and authority."
When applied to medicine, this hierarchical approach serves to discount
the non-expert knowledge of, for example, pregnant women (see Jordan,
1986). Their experience will, in any case, be seen as subjective and,
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therefore, tending towards 'unreliability' within the epistemological
framework of 'scientism'.	 In Obstetrics, the experts in giving birth
are no longer women themselves but Obstetricians. Within Intensive Care
likewise, expertise in dealing with critical illness becomes embedded in
high-technology, a construction inpenetrable to the patient's close-
relatives. Habermas (1971) has criticised the tendency of handing over
self-understanding to technical-experts, involving the de-politicization
of issues and the mobilization of a 'neutral' technical rationale.
Scientific theories can be seen simply as forms of language which
provide an interpretation of the world (Nietzsche, 1974); such that
there are no 'facts' but only interpretations. The form that scientific
language takes is, however, significant. The separate language used by
science to encode its world-view forms a semantic barrier, representing
a power divide between scientists and lay-people (Gorz, 1976). The
exclusivity of such encodement serves to mystify rather than enlighten
the uninitiated.	 Similarly, Rose and Rose (1976) point-out that, the
choice of words used to express activities addressed by technological
ideologies are indicative of the inherent power-game agenda: the
'conquest' of space, the 'modification' of weather, the 'exploitation'
of natural resources, the 'control' of brains and behaviour.	 We may
add to these the 'management' of labour, remembering that management
ultimately is neither an art nor a science but a command relationship.
Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) has termed this a 'male choice of theory' which
stresses principles of domination and aggression. She cites the DNA
molecule which is termed the 'master molecule' determining the structure
and processes of life and points-out that feminist geneticists have
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posed a more holistic less hierarchical model of the organism and the
role of genetic structures within it.
Lukes (1974) has emphasised the impact and power of non-decisions on
eventual outcomes, i.e. it is a political decision to decide not to
address certain questions or posit certain possible solutions.
'Science' is functional to capitalism and patriarchy in addressing some
questions rather than others, whose terms of reference would widen the
debate to challenge fundamental social relations. For example, the
majority of diseases have social, economic and environmental causes and
are, therefore, best addressed through preventative health strategies
(Doyal 1979, Townsend and Davidson 1982). Many such strategies would,
in practice, prove unacceptable to capital or patriarchial interests,
since they would involve a restructuring of the productive and domestic
labour processes in such a way that the profit motive and the interests
of men were not supreme. They would thus require a wholesale
redistribution of power and wealth within society in favour of the less
privileged. Addressing this issue in terms of capital, Doyal (1979,
p.297) comments:
"Consequently health itself has come to be defined in terms of the needs
of capital accumulation and . . . health objectives will not be pursued
if they conflict with profit - as ultimately they must."
This includes the capital accumulation of drug and medical equipment
companies and, for example, the tobacco industry whose profits are
directly linked to ill-health but whose revenues to Government coffers
counteract the N.H.S. revenue consequencies of smoking. It is,
therefore, less disruptive to the existing power relations and more
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economically profitable to seek salvation from illness and disease
through a 'technological-fix'.
Although it is undeniable that medical science and technology have made
a substantial positive input to health care, the size of that
contribution has been considerably over-estimated, while their
iatrogenic effects have been greatly under-stated. The greatest
benefits to health have resulted from public health measures and
improvements in nutrition, limitations in family size, and so on. In
terms of social control, however, the interests of capitalism,
patriarchy and the medical profession coincide to frame the debate in
terms of (male) medical heroics; in this way these groups keep and
enhance their power.
Technology, which is applied science, is the product of specific
design-goals and reflects the social relations of capital and
patriarchy.	 The practical problems technology addresses are
determined by the political, economic and social context not by the
direction of the particular science.	 The outcome of technology design
reflects and reinforces the interests of some social groups rather than
others.	 This is because technology embodies certain assumptions about
the nature of 'reality' (for example, much medical technology, as we
have seen, proceeds on the basis of mind-body dualism and the body as a
machine - derived from Cartesian dualism). Thus, it is designed with
certain aims, goals and targets in mind:
n . . . medical care as we know it - i.e. as it has developed in
capitalist society - is not just an unambiguously useful commodity like
asparagus or shoes or swimming lessons. Like many other more complex
commodities, it is thoroughly permeated with captialist priorities and
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capitalist social relations. Not merely the distribution, not merely
the transaction between doctor and patient, but the medical technology
Itself (which is based on certain assumptions about the nature of
disease processes, the causation and cure of disease, the relations of
individuals to their own bodies and to social processes) embodies the
social relations created by captialist society. . ." (Ehrenreich, 1978,
p.16)
This understanding of technology does not imply technological
determinism but suggests that technology does set some limits, the scope
of which are not socially neutral. For example:
u . • . assembly line production techniques and machinery assume and
reinforce the separation and antagonistic relation between mental and
manual labour; and so forth" (Ehrenreich, 1978, p.17)
Ehrenreich continues by pointing-out that this may be less evident in
relation to medical technology:
"For one thing, an unusual amount of mystery surrounds the technology,
the result in part of doctors efforts to keep their knowledge esoteric;
for another, the presumably benevolent purposes of medical endeavor
prove an unusually opaque disguise for the sometimes antagonistic social
relations built into it." (Ehrenreich, 1978, p.17)
In capitalist society it is the owners of the technology (the means of
production) used in the productive sphere who are empowered by
technology design and those who work with it disempowered. The issue is
one of control. Control is the mobilisation of power. Social relations
determine the division of labour around technology and, since technology
also embodies social relations, technology will be one site in the
struggle for control within the labour process.
u . . . if capitalism is to survive, each succeeding generation of
workers must stay in an appropriate relationship to capital: the
relations of production must be reproduced. Workers must not step
outside the relation of the wage, the relation of property, the relation
of authority. So 'reproducing capitalist relations' means reproducing
the class system, ownership, above all reproducing a 'frame of mind'."
(Cockburn, 1977, p. 56)
In medicine the dominant group are doctors, in terms of both social
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class (often combined with gender-derived or race-derived power) and
recognised 'expert knowledge'. Subordinate to this controlling group
are both the Intensive Care Nurse/Midwife and the patient/birth
partner/relatives. This subordination will be built into and reinforced
by the nature of the technology and the way the superordinates would
prefer it to be used. There will be some re-negotiation, for example,
around the use of fetal monitors and the results they produce, by some
subordinates, representing a 'fight-back' in terms of wresting back some
power and control within the labour process. Technology represents a
central focus in this endeavour, since its use is integral to the
division of labour and policy implimentation in both ITU and Obstetrics.
The Social Relations of Technology in Context 
We have seen that social relations, often antagonistic, are embedded in
technology and surround its use. Such social relations are expressions
of the power relations which structure society. Technology reinforces
the power of 'the expert', since it involves a hierarcy of competence
and decision-making power (Jordan, 1987). Experts are seen as
especially, sometimes uniquely, qualified to judge the merits of
situations. The corollary of this for the 'non-expert' is the
mystification of human agency, the masking of 'uncertainty' and a de-
skilling and dis-empowerment of their own autonomous human responses.
This section will take as its prime focus the use of technology in
Obstetrics. This focus is emphasised because 'patients' are conscious,
supposedly consenting, usually in good health and are participating in
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an event which is generally defined as 'happy' and 'fulfilling'. It is
interesting to consider, therefore, the social relations of technology
use against this more socially positive backdrop.
The management of birth by the application of science and technology, is
part of the process whereby technology, and the positivist,
behaviouristic model of the world on which it rests, is seen as the only
rational response to social life (Marcuse, 1964). Within the biomedical
model, birth comes under the ownership of (male) 'experts' and
sociocultural factors are seen as either neutral or an inhibiting force
to the appropriate care of the childbearing woman (McLain, 1983,
Scambler, 1987). We have already seen that the epistemology of
'scientism' relegates the 'subjective' to the sphere of the unreliable.
This causes obstetricians to comment, for instance: ". . . people get
funny ideas about how they want to have their babies. . •" (Consultant
Obstetrician, Obstetric Hospital)
We have seen that, stretching back to the Renaissance, 'science' was
equated with 'Reason' - and both 'Reason' and 'science' were depicted as
cognitively 'male' (see, Easlea, 1981; Lloyd 1984; Cockburn 1985).
The task of science was to control and order the chaotic threat of
Nature which was conceptualized as female (Lloyd, 1984).	 Marcuse
(1964, p9) taking-up the theme of 'science' as 'Reason' comments;
. . . in the contemporary period, the technological controls appear to
be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social groups
and interests - to such an extent that all contradictions seem
irrational and all counteraction impossible. . . The intellectual and
emotional refusal 'to go along' appears neurotic and impotent."
The failure 'to go along' with what is suggested in pregnancy and birth,
will certainly be seen as a wilful, neurotic and selfish act by the
mother and detrimental to the child she is carrying. For example:
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"Obviously, I'm very sympathetic to the mothers as well but possibly I
have more sympathy for the babies. . . • we have to consider the baby,
I think some mothers, a small minority, see childbirth as a personal
experience for them, rather than as a start of life for somebody else
and I think they may have a rather selfish outlook upon it. . . •The
baby needs an advocate sometimes." <Consultant Obstetrician, Obstetric
Hospital)
• • • they want to get away from so called high-tech obstetrics.	 .
And my own personal feeling is, that any mother who wants to have her
baby at home is having it for her benefit and to her it's a purely
selfish experience. . . my own personal feeling is that if a mother
wants her baby in her home now, she is putting the baby at risk,
unnecessary risk, for her own self-satisfaction, 0.K?" (Consultant
Obstetrician, Obstetric Hospital)
Arney (1982) has pointed to the emergence in Obstetric literature from
the 1950's of the baby as the 'second patient' and the extent to which
this has been facilitated by the emergence of technology which aids the
direct surveillance of the baby as well as the mother. Embodied in the
Consultants' comments is a construction of the mother and baby as in
opposition to each other. Of course, dilemmas may arise where the
interests of the mother and the baby may not be the same but this
depiction seems to involve a more fundamental conflict of interest
between the woman and the child she is carrying. Why should this be so?
First, it is necessary to consider why the mother is being seen as
'selfish'. She is not seen as selfish if she rushes for pain relief
(which may have iatrogenic effects). She is not seen as selfish if she
gives health care professionals a 'free-hand' in the use other medical
technologies on her body, despite the efficacy and safety of some
techniques remaining unproven. This is, at least, consistent since such
circumspection on the part of the woman would imply that she was the
best advocate for her baby but we have already seen the Obstetrician has
claimed this role for himself. 	 The mother is construed as 'selfish'
because she resists the view, held by the majority of obstetricians,
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that high-technology birthing is the safest option. The question
emerges as one of control <like the subtext of Wendy Savage's (1986)
defence of her own practice): "who controls childbirth?". To press his
(sic.) claim based on expertise and technology the Obstetrician will
enlist the baby against the mother.
Pregnant women in my study displayed a basic acceptance of the medical
model of birth and expected to experience a labour with some degree of
technological intervention; although a few commented they wanted it to
be 'as natural as possible'.*	 The vast majority expected to need some
form of artificial pain relief (only 3 of the 20 intended to try and
cope without such relief - see Appendix IX for full details). In the
event none did. This is a highly technologized model of birth.
Interviewed antenatally nearly half the women hoped to labour with
external monitoring, in practice only two of the twenty did so. The
organisational culture predominantly promoted internal monitoring. It
was often a corollary of some other treatment, usually pain relief or
the acceleration or induction of labour. 	 Those wanting to be
monitored externally often appeared to be repelled by the very
'internal' and invasive nature of internal monitoring (whereby a scalp
electrode is attached to the baby's head via a lead running through the
woman's vagina). One woman expressed this graphically:
"I felt I was invaded (by internal monitoring during her last labour). .
. at the time I felt I wanted to do it all myself and not have anything,
any sort of invasion or anything like that." (Antenatal Interview)
* What they meant by this is itself problematic and will be considered
later.
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Similarly:
This woman feels 'invaded'; an 'invasion' from an invasive technology.
"I hated that (internal monitoring), I felt like I was bionic. Like I
wasn't a human being" (Antenatal Interview)
Why does this woman feel less than a human subject? Since electronic
monitoring is essentially located in the positivist/behaviourist mode
(concerned with those aspects which can be mechanically described and
measured), such technology works towards the 'objectification' of the
patient.	 This occurs by surveillance and 'measurement' of the patients
'vital signs'.	 Deriving from the Sartrean notion of 'being for self'
the 'struggle for freedom' is lost when one allows oneself to become
objectified in the eyes of another.	 Foucault (1977) has pointed to
the control achieved by locating an individual in a 'field of
visibility' and Arney and Neill (1982) have applied this notion to
maternity patients. Electronic monitors have considerably extended
this process, since they make visible, on a continuous basis certain
internal workings of the body. This may lead in labour, for example, to
the midwife telling the labouring woman: 'you're starting to have a
contraction now, start breathing' rather than allowing her to apprehend
this for herself through her own body. This may cause the woman to
doubt the integrity of her own body to 'know' how to give birth.
Similarly in ITU, patients discharged from Units often experience
anxiety and mistrust their own body's ability to continue functioning
efficiently without the support of technology.
Associated with this doubt in the integrity of her own body to give
birth without technological assistance, the labouring woman may also
experience some difficulty in moving repeatedly between the 'natural'
discourse and the 'technological' discourse. In the 'natural'
discourse, she is primarily responsible for her body and coping with the
labour. In the 'technological discourse', control and responsibility
lie primarily with the medical experts. During the course of a labour,
she may be required to move between these two discourses, perhaps on
more than one occasion. For example, having laboured for a certain
amount of time, she may decide to have an epidural fitted. This may not
work well and she may have to again try to cope from her own resources.
The staff may then get the epidural working effectively and later tail
it off in order to let her try to push the baby out herself.
To pursue this a bit further, many women believed that an epidural would
inevitably remove all pain. This view was often reinforced by the staff
who tended not to discuss fully the 'downside' of pain relief. A
Consultant Obstetrician commented:
"Then you would discuss the epidural. Very few people don't know what
an epidural is. But you would say what it is, you say 'it's an
injection in your back, once you give it then your pains disappear'"
However, 'pains' do not always 'disappear'.	 Crawford (1972), for
example, found that 5% of epidurals fail completely and relief is
incomplete in 15.4% of women and Doughty (1975) found a failure-rate of
8%. More recent research (Moir, 1982) suggests 4-7% of women given
epidurals will be left with one or more spinal nerves unaffected. As
Inch (1982) has pointed out, women can be psychologically devastated to
find that they are left with pain when a pain-free labour has been
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promised. One woman interviewed received no pain relief from her
epidural after the first half an hour.	 Another suffered
considerable pain and believed that the catheter delivering the epidural
had fallen out during the course of the labour, while one woman who was
induced and advised to have an epidural for raised blood pressure
described her labour in the following way:
"Then it (the epidural) only took on one side. . . and they were busy
trying to right that by tipping me on my side. There was a drip to make
the contractions, I don't know what was in it and they came really,
really quickly and that was pretty awful. The trouble was I could feel
these contractions and they came so fast I got really het-up about it
and distressed. • . so they gave me a long break before going into the
second stage, which was probably the best bit really. The rest was
pretty awful. The actual delivery was OK, except I couldn't get him out
(laughs). It had to be the forceps in the end which I didn't mind.
They said 'You'll have this baby one way or another!'. . . I found the
whole thing pretty horrible really." (Postnatal Interview)
Several women with epidurals whose labours I attended seemed to suffer
some degree of pain, although they often reported this as slight and it
was frequently remedied by re-positioning the woman. One woman
complained of considerable pain on one side of her abdomen. She
appeared to experience more difficulty coping with this development than
she had with the pre-epidural pain. Once the epidural was in place her
expectation had been that she would suffer no pain. She was now unable
to move into a more comfortable position, while agreeing to the epidural
had in some ways represented the handing over of the labour to the
medical staff. Since the pain remained, she now had to take this back
again and attempt to deal with it herself (while the staff continued to
attempt adjustments). For women, this process involves moving between
two different discourses: the 'natural' and the 'technological' and back
again, and is difficult to achieve. These are different models of the
world, which place the woman in a different relationship to her
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environment and the people around her. The staff too work on the
principle that if the woman has an epidural she should feel no pain.
Rectifying epidural malfunctions becomes a central focus of interaction
for the remainder of the labour where these occur. Thus,the focus
shifts to the technology. Furthermore, epidural analgesia prevents
reflex stimulation of the perineum and reduces or eliminates the
mother's urge to push in second stage. It also causes the pelvic floor
muscles to become flaccid so that they do not guide and rotate the
baby's head towards the correct position for birth; natural rotation and
descent is, therefore, inhibited and the need for forceps assistance is
greatly increased (Hoult, et al, 1977, Studd, et al, 1980). Goodfellow,
et al (1983) argues that an effective epidural also inhibits the .
stimulation of the pelvic autonomic nerves as the birth canal is
distended, reducing the natural release of oxytocin, thereby reducing
the force of uterine contractions. Against this backcloth:
". . . someone's got to get the knack of pushing without feeling it."
(Senior Sister Midwife)
Pushing (and, indeed, pushing hard enough and in 'the right place')
without the presence of an expulsive urge is not to be under-estimated:
"It (the epidural) worked too well because I couldn't feel the
contractions to push (laughs). I ended up having forceps. They'd say
'that's right, do it again' but I didN it know what I was doing, it was
really difficult." (Post-natal interview)
Attempting to tail-off the epidural at second stage, to allow sensation
to return was not always the answer. Women were often unable to deal
with the return of pain in this more severe form, having been 'pain-
free'. This again represents moving between discourses, from the
'natural' to the 'technological' and then back again; from being under
technological control to attempting to be in self-control. This
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ontologically fractures the woman's experience of giving birth. It is
often not possible to put 'humpty-dumpty' back together again:
"And I was in such pain after not feeling any and they'd sped up the
contractions and I was in agony and I was being sick, And then they
couldn't find the Anaesthetist. If I could have walked I'd have killed
someone honestly", (Postnatal Interview)
One woman in second stage with an epidural fitted commented rather
plaintively: "I am glad I am pushing, it's like you're participating".
There may also be a mystification of agency surrounding technology:
Epidurals may cause a drop in maternal blood pressure (hypotension),
which may in turn lead to decelerations in the fetal heart rate. These
may be more pronounced if oxytocin is being used to accelerate the
labour (Lieberman, et al 1979). This becomes more likely, since an
epidural tends to prolong labour if it is not already well-established
(Rosen, 1977). During one observed labour where the above events
appeared to be unfolding, such 'technical problems' were attributed by
the midwife to the idiocyncracy of the baby: 'it doesn't like that' she
said several times in relation to the baby's response to the syntocinon:
'it must be a boy causing this much trouble!'. She later pronounced
that the baby was 'playing with us', rather in the manner of the whale
In Moby Dick, since it manifested a deceleration each time the
syntocinon was turned-up. She also accused the baby of being
'troublesome' when a uterine pressure catheter fell-out. This ruse
seemed to be intended to 'lighten' the atmosphere but also served to
further mystify agency within the situation. The problems had arguably
been set in train by human intervention using technological initiatives.
This particular mother, as was evident in other cases, used further
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interventions (that were arguably associated with the use of epidural
anaesthesia) as validatory of the decision to have an epidural, i.e.
when the second fetal blood sample was being performed (a blood sample
taken from the fetal scalp to test for the level of oxygen in the blood
- to check the level of fetal distress registering on the fetal
monitor), she steadfastly intoned: 'I'm glad I had an epidural'
	 Thus
signifying that further interventions may be seen as confirmatory of the
initial decision to have an epidural and not as a possible critique.
Having said this, it must be stressed that several women in the study
.remained extremely grateful and positive post-natally that they had
opted for epidurals regardless of the type of delivery they had
experienced and said they would do so again. One added:
"They'll be no hanging around, I'll just go straight in and say 'I want
an epidural'" (Postanatal Interview)
One woman, in fact, described the epidural itself (rather than the
birth) as: "a beautiful thing" and although she was frustrated about
"not being mobile", this comment addressed the post-delivery situation
when her legs were still numb, rather than her desire to move about in
labour. Another woman said she had an epidural in order to keep
control:
. • . I thought I might have some Entenox, although in the back of my
mind I'd always thought I might have an epdiural because I didn't want
to lose control." (Postnatal Interview)
Kitzinger (1987) mentions women opting for epidurals to maintain or
reassert control (using drugs to reassert control was also a strategy
used by staff in ITU) or because they feared losing control. She
reports that they later felt out of control as a result of this
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decision, given that they found this choice entailed other
interventions.
Arney (1982) maintains that continuous electronic fetal monitoring
places the labouring woman under more direct surveillance by the
obstetrican and, therefore, she is under greater control. It also
places midwifery practice under greater surveillance by super-ordinates
(and, therefore, potentially more readily under their control), since
all treatment must be recorded on the monitor print-out (this does not
apply to Intensive Care), alongside fetal and maternal physiological
readings.	 Recording all treatment on 'the trace' (monitor print-out)
made the midwives' practice all the more visible to the doctor. Doctors
entering the delivery room would always view 'the trace' if one were
available (as was usually the case at the Obstetric Hospital). One
doctor, in particular, tended to walk into the Delivery Room, look at
the trace and walk out again without speaking to either the midwife or
the woman in labour. During observation, another doctor walked into the
Delivery Room, leaving the presence of the labouring woman and the
midwife completely unacknowledged, he looked at the trace and said
"Nice!" and then walked out again:
". . . it's like a recording. So when the doctors come. . . usually the
trace is the one they will want to see. . ." (Staff Midwife)
A Sister Midwife sums-up this situation:
"And most people when they come in, tend to go and look at the print-out
of the machine and ignore the mother because it gives you everything
that's been happening and you're looking at the baby."
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Here, 'Everything that's been happening' is narrowly and
positivistically defined, while 'the baby' becomes: the fetal heart
rate reading. Simultaneously, the trace may undermine the authority and
power of the midwife. The doctor is able to bypass her (this will
happen to varying degrees in practice) and gain information directly
from the trace not only about the physiological behaviour of the mother
but the conduct of the midwife. In practice, information has always
been available to doctors from the patient's medical notes but data in
the form of a trend print-out (which the trace represents), annotated
with all treatment and observations represents a highly visible and
accessible (legal) document. The comprehensive nature of the obstetric
trace, therefore, means it can be used for the surveillance of the
midwife's practice as well as the patient's performance. Thus, it is a
form of Obstetric control which bears on the midwife as well as the
labouring woman.
Within capitalist society, manufacturing shop floor assembly line
production techniques and machinery assume and reinforce the separation
and antagonistic relation between mental and manual labour. As we have
already seen, much chemical pain relief used in obstetrics operates on
the basis of mind body dualism either dissociating the mind from the
body (Pethedine) or the body from the mind (Epidural Anaesthesia).
This in effect also represents a separation of mental and manual labour.
Chemical pain relief is also an external agent of coping , de-
emphasising the ability to cope from one's own natural resources and the
emotional support of others. To use routinely a technical system which
acts as a substitute for the women's ability to cope in labour (and with
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an epidural, this will reduce the chances that she will be able to
deliver her child herself without the use of Obstetric instruments); is
an expropriation of women's creative powers at a fundamental level.
Cooley (1976, p.74) writing of the expropriation of skills into
technological power on the manufacturing shop-floor has this to say:
"This science, as it manifests itself to the workers through fixed
capital, although it is merely the accumulation of the knowledge and
skill now appropriated, confronts them as an alien and hostile force,
and further subordinates them to the machine. The nature of their
activity, the movement of their limbs, the rate and sequence of those
movements - all these are determined in quite minute detail by the
'scientific' requirement of fixed capital'. Thus obJectivised labour in
the form of fixed capital, emerges in the productive process as a
dominating force, opposed to living labour. . . now this life no longer
belongs to them but to the owner of the object."
Here one could equally be talking about the woman in labour attached to
a battery of instruments and machines, immobilized, her pain
anaesthetised and her labour being 'adjusted' according to a previously
determined schedule of what is considered 'efficient' and 'normal'.
Might not, under such circumstances the women feel that her labour is no
longer her own but belongs to the 'owner' (professionally) of the means
(technology) by which the labour is being conducted? In this way
Obstetricians might be seen to have colonised childbirth in the truest
sense of the word, not Just taken over much of the work of the midwife.
Technology, therefore, is a control resource which may be aimed towards
securing predictability and compliance within a labour force and labour
process by the dominant group (in both Obstetrics and ITU, the
doctors).	 This is associated with a standardization and routinisation
of events - in this case birth and death. Technology will be designed
to encourage passivity and visibility of the patient (Arney 1982, Arney
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and Neill 1982) and visibility and compliance of subordinate staff
behaviour. Technology is also used in social closure around occupations
(Witz, 1985), its use often forming part of the boundaries around
occupations. This may be seen in Obstetrics where who is allowed to
use certain technology is an integral part of the normal/abnormal
divide, for example, forceps are exclusively used by doctors.
Certain conclusions arise from this analysis. As we saw earlier, Odent
(1984) has claimed that women give birth with fewer complications and
greater satisfaction if they are allowed to contact the primitive
instincts which lie deep within themselves. The social relations of
obstetric technology are likely to represent some considerable
disjuncture from instinctual birthing. Strauss, et al (1982), pointed
out that health care professionals were often required to do
'sentimental work' in order to facilitate carrying-out of their
instrumental work. They may be less inclined to admit the value of
'instinctual work', since this can only be carried- out by 'the subject'
and so is outside the control and jurisdiction of the Obstetrician and
may indeed threaten their role by making it obsolete (in the individual
case). This is to make central the patient as 'subject', rather than
the patient as 'object'.
Significantly, Marcuse (1964, p,72) points out that not all energy saved
by machine power (technology) is labour power (physical and mental
labour). Libido, the energy of the life instincts is also saved or
barred from its previous modes of realisation. This may well be applied
to childbirth and the inability to realise 'instinctual energy' for
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'instinctual birthing' in the wake of medicalization and technologising.
Marcuse (1964, p.73) acknowledges that the pre-technological world would
have been full of misery, toil and filth but:
". • . still there was a 'landscape', a medium of libidinal experience
which no longer exists. With its disappearance. . . a whole dimension
of human activity and passivity has been de-eroticised. • . The
environment from which the individual could obtain pleasure, which he
could cathect as gratifying almost as an extended zone of the body has
been rigidly reduced, consequently, the 'universe' of libidinous
cathexis is likewise reduced. The effect is a localization and
contraction of libido, the reduction of erotic to sexual experience and
satisfaction."
It is thus that he compares sex in a meadow to sex in an automobile, a
lovers walk in the countryside to that in a Manhattan Street:
"In the former case, the environment partakes of and invites libidinal
cathexis and tends to be eroticised."
Kitzinger (1987, p. 9,) has described childbirth as a psycho-sexual act:
"For quite apart from pain it involves intense, urgent and incredibly
powerful physical sensations of pressure and opening and overwhelming
emotions."
It is clear that libidinal cathexis of this instinctual life energy is
less likely to be achieved in a highly clinical, technological setting
and least of all paralysed from the waist-down (during an epidural).
Furthermore, the biomedical approach is ultimately antagonistic to
notions such as instinctive birthing given its positivistic core:
"The metaphsycial dimension, formerly a genuine field of rational
thought, becomes irrational and unscientific . . . non-operational
ideas, aspirations, memories and images have become expendable,
irrational, confusing or meaningless." (Marcuse, 1964, p.173-187)
Rather, the social relations of the medical technology employed involves
male dichotomies of the subject and object, mind and body and the
emphasis on the need for an 'expert technician' - the doctor. The
biomedical model is based on empiricism, arguing that labours are
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only 'normal' in retrospect (when they have proved themselves to be so).
The uncertainty that this engenders (given the potential
unpredictability in individual cases) leads to the propostion that: all
must be subject to the same regime. This is put forward as the
technically rational way to proceed. Women who do not wish to accept
what is routinely offered are likely, therefore, to be viewed by the
majority of obstetricians as recalcitrant and/or neurotic and
irrational. In this sense, Marcuse points-out, society alters the
relation between the 'rational' and 'irrational'. 	 Liberty is extended,
since technology frees women from extreme pain in some labours or the
prospect of a previously unavoidable death, while domination is
intensified, given that the nature of the technology is itself
repressive (as are the social relations between those who
professionally 'own' the technology and those who labour with it) and
the fact that it is often used routinely:
"Inasmuch as the greater liberty involves a contraction rather than
extension and development of instinctual needs, it works for rather than
against the status quo of general repression - one might speak of
'institutionalized desublimation'. The latter appears to be a vital
factor in the making of the authoritarian personality of our time."
(Marcuse, 1964, p.74)
Conclusion 
Thus, authoritarian relations are facilitated 	 by the pervasiveness of
technological rationality within capitalist society which preconditions
"the organism. . . for the spontaneous acceptance of what is offered"
(Marcuse, 1964, p.74). Marcuse describes as the 'happy consciousness'
the belief that 'the real is the rational'; that what exists is what
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should exist. There is an inability to conceive of an alternative
(greatly fostered and reinforced by 'the expert'); this is a feature of
hegemony as described by Gramsci (1971) and other Marxists in this
tradition, for example, Mann (1973). Marcuse (1964, p. 1) links this
with discontent being 'bought-off' by technological 'progress':
"A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in
advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress. . . In
this universe, technology also provides the great rationalization of the
unfreedom of man and demonstrates the 'technical' impossibility of being
autonomous, of determining one's own life. For this unfreedom appears
neither as irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to the
technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life (and increases
the productivity of labour)."
Autonomy has given way under pain relief (see also Illich, 1976). Many
women and experts now strive for childbirth with as little pain as
possible or, indeed, the 'painfree' labour (of the epidural or the
general anaesthetic). This is to gloss over the fact that such labours
are scarcely pain-free, since the interventions may either involve pain
(or may be followed by pain) and may lead to further interventions.
There is also often a failure to acknowledge that childbirth can be
enjoyable with little or no pain relief. At the same time, that which
may be desirable in specific cases may be highly undesirable applied
routinely? How has this degree of medicalization come about? And, how
has it developed in the two areas under review? Furthermore, what role
has technology played in this process?
CHAPTER 5 
MEDICALIZATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL COLONISATION OF THE BEGINNINGS AND 
ENDS OF LIFE 
Once	 a	 society	 is
medicine	 can	 transform
because they are unborn,
at	 some	 other	 'age	 of
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nothing	 new;
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newborn,
	 menopausal,	 or
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its	 autonomy	 to	 its
life is
intense
some of
ritualization of stages of
what is new is their
(Illich, 1976, p.86)
Birth and death used to be located in the home and in the community.
Now they are private affairs 'locked' away in hospitals. Enclosed in
these hermetically sealed environments, they have been pulled-out by the
roots from everyday experience. They have been withdrawn into the
province of the professional carer and the medical model. How is it
that the beginnings and ends of life have become medicalized (Zola,
1972; Illich 1976) in this way?	 Technology, often used on a routine
basis, plays a key role in this process. It is in medical science and
technology that we are encouraged to seek individual salvation, rather
than changing many of the social practices (aligned with powerful vested
interests) that cause ill-health (see, Townsend and Davidson, 1982).
Medicalization often serves to regulate what it cannot 'cure'. Birth
and death are an inevitable part of life; medical technology is used in
the procedural standardization of these events.
The process of technologizing around birth and critical illness/death is
considered in the context of the historic and contemporary struggle over
who controls childbirth and the establishment and development over time
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of the ITU provision. Technology has been central to the transformation
of childbirth from a women-dominated area to one controlled by
(predominantly) male obstetricians. Technological development has also
been fundamental to the creation of the Anaesthetists' ITU 'empire'.
Thus, medical technology has been integral to the process whereby
doctors have furthered their professional interests and extended their
control over health care subordinates and patients.
It follows, therefore, that the 'technologizing' of birth and critical
illness/death has been intimately connected with the increasing
'medicalization' of experience: ". . . people come to believe that in
health care, as in all other fields of endeavour, technology can be used
to change the human condition according to almost any design." (Illich,
1976, p.82)
'Medicalization' is a critical concept emphasing the medical enterprise
as not merely 'scientific' but social (Zola, 1972, Illich, 1976). It
represents the mobilization of the medical model in the social world.
The medical profession's jurisdiction over evermore areas and conditions
has extended considerably beyond its demonstrated capacity to 'cure'
them (Freidson, 1970). This has variously been associated with 'medical
imperialism' (Illich, 1976), a reliance on scientific experts, stemming
from an increasingly technical and bureaucratic society (Zola 1972,
1975) and the desire to create and control markets (Larson, 1977). This
has certain effects. Both the meaning and interpretation of an
experience is transformed when it is seen in terms of the medical
model, as either a disease or a syndrome (Freidson, 1970). Defining
either conduct or physiological functions - for example, pregnancy,
menstration, manifest psychological distress - in terms of medical
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symptoms and labels, serves to define and control behaviour; and
influences the perceptions of what is occuring both for the 'sufferer'
and those close to them. It allows doctors to become "moral
entrepreneurs" (Illich, 1976, p54), moral power-brokers, able to
legitimize the moral status of the individual in various ways, for
example, whether the pain they feel is 'real', whether they are 'fit' to
work, whether they are 'dead' (the latter comes to the fore in a
particularly contentious and technological form in the area of 'brain-
death'- see chapter 7). Medicalizing problems and encoding them in a
mystifying medical language, also removes them from the public debate
(Conrad and Schneider, 1980).	 Thus, medicalization, as well as
furthering the professional interests of doctors, also serves the
political interests of capital and patriarchy. An aspect of this is the
market it provides for the accumulation of capital based on the sale of
medical products (see Waitzkin, 1990).
Medicalization may inhibit people from developing skill and autonomy
both in coping with suffering and responding and relating to bodily
changes in personally meaningful terms. In short, they may allow
experts to define human experience and in so doing lose this ability
themselves (Mich 1976). Illich argues that the impersonal medical
mode of defining and 'dealing' with 'problems' works against the
development of wider compassion and a personal, tender response to
suffering on the part of the wider community. The latter mode Illich
terms "compassionate tolerance" (Mich, 1976, p.117) and may be
compared with "repressive tolerance" which, Marcuse (1964) associates
with the technical mode with which the medical model is linked. Thus,
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whereby individuals and communities become unable to define and care
for themselves. It is a process which he sees as promoting dependency,
lowering levels of tolerance for discomfort and pain, and de-skilling
and de-legitimising possibilities for self-care:
"Social iatrogenesis is at work when health care is turned into a
standardized item, a staple; when all suffering is 'hospitalized' and
homes become inhospitable to birth, sickness and death; when the
language in which people could experience their bodies is turned into
bureaucratic gobbledegook; or when suffering, mourning and healing
outside the patient role are labelled a form of deviance." (Illich,
1976, p.49)
i> The Management of 'Risk' 
These days, even when one is nominally 'healthy', one becomes defined as
medically 'at risk' of contracting various diseases. It is not so much
that 'we are all middle class now' as 'we are all hypocondriacs now:
dogged by skin cancer, heart disease, aids or the latest medical moral
panic.	 "Well Men" and "Well Woman" clinics have now become a part of
everyday life. These are part of the drive towards the proliferation
of 'preventative' screening techniques. Illich (1976, pp.97-129)
maintains of this trend:
"People are turned into patients without being sick. . . until proved
healthy, the citizen is now presumed to be sick. . . Health has ceased
to be a native endowment each human being is presumed to possess until
proven ill and has become an ever-receding goal to which one is entitled
by virtue of social justice."
The culmination of medicalization is that one has to go to visit a
doctor for him/her to 'diagnose' you as 'healthy'. The individual is
thus constructed as constantly 'at risk' of contracting some 'medical
condition'. Thus Illich (1976, p.86) argues that life is turned into:
"a series of periods of risk, each calling for special tutelage of a
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"a series of periods of risk, each calling for special tutelage of a
special kind." If one is constructed as constantly at medical 'risk',
this comes into even sharper focus when either pregnancy has been
'diagnosed' or there is an onset of critical illness (the latter is at
the extreme of the medical 'risk' continuum).
In both Intensive Care and Obstetrics there is an attempt to assess
'risk'. In Intensive Care this takes the form of an assessment of the
risk of death. This is a Judgement which needs to be finely balanced in
the ITU context, since in some sense the patient must be in a
potentially life-threatening situation to warrant ITU care but, on the
other hand, they must be deemed recoverable and capable of worthwhile
survival. In practice, such an assessment is riven with uncertainty as
it bears on the individual case. 	 Various procedures and techniques
have been employed, with varying degrees of formality to address the
question of 'risk'. Apache II (developed by the ICU Research Centre at
the George Washington University Medical Centre, U.S.A., to establish
physiological derangement from the norm) exemplifies the formal end of
the assessment continuum, whilst, for example, the patient's presumed
feelings about what constitutes 'acceptable' survival is at the
informally constructed end of the range. Such assessments take place
against some considerable uncertainty (see Chapter 8), in essence:
"I'm not sure we know which patients to treat. I'm not sure we know
when to quit." (Consultant Intensivist, General Unit). To the patient's
relatives, however, the uncertainty surrounding the patient's condition
might become less apparent whilst the situation appears (however
temporarily) technologically controlled. This, occurs in tension with
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the more general association of Intensive Care with high drama and
incipient crisis.
In Obstetrics too, Antenatal Clinics have increasingly ascribed women a
'risk status', based on factors such as age, number of children,
obstetric and medical history. Risk assessments are concerned with
morbidity but the underlying premis is again the risk of death: maternal
or fetal (see, Oakley, 1984), A Consultant Obstetrician commented:
H
.
 • . if the woman's life was at risk. I mean it's at risk with any
Obstetric case but. . ."
In this way, Obstetrics, like Intensive Care, is primarily concerned
with preventing death rather than facilitating and positively promoting
birth. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is such widespread
commonality of technology between the two areas. Quiligan (1972, pp.61-
69), an American Obstetrician, writes:
"It is our contention. . . that unless the Intensive Care orientation
pervades hospital obstetric practice from clinic to delivery room, many
patients who need such care will fail to be identified. . • Intensive
Care, of course, is more than an orientation. It requires the
concentration of equipment and test results. . • that permits fetal-
maternal status to be evaluated in much greater detail than is possible
by traditional indice.s. • ."
Health care professionals view the allocation of a woman to a 'risk'
category as representing an objective quantification of 'risk' applied
to the individual mother. Over the years, high-risk status has been
extended to include increasing numbers of women. 	 Conrad and Schneider
(1980) have pointed out the extent to which medicalization involves the
regularization and management of populations and bodies in the interests
of a discourse which identifies and controls that which is 'normal'.
Despite the use of such risk scores (based on epidemiological findings
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that the risk of death is greater when certain characteristics are
present), the vast majority of babies will be delivered safely even when
the risk is high, whereas a few low-risk babies will die. High-risk or
low-risk allocation is not, therefore, an accurate indication of
individual outcome. In the process childbirth has been constructed as
imbued with 'pathological potential' (Haire, 1978); 'normal' only in
retrospect. This introduces the notion of open-ended risk; infinite
uncertainty. Medical technology is put forward as the ideal tool in the
management of this uncertainty so that, Oakley (1981a, p.15) maintains:
• • trust in nature has been replaced by trust in technology, as
tests and machines and instruments become the necessary paraphernalia of
birth. . • People are not responsible for their own health, their own
illness, their own births and deaths: doctors are saviours, miracle-
workers, mechanics and culture-heroes."
It has long been recognised that birth and death are cultural as well as
biological events, but in modern industrial society, they are also
technological events. In Obstetrics the 'patients' are usually in good
health. They are conscious, supposedly consenting individuals,
anticipating 'a happy event'. In ITU the patients are critically ill,
in some cases dying but, in any event, the subject of potentially life-
threatening conditions. They are usually unconscious or semi-conscious.
They and their close-relatives are caught-up in a life-crisis that may
become a terminal event. What is the history of technological
colonisation in the two areas? What purposes does technology serve and
how has it been used?
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ii) The Struggle over the Control of Childbirth 
The historical struggle over who controls childbirth has now been well-
documented (for example, Donnison, 1977; Oakley, 1976; Rothman, 1982).
Prior to the involvement of the medical profession, birthing woman were
attended by lay-women in the community who acted as unofficial healers
and attendants during childbirth (Oakley, 1976, Chamberlain, 1981).
Childbirth occured at home. There was no systematic ante-natal care and
no hospital confinement. Donnison (1977) provides a very detailed and
comprehensive account of female midwifery practice and its colonisation
by medical men from the seventeenth century; such that, surgical
techniques and the management of abnormal labour became the exclusive
province of the male barber-surgeon. This is further developed in the
work of Oakley (1976), Garmarnikov (1978) and Witz (1985, 1992) who
locate this emergent division of labour in patriarchal social relations.
Within the social division of labour around childbirth, women have again
become cast in the subordinate role both as inexpert birth-givers and
doctor-directed midwives. Even in their unique capacity to bring forth
life, women are subject to male domination. Male domination of the
birth process is linked by many commentators with an attempt to control
and shape women's procreative power which men perceive as a threat (see,
for example, Ehrenreich and English, 1973; Easlea 1981). This
development is linked with the medicalization of both the birth process
and motherhood (see, Oakley 1981a, 1984). 	 Nobel (1983, p.xix) has
written of this process;
"There is nothing new about the way women give birth, only the way that
those around them control the birth experience".
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This raises the question of how the birth experience 	 has been
'controlled' over the years and, what and how technology has been used
in this project. I, therefore, propose to give a short review of the
technological developments in midwifery (from the seventeenth century)*,
with some consideration of who controlled the technology and who
benefited or suffered from its use.
From the seventeenth century men-midwives (who were associated with
male barber surgeons) gained control over active intervention in labour
by the use of instruments. During that century, the Chamberlen family
of doctors invented the obstetric forceps, whose design and use were
initially surrounded by great secrecy (see, Rushden, 1991). Brought
into the delivery room in a box and removed and used under a sheet, they
thus simultaneously protecting the woman's modesty and the Chamberlen's
monopoly (although the woman often suffered disasterous injury or death
in the process). From the beginning midwives were precluded from using
instruments** and the medical profession have continued to exercise a
monopoly over forceps deliveries.
In the eighteenth century male practice in midwifery increased unabated
(Donnison, 1977) and by the nineteenth century doctors were striving to
*This account draws on the historical information concerning medical
technology in Tew, 1990.
**Oakley, 1976, suggests this may be associated with a fear that they
might use these to perform abortions, given their possible empathy
concerning an unwanted pregnancy and in the light of their cultural
image which involved notions of immorality and even witchcraft.
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establish 'obstetrics' as a specialism within the medical profession
(Witz, 1992), The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had seen the
advent of Lying-in Hospitals for poor and homeless parturient women.
They were hot-beds of disease and cross-infection, They served as
centres of obstetric teaching and research where students could perfect
their techniques on the poor (Versluysen, 1981).
By the nineteenth century the division of labour between midwives and
medical men had been constructed as a division between assistance and
intervention in the process of labour and was mirrored by the
construction of labour as either 'normal': unfolding 'naturally'; or
'abnormal': requiring intervention, frequently by means of instruments
(Witz, 1992), A major development (in the nineteenth century) had been
the invention by Pinard (a French obstetrician) of a stethoscope for
listening to the fetal heart (this is still in use today).	 Pain
relief technology - that is, 	 chloroform - also began to be used in
childbirth from the mid-century, under the control and administration
of the medical profession (at this time midwives were not allowed to
prescribe any medicines). Around the turn of the century, EalleatTae
implimented chemical testing of maternal urine and blood to investigate
the condition of the fetus in utero (such developments are linked to
the patient being viewed as an 'object', see for example, Jewson, 1976;
Reiser, 1978).
The Midwives Act (1902), codified the sexual division of labour around
birth and formalized the midwife as an Independent Practitioner of
'normal' labour (Witz, 1985, 1992). From early in the twentieth
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century,	 Caesarian Section which had been very uncommon, now began to
increase.	 At the same time a technique known as 'Twilight sleep' was
developed in Germany. This involved administering morphine at the
beginning of labour and scopolamine (an amnesiac) after the baby had
entered the birth canal; in the hope of erasing the mother's memory of
the birth.* This put the delivery entirely under the control of the
medical profession, while the mother was passified by drug technology.
For thirty years 'Twilight Sleep' was used extensively in the United
States (see Arms, 1975), although rather less in Britain. Kielland's
forceps were invented in 1913. They were designed to rectify
malpositions of the fetal head by means of rotation. From 1915 Dr.
Joseph DeLee in America used these as a routine procedure in childbirth
(the 'prophylactic forceps operation'). This illustrates that
technology designed for a specific purpose may become used as an
obstetric routine. 'Prophylactic forceps' were used in conJuction with
'Twilight Sleep' to render the delivery totally under the control of the
obstetrician. This approach is bound-up with the notion of 'birth as
pathology' (see Haire, 1978). Pregnancy becomes a stress on the female
system, which must be managed; birth a medical crisis which must be
medically controlled. DeLee's 'prophylactic'
	 views remained
influential for many years, particularly in the United States.
* It should be noted that many initiatives concerning pain relief in
labour have received the active support of women, including the exertion
of group pressure, for medicine to control or extinguish the pain of
childbirth (see, Jenny Kitzinger, 1990).
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As the twentieth century continued, technological development
accelerated and intervention increased. Local anaesthesia for repairing
perineal tears and episiotomies were used from the late 1920's, as was
radiography which was used antenatally to determine the position of the
fetus and the placental site, detect skeletal malformations, pelvic
disproportion and multiple pregnancy. Radiography led to an
overdiagnosis (false-positives) of disproportion, since there was often
an under-estimation of the potential effects of labour to stretch the
pelvic opening and mould the fetal head (Strachan, 1954). Not until
1956 (Stewart, et al, 1956) was an association demonstrated between
antenatal X-rays and childhood cancer; in the intervening years such a
possibility had been denied. This exemplifies the lack of testing which
often surrounds a major technique, followed by the later discovery of
its mal-effects.	 From the 1930's, midwives were able to administer
gas and air and at the same time artificial rupture of the membranes
began to be used in British hospitals to induce labour prematurely.
This was followed in the 1940's by the use of an Oxytocin drip for
augmenting or accelerating labour and, in American Hospitals, spinal
anaesthesia came into use (requiring the attendance of a skilled
Anaesthetist). In 1946 51% of mothers received neither anaesthetics,
analgesics nor sedatives (Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists, 1946). However, by 1970 this had fallen to 3%
(Chamberlain, et al, 1975) and has remained at this figure (Inch, 1982).
More generally, from the 1940's onwards with advances in surgical,
nursing, anaesthetic, aseptic and transfusion techniques, the safety of
Caesarian Section greatly increased. By 1959 the Caesarian Section rate
nationally in Britain stood at 2.7% (Butler and Bonham, 1963) and by
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1985 in had reached 10,5% (HMSO 1988); countries such as the United
States, Canada and Australia displaying rates of 20% (the Caesarian
section rate at the Obstetric Hospital is 20%),
Since the 1950's there has been a great proliferation of screening and
diagnostic techniques, including ultrasound, amniocentesis and various
biochemical and biophysical tests. Ultrasound greatly increases the
possibility of intra-uterine diagnoses of fetal abnormalities and fetal
growth problems and has now become a largely routine antenatal
procedure. However, it has never undergone vigorous testing tor long-
term ettects.	 The electronic fetal monitor was also developed in the
1950's by Laldeyro-Barcia and Edward Hon. Hon set-up a commercial
company to develop and market his 'product' as well as publishing papers
on his equipment. Hewlett Packard and Texas Instruments entered the
fetal monitoring business in 1975. Electronic fetal monitors are based
on the proposition that the fetal heart rate reflects the adequacy of
its oxygen supply, measures on a continuous basis, the iluctvatim cs.0
the heart rate under the influence of fetal movements and uterine
contractions.	 It allowed for the first time the continual surveillance
of the fetal heart during labour. Print outs from electronic monitors
are legal documents admissable in a court ot law. Monitors became very
widely used in the 1970's and 1980's and remain so to the present day.
They restrict the movement of the mother and, when applied internally,
a scalp electrode is attached to the baby's head via a lead through the
vagina (artificial rupture of the membranes will be necessary in order
to fit the electrode if rupture has not occurred spontaneously).	 There
have been charges of over-diagnosis and it is not always easy to
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distinguish fetal distress (abnormal), from fetal stress (normal) when
using such techniques (particularly in second stage). The increase in
monitoring and surveillance from the early 1950's has been termed by
Arney (1982) 'a new mode of social control over childbirth', whereby the
division between the normal and abnormal pregnancy is abandoned and:
'every birth became subject to its (obstetrics) gaze' (Arney, 1982,
p.100). This greater 'visibility' of the fetus led to it being seen as
'the second patient' (Arney, 1982). Thus, its interests could be
constructed as distinct and sometimes in opposition with those of the
mother, such that Quilligan (1972) was moved to ask: 'who is the primary
patient?'.
The 1950's also saw a increase in other medical and technological
interventions around birth. Midwives were allowed to administer
Pethidine from 1950 (Obstetricians had done so since 1939) and the use
of episiotomy also increased at this time. Devised for instrumental
deliveries and some unassisted births where perineal tears seemed
probable, midwives were able to perform it routinely after 1967 (again
we have the example of a technique devised to meet a specific need being
generalized into a 'prophylactic' obstetric routine. Episiotomy peaked
in Britain at 52% in 1980 (HMSO 1986). By 1985 it had fallen back to a
national figure of 37% (HMSO 1988). Routine obstetric procedures, such
as, episiotomy, induction, enymas and so on, had by this time become
the subject of some considerable criticism from interested pressure
groups and the quality media.
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From the late 1950's Syntocinon had come into use. Synthesized from
natural oxytocin, it had been used both for induction and the
acceleration of spontaneous labours where the obstetrician felt that
progress was insufficient. This process was refined in the 1960's when
the Cardiff pump was developed, allowing the accurate titration of
Syntocinon to achieve the desired strength and frequency of
contractions (as determined by the Obstetrician). 	 This allowed
obstetricians more control over the strength of contractions and the
duration of labour. At the same time, monitoring techniques became much
more widely applied, partly to monitor the increasing use of Syntocinon
(this shows how the use of one technology, often begets the use of
another). The rate of induction continued to increase, eventually
peaking in 1974. It had risen from 13% in 1958 to a national average
of 39.4% in 1974 (H. M.S.O., 1981). That year saw a widescale public
debate concerning 'the new obstetrics' and artificial induction of
labour in particular. Articles appeared in 'The Sunday Times' (Louise
and Oliver Gillie, 1974) questioning the 'childbirth revolution' and
were followed by an investigatory television programme on the artificial
induction of labour ('Horizon', 1975). One of the charges against
artificical induction was that it was being used for organisational
convenience to ensure that babies were born between certain hours of the
day. This position was defended to me, as current practice, in one
hospital I visited during the course of this research - the
Justification was put forward that they 'liked' babies to be born
between certain (daytime) hours because if there was an emergency there
would be more staff around to deal with it.
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A Public Opinion Survey of the Maternity Services in 1974 had found
that they were the subject of more criticism than any other branch of
the National Health Service. Findings centred on the perceived short-
comings of human relations and effective communications. However, many
commentators continued to call for controlled studies to evaluate the
different obstetric practices involved in the active management of birth
(see, Richards 1975, Chalmers 1978). This call was reinforced by a
survey of 2,000 women for the National Childbirth Trust, which
investigated mothers' experiences of induced labour (Kitzinger, 1975,
1978). It found that those induced were more likely to suffer further
medical interventions than other women. Given continued criticism of
this nature, inductions stabilized from 1974, decreasing after 1978.
As Syntocinon use declined for induction, it increased for the
acceleration of spontaneous labours. This was linked to the
introduction in the 1970's of the Partogram. This graph records the
progress in labour, measured against an 'ideal' cervical dilation curve
posited by Friedman; roughly, dilation of the cervix by 1 cm. per hour
(10 cms. = full-dilation) once the first phase of 3 cms. has been
achieved.	 Failure to achieve this standard may result in acceleration
of the labour by artificial means (usually either artificial rupture of
the membrains and/or Syntocinon drip). Again, there is an attempt to
control and standardize labour within the parameters decided upon by the
obstetrician applying a medical perspective.
During the 1960's just under half of British births occured at home but
this changed from 1970, when the Peel Committee, with no statistical
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backing, recommended 100% hospital delivery. 	 Hospitalization and
medical management of labour, it was argued, would reduce the maternal
and perinatal death rate. However, there is no scientifically proven
association between the decline in the maternal and perinatal death rate
and the increased hospitalization and active management of childbirth
(Tew 1977, 1990). Notwithstanding this, place of birth is of great
social significance and bears directly on the question: 'who controls
birth?'. Barbara Katz Rothman (1982) pointed out that obstetricians
could not bring childbirth fully within their domination until they had
transferred it to their own domain - the hospital. Here they had both
institutionalised power and an armoury of medical equipment and
interventions at their disposal. At the time of completing this thesis
the House of Commons Health Committee on Maternity Services Report
(February, 1992) has recommended a move towards more home births (in the
interests of 'choice') and a wider role for midwives. They have finally
recognised Tew's 1977 findings by acknowledging:
"There is no convincing and compelling evidence that hospitals can
better guarantee the safety of the majority of mothers and babies."
In the 1970's, however, the increasing hospitalization of childbirth saw
the more general use in Britain of epidural anaesthesia. Whereas the
woman remains conscious, she is paralysed from the waist down and so is
no longer physically in control of her body. Epidurals are associated
with the need for further interventions to monitor and rectify their
side-effects.	 The forceps rate rose with increasing hospitalization,
epidural anaesthesia and induction, peaking in 1977 at 13% (HMSO 1981,
1984), reducing to 9.1% in 1985 (HMSO 1988).
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Recent developments in Neonatology have also enhanced the possibility of
interventionist obstetrics, since Neonatal Intensive Care Units are able
to sustain evermore immature babies. This has enabled Obstetricians
to end pregnancy artificially (usually by means of Caesarian Section) at
an earlier point. In practice, interventionist obstetrics, anaesthesia
and neonatology are dependent upon the technology and pharmaceutical
products produced by commercial companies. Since these companies are
driven by the profit motive, it is in their interest to promote the
widest possible use of their products and aggressive marketing
techniques are employed. Legal safeguards surround the marketing of
drugs but sometimes harmful side-effects may only emerge in the long-
term In all areas of medicine, there is a long history of failure to
evaluate new treatments and technologies accurately before their
widespread application (see the Council for Science and Society Report,
1982). Indeed, the minimum requirements of a system for assessing
medical technology have not yet been implemented in any country in the
world (Banta and Britten, 1982). This is associated with 'clinical
iatrogenesis' (Illich, 1976): disease produced by diagnostic or
therapeutic procedures and often intervention during labour is an
attempt to redress the harmful consequencies of earlier interventions
(MacLennan, 1978, has called this 'a cascade of intervention').
It is clear that obstetric technology has played a central part in the
medicalization and colonization of childbirth by (predominantly male)
obstetricians (see, Arney, 1982). 	 It has also been central to the
(cognitively male) medical scientific attempt to control and regulate
birth.
	
Such technology has, to some extent, contributed to beneficial
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outcomes in individual cases but its general contribution appears to
have been vastly overstated. Thus, the grounds for using much obstetric
technology on a 'prophylactic' basis remains scientifically
indefensible. A considerable disidecture exists between incontrovertable
evidence of its efficacy and its routine use in Obstetric practice. At
the ideological level the case has been fiercely promoted that medical
technology and techniques have been largely responsible for a decline
in the maternal and perinatal death rate. However, social class remains
the greatest correlate in this decline (Townsend and Davidson, 1982).
Obstetric ideology also maintains that pregnancy and labour is 'normal'
only in retrospect; in the present, it remains loaded with 'pathological
potential'. The 'uncertainty' this engenders is promoted as best
managed by the use of technology.
iii)	 The Establishment and Development of ITU Provision 
"This life-span is brought into existence with the
pre-natal check-up, when the doctor decides if and
how the feotus shall be born, and it will end with a
mark on a chart ordering resuscitation suspended.
Between delivery and termination . . . At each stage
of their lives people are age-specifically disabled.
The old are the most obvious example; the are victims
of treatments meted out for an incurable condition
• . . Intensive Care is but the culmination of a
public worship organized around a medical priesthood
struggling against death." (Illich, 1976, pp.87-114)
Illich (1976, p.104) terms this heroic medical "struggle against death"
a "phantom production of life expectancy as a commodity". Intensive
Care is the ultimate technological expression of the heroic medical
struggle against death; that is why it is so often used in film or the
media as a dramatic symbol of such mortal combat. In an age where
doctor's surgeries advertise 'Yearly M.O.T.'s' for their patients, the
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Intensive Care Unit may be seen as the archetypal medical 'engineering
workshop'. The body can be mended, since 'we have the technology':
If . 
• . (if the patient dies) we have failed the patient in that they
and their relatives have put themselves in our hands, trusting that 'we
have the technology, we can rebuild you', and we haven't done it."
(Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
Thus, Illich (1976, p. 104 maintains)
". . • people are strengthened in their belief that they are machines
whose durability depends on visits to the maintenance shop. • .
The development of the Intensive Care Unit was promoted by a number of
factors: the rapid development of major surgery, the refining and
extension of anaesthetic techniques, the development and use of
ventilators, and the importance attached by the medical profession to
the close monitoring of patients following myocardial infarction (heart
attack). These areas also represented the development of new markets
and products for medical equipment companies.
The beginning of Intensive Care in Britain, in the early 1960's, was
marked by the development of the so-called 'iron lung' respirators for
patients whose capacity to breathe unaided was temporarily interrupted
(or needed to be rested). Such patients were intensively nursed
together on a side-ward - these were called "Respiratory Units". The
first ITU in Britain was established in Liverpool in 1959/60. The first
training course for ITU nurses was started there shortly afterwards.
1.1. U. was the first example of nurse specialization, which has since
blossomed. The early 'iron lung' was used for patients who were
suffering from, for example, polio myolytis, chronic brurhitics with
chest infection, or crushed-chest injuries. Doctors Sherwood and
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Robinson, who had acquired expertise in acute respiratory failure, were
the first British exponents (in 1962) to use prolonged mechanical
ventilation and muscle relaxants in the treatment of a crushed chest
(Ambiavagar and McConn, 1978). Pioneers in the field were involved in
the design of respirators alongside commercial companies. In 1965
Lassen, one of the early exponents of ITU was the first physician to
call an anaesthetist in consultation in the treatment of polio myolytis
(Ambiavagar and McConn, 1978). The first ITU in America was based at
the North Carolina Memorial Hospital, where in 1953 all critically ill
patients were relocated in one room equipped with emergency equipment
and specialised drugs (Christie and Bone, 1981). 	 Intensive Care
provision emerged rapidly during the 1960's, based on the new respirator
technology and the development during that decade of electronic
monitoring equipment which could be used for the continuous surveillance
of patients who had suffered, or were threatened by, myocardial
infarction.	 Many techniques remained unverified by clinical trials
and certainly random controlled trials were few (Waitzkin, 1990). For
example, continuous electronic monitoring in cases of myocardial
infarction was never proven a more effective treatment in terms of
mortality outcome than care at home and serious research in Cardiac Care
Units was not undertaken until the 1970's, although this provision was
extended to hospitals throughout the system (Waitzkin, 1990).
Intensive Care provided a concentration of nursing expertise in close
liaison with surgeons and anaesthetists: intensive care of the
critically ill combined with clinical investigation. This placed
particular emphasis on the nurse, providing the same vigilant attention
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for the unconscious ventilated patient as the anaesthetist in the
operating theatre. Both nurses and midwives are subordinate to the
medical profession. The time commitment involved in attending labour
meant that male Obstetricians colonising the area were unwilling to take
it over completely, since in terms of opportunity-cost this would have
been unremunerative (Witz, 1985, 1992). Similarly, in Intensive Care,
the continuous presence of an Anaesthetist (male sex-typed profession)
is not considered cost-effective and the ITU nurse (female sex-typed
profession), therefore, acts as a technological caretaker. ITU nurses,
therefore, receive supplementary training in the use of monitors and
respiratory equipment, and further instruction in physiology, illness
trajectories and care of the critically ill. They carry-out protracted
'extended role' functions, 'sub-contracted' to them by the adjacent
medical profession. These remain under the 'ownership' and control of
the dominant group (see Chapter 7). 	 At the same time, patients are
nursed within parameters laid-down by the doctors and medical advice
must be sought if the patient transgresses these limits. 	 Although most
informants, including Intensivist Consultants, described Intensive Care
as primarily a 'nursing procedure', saying Units were 'only as good as
their nurses', control over the ITU lies firmly with the dominant
(predominantly male) medical profession and it is the scientific medical
model that remains in ideological ascendency on the Units.
Doctors with an on-going major committment to ITU may be called
Intensivists. In the United States and Europe, Intensivists are
recognised as a Speciality in their own right and it is common for
Intensivists to concentrate exclusively on Intensive Care. In the
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United Kingdom Intensive Care is still in the process of being
recognised as a Speciality.	 The vast majority of Intensivists in the
United Kingdom are Anaesthetists. This is related to the preserve of
Anaesthetics being the paralysis of the patient and the support of the
patient's vital functions while paralysed - this is the role of the
Anaesthetist in the Operating Theatre - so that when these techniques
became used in the more general treatment of the patient, Anaesthetists
were involved and took over the area that developed. Since they are a
'service Speciality', Anaesthetists have always been seen as subservient
to Surgeons, some of whom (according to Anaesthetists) regard
Anaesthetists as 'technicians'. This, despite the fact that, "we play
with more dangerous toys" (Senior Registrar, Anaesthetist). Consultant
Anaesthetists do not have patients for whom they have overall clinical
responsibility. Until the emergence of the Intensive Care Unit, they
did not have hospital beds directly under their jurisdiction or a
particular clinical location within the hospital that they could claim
as their own territory. This is important, since as one Consultant
Anaesthetist put it, "power in medicine is geographical". Intensive
Care, therefore, represents the colonization of a particular
geographical location and care-niche (care of the acutely, critically
Ill) by the anaesthetic profession; achieved by the development and use
of high technology medical equipment.
Intensive care provision varies according to the Specialities of the
particular hospital and there is a great deal of heterogeneity.
Broadly, there are General I.T.U's taking a range of patient
conditions, including 'road traffic accidents' and there are Specialist
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I.T.U's treating patients with specific conditions (e.g. cardiac by-pass
surgery, neurosurgery, organ transplantation) or age ranges (paediatrics
or neo-nates).
The recent Kings Fund Report on 'Intensive Care in the United Kingdom'
(1989) defines intensive care as: 'a service for patients with
potentially recoverable diseases who can benefit from more detailed
observation and treatment than is generally available in the standard
wards and departments'.
	
It provides a centre for physiological
measurements, nursing procedures and therapeutic manoeuvres in the care
of the critically ill. Much intensive care involves the temporary
artificial support of the function of one or more major organs, for
example, the use of a mechanical ventilator in the case of respiratory
failure or dialysis for renal failure; up to three systems may be
simultaneously supported. Such technological support may follow major
trauma, major surgery or critical illness. Supporting individual
functions is designed to allow time for the healing process to
getunderway or further treatment be undertaken. Intensive care units
also maintain 'organ viability' in the case of patients who fulfil the
criteria of 'brain death' and are potential organ donors (mechanical
ventilation is required in order to keep the organs in good condition).
This connection with transplantation also reinforces the notion of the
body as a machine, which may receive 'spare parts' from comparable
('cross-matched') models.
Patients in Intensive Care tend to be semi-conscious or unconscious,
either as a result of sedation, their particular illness or a
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combination of the two. In recent years there has been a move away from
paralysing artificially ventilated 	 patients, although this still takes
place in some Units and for some patient conditions (patients are still
routinely sedated to varying degrees). This trend has been fuelled by:
fear that the paralysed patient may become accidentally disconnected
from the ventilator; the fact that in some cases patients were found to
be paralysed but conscious; worries about
unnecessarily debilitating the tone of the respiratory muscles and the
build-up of toxicity associated with heavy and sustained drug use.
Some patients in ITU may become extremely disorientated, sometimes
hallucinating; this is known as 'ITU Syndrome' and is well-recognised
within the literature (see, Adams, 1978).
Intensive care also involves extensive patient monitoring in order to
survey the effects of treatment and attempt to detect the early onset of
deterioration. Much monitoring is carried out electronically. Typical
vital functions that are electronically monitored include: heart rate,
pulse rate, blood pressure and central venous pressure. Many techniques
are highly invasive. Some manoeuvres involve a considerable risk to the
patient <one in fifty patients undergoing heart catheterization die
resulting from the procedure (Waitzin, 1990]), and substantial cost-
implication for the hospital.
Currently, the Department of Health (Building Note 1970, revised 1974)
recommends the I.T.U. should correspond in size to 1 - 2% of total
acute beds in every hospital and that a District General Hospital
(D.G.H.) should have a 6 to 8 bedded Unit. According to a recent survey
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conducted by the Association of Anaesthetists (1988), most Units are
smaller than envisaged by the Department of Health. At the present time
many Units have at least a proportion of their existing beds closed
because they cannot afford to staff them - the nursing staff to bed
ratio is 6% to 1 and, as one Consultant Anaesthetist put it:
"Two Intensive Care beds are the same in nursing terms as an entire
Nightingale Ward."
This makes ITU high-cost as well as high-technology care and yet there
is little evidence about its proven efficiency for the majority of
patients treated (Kings Fund, 1989). This provokes the question: could
the money be more effectively spent in other, more 'low-tech' areas?
There are no private Intensive Care Units in the U. K. This may be
compared with the United States where Intensive Care is 'an Item of
Service' and each procedure carried out on the Unit is billed to the
patient. In this context Intensive Care affords the possiblity of
greater income from the patient, since more intensive treatment is
involved. This system has led to charges of 'over-treating' in the U.S.
context and, for example, Waitzkin (1990) has contrasted the over-
production of Intensive Care technology with the fact that many people
still have little access to the most simple medical services.
The medical technology market is now a considerable source of income in
terms of capital accumulation. There are many companies involved in the
Intensive Care market. Hewlett Packard, one of the largest,
aggressively promoted cardiac monitors with the consistent claim that
they were decisively effective in reducing mortality from myocardial
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infarction (heart attack) and rhythm disturbances; despite the fact that
such claims remained unproven (Waitzkin, 1990). At the same time, such
companies diversified into third world markets and the competitive drive
was to devise new products and render existing ones obselete. This
included the development of telemetry for ambulatory patients and
computerized data-analysis systems. Medical technology has been termed
a 'social capital expenditure', whereby the State tries to counteract
the recurrent crises of advanced captialism (O'Connor, 1973). Such
expenditure serves a dual function, representing a display of public
concern (public health and welfare expenditure is highest at times
ofunrest) and simultaneously supporting the business interests of
capital invested in that area (Waitzkin, 1990). It is clear, however,
that many patients do owe their continued survival to Intensive Care
and that patients are now surviving who would not have done so even 5
or 6 years ago. Nevertheless, achievements must be set against costs,
both in terms of whether the money could better be spent on other
provisions and the validity of such radical interventions on patient
autonomy unless such treatments are of proven effectiveness.
Conclusion 
Obstetric technology represents a central mechanism whereby male
Obstetricians were able to medicalize and colonize childbirth, bringing
under their own control both the labour process of pregnancy and
childbirth and, more generally, containing the perceived 'threat' of
women's procreative powers (see, for example, Easlea, 1981; Arney,
1982). Intensive Care from its inception, grew out of the
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concentration and use of advanced medical technology, organised in a
mortal struggle against death (which may be technologically regulated
even if defeat is not possible - see Chapter 7). It has represented the
colonisation of a care niche (care of the acutely critically ill) and a
geographical area of the hospital by Anaesthetists. This has involved a
delegation of the routine care of the ventilated patient to the ITU
nurse (a female sex-typed profession) from the Anaesthetic staff (sex-
typed male). Just as the time-commitment involved in the conduct of
labour was considered unremunerative (or not cost-effective) for the
Obstetrician (Witz, 1985, 1992), the continuous presence of an
Anaesthetist is viewed similarly. Both areas are the subject of some
considerable ideological overlay, revolving around both the question of
risk and uncertainty (open-ended risk), and the claims made on behalf of
technology by professionals or attributed to such techniques by lay-
people.
In Obstetrics, 'uncertainty', as an adjunct to 'pathological potential',
has provided an entree for the Obstetrician to dominate the entire area:
technology has been central to this domination with its key role in the
management and manipulation of uncertainty (see Chapter 8). In ITU,
technology is also central to the manipulation and management of
uncertainty. The development of a technological product market around
childbirth and critical illness/death has also provided an expanding
market for capital accumulation. Many techniques and technologies,
however, remain questionable in terms of proven effectiveness. In
Obstetrics, given that one is concerned with largely healthy women and
an event which is potentially fulfilling and empowering, the necessity
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for the routine use of technology, however valuable it may be in
specific cases, must be of particular concern. At the same time, in
Intensive Care, given the costs - social, emotional and economic - the
ethics and efficacy of practices and technologies must be further
scrutinised. The claims, ethics and proven effectiveness of some of the
central practices and technologies of Intensive Care and Obstetrics will
now be examined in more detail.
CHAPTER 6 
THE ETHICS AND EFFICACY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
Medical science constructs the patient (a person/subject) as an object
(of scientific investigation). This has ethical implications, since
individuals have a sense of self and others (Mead, 1934), which means
they are able, perhaps entitled, to make moral choices about their own
conduct and that of others towards them.
The use of medical technology raises two questions which do not apply to
technology use generally. Firstly, patients are not merely working with
technology (within the division of labour, following Hughes 1971,
Strauss, et al, 1982, and others, I view the patient as being part of
the division of labour), they are also objects of technological
intervention. Viewed through the mechanistic materialist gaze, the
'patient' may be seen solely or primarily as a 'work object', a
'scientific problem', and so lose their personhood. Secondly,
uncertainty permeates the health labour process (see, Parsons 1951, Fox
1957, 1979, Davis 1960, Scheff 1963, Robinson 1973).
	 The latter is
untrue of many work situations which are not only repetitive but
predictable. More generally, medical technology, since it intervenes
in care and prolongs or saves lives, raises ethical questions of an
especially acute kind.
Intensive Care technology, such as mechanical ventilators, increasingly
requires doctors to decide how long to maintain intervention when the
chances of patient survival are minimal. The patient may be 'brain
dead', which often raises the question of organ donation, or they may
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be in a 'vegetative state'. The latter denotes severe, often global,
brain damage - the patient is totally unable to communicate or interact
with their environment. Unlike 'brain death', this state is not
incompatible with continuing life (however circumscribed this may be).
Therefore, does Intensive Care sometimes prolong deaths rather than save
lives? Does it extend ailing rather than healthy lives? What are and
what should be the criteria for admission to Intensive Care, since it
represents a very costly and aggressive form of medical intervention?
Active euthanasia is illegal. What are the criteria and limits of
passive euthanasia, that is, no active intervention or the withdrawal of
active support? Does it make a difference whether it is active or
passive when the outcome is the same: the person is dead? When you
'turn off' a 'life-support system', are you: killing someone, letting
them die or finding out they are already dead?
In pregnancy too, issues have been raised about the ethics of various
reproductive technologies (Stansworth, 1987). Is the routine use of
extensive monitoring and surveillance equipment Justified for mothers in
'normal' labour? Does medical technology facilitate the birth process?
Does it routinely save lives? Such technologies may be seen as
disempowering to the mother, has their use, therefore been validated?
Are the high levels of instrumental deliveries based on sound practice?
Oakley (1980), for example, has suggested that a high-technology birth
may be associated with post-natal depression.
More generally the question arises of competing resources between
different medical areas. High-technology 'solutions' may be especially
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costly in economic terms and may deprive other areas as a result, so do
the results Justify this? Furthermore, how will scarce technological
resources be allocated, for example, ITU beds? Lay-people generally
first have direct contact with medical technology as patients or as
relatives or friends of patients. The extent to which individuals wish
all the potential benefits or risks of a particular procedure or
technology to be outlined to them is a matter of conjecture and makes
debatable where to draw the line in terms of 'informed consent'. Some
may prefer professionals largely to assume the 'burden' of decision,
others might wish to be fully consulted. Many technologies are highly
complex and may be difficult for lay-people to understand in detail
(Alderson, undated). However, people have free-will (however
constricted), possessing consciousness and conscience. This raises the
question of choice. How much choice will the individual be afforded in
the medical encounter? The opportunity for the patient to engage in
moral conduct may be essential in maintaining a humanized approach to
medicine (Ledermann, 1986). Technologies also impact on wider social
values, for example, does the increase in antenatal test techniques for
congential abnormality (allowing the possibility of abortion) influence
the value society places on the disabled?
Despite the high cost of implementing medical technology, scientific
evidence of its benefits to patient-outcome is often lacking. The
ethical use of medical technology is intimately related to the question
of 'efficacy'. If a 'cure' carries possibilities of iatrogenic effects
- disease and illness resulting from diagnostic and treatment techniques
(Illich, 1976), then the ends must justify the means (as well as the
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'ends' themselves being morally justifiable). That is to say, we must
assess outcomes associated with a given technology. Navarro (1976)
criticises Illich (1976) for judging outcomes in terms of 'cure' (rather
than 'care'). Many of the claims relating to medical technology have,
however, stressed its contribution to effecting a positive outcome.
This, therefore, becomes highly relevant. 	 Infectious disease has been
the area most successfully treated by technology, such as, 	 vaccines
and antibiotics. More generally, the uptake of technological
developments may not coincide with their therapeutic effectiveness.
Finally, decisions concerning medical technology use are represented
as proceeding from medical imperatives.	 Is this an accurate
representation of practice? 	 If not, what are the other factors and
rationales, including ethical components, influencing decision-making
and organizational outcomes?
i) Intensive Care - Hi-tech/High Costs 
Intensive Care, in addition to being a nursing procedure, is a
technological resource in the care of the critically ill. A recent
report from the Kings Fund Centre (1989) points out that although
Intensive Care saves lives in some cases, its benefits have not been
scientifically investigated for the majority of patients gaining
admission. This is despite the fact that, as Manson (1977) argues,
performance indicators, 'throughputs' of patients and other 'efficiency'
criteria are more easily applied and measured in high-technology areas.
In addition, the effectiveness of certain technologies used in the area
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remains unproven in terms of beneficial patient-outcome. For example,
continuous monitoring of myocardial infarction (heart attack) patients
was speedily adopted and became widespread from the 1960's, although
this technique was never proven effective for this purpose by controlled
clinical trials (Waitzkin, 1990). Serious research was not undertaken
until the 1970's when random controlled trials by Mather, et al (1971,
1976) and Hill et al (1978)	 found no evidence that such patients did
better in hospital than at home. 	 A twelve months' descriptive
epidemiological study of myocardial infarctions on Teemdde (Coiling, et
al, 1976, Dellipiani, et al, 1977), investigating treatment and
mortality outcomes, found both crude and age-standardized mortality
rates were better for patients treated at home. Furthermore, Unit
death-rates may be misleading, since the function of ITU is to support
patients through critical periods. The patient may die shortly
afterwards either on the Ward or at home or they may remain terminally
ill. This is comparable to low birth weight infants 'saved' by
electronic fetal monitoring (they would not register as perinatal
deaths), where research indicates that approximately one third died by
the end of the first year of life (Hack, et al, 1980).
Given the high economic costs of Intensive Care (it is the most
expensive of the Specialities to fund), together with the ill effects
which may arise in terms of loss of patient's dignity, privacy, autonomy
and the possibility of iatrogenic effects of treatment, this shortage of
evidence may be viewed as a serious problem (Kings Fund, 1989), The
Kings Fund calls for an evaluation of who is most likely to benefit from
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Intensive Care, the cost of provision, and the criteria that should be
set for admission and discharge.
In practice, the decision to admit a patient to an ITU will relate to
various criteria which, at the overt level, may include such factors
as: an Apache severity of illness score, the patient's pre-morbid state
and probable quality of survival (encompassing the patient's reaction to
this - very much a social calculation). Discharge criteria are also
unlikely to have been formalized and contention may arise. Furthermore,
there are no national or Regional guidelines laid-down about the use of
technology in Intensive Care (or Obstetrics); this is said to be a
matter of 'clinical Judgement'. However, if one detaches a dying
patient from a ventilator before their heart has stopped beating, one
risks prosecution	 (for murder) but ventilators can be regulated to
deliver fewer breaths or a less oxygenated mixture. Additionally, in
both ITU and Obstetrics electronic monitor print-outs must be retained
but it is not a legal requirement to produce them in the first place.
The Kings Fund (1989) stresses the right of patients to make an informed
decision to forgo Intensive Care and underlies the importance of keeping
relatives fully informed of the patient's condition and prognosis. The
right to forgo ITU appears highly problematic. It is unclear at what
point the patient would signal this decision, especially since many are
emergency admissions and once critically ill may be unconscious or semi-
conscious and unable to make judgements of any kind. It also seems
unlikely that many individuals would categorically wish to decide, while
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not in a life-threatening state, that they would not, in any
circumstances, wish to be admitted to an I.T.U.
ii) The Political Economy of Intensive Care Technology Use 
Given the debate concerning rational admission and discharge criteria
for Intensive Care, I intend to consider how admission comes about in
practice and the rationales that attend discharge (or the 'withdrawal
of active support'). The demand for Intensive Care stresses the
medical imperative but are there other rationales and dynamics at work?
There was considerable controversy in the media and surrounding the
General Election campaign (April, 1992) about the shortage of ITU beds.
Units throughout the country have /TU beds closed because they cannot
afford the revenue consequencies of keeping them open and there is also
a national shortage of ITU trained nurses. A National Confidential
Enquiry into Pen-operative Deaths (1992) claims that the shortage of
I.T.U. beds is one of the two major causes associated with such deaths
(the second is the operation being performed by inexperienced staff from
another Specialism, with insufficient supervision).
Some distinction needs to be made concerning both admissions and
discharges, between the General and the Specialised Unit. 	 Admissions
to the General Unit tend to be emergencies: patients suffering post-
operative problems, trauma cases, road traffic accidents (R.T.A.) or
patients whose condition has deteriorated into critical illness. The
General Unit tries to keep an 'emergency bed' free in order to allow
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flexibility for new cases.	 Ideally, the situation is one of optimising
resources by attaining the right balance between admitting patients who
are sufficiently ill to warrant ITU but not beyond redemption;
Intensivists admit, "there is a large grey area". Particularly in the
case of a General ITU, the fear is that:
H . . the Unit will become a dumping ground for things that other
people no longer want to manage." (Registrar Anaesthetist)
This can block beds, causing frustration amongst staff, distress amongst
relatives and is of dubious benefit to patients. In practice a
negotiation often occurs (although, in the absence of agreement, an
Admitting Team can insist on an admission if a bed is free):
"A Registrar came along and said, 'I've got this patient whose an 84
year old respiratory failure whose got a carsonoma of the colon and we
may well want to operate tomorrow, what about an ITU bed?' Ay response
to that was, 'Well, I think that may well be an abuse of ITU as a
resource. It sounds to me as 'though the patient's pretty well reaching
the end of his natural life'. If he has an operation, afterwards, my
view would be, fair enough, but if he can't swing it . . • I think it
would be meddlesome to end up with an 84 year old with that sort of
disease on a ventilator with a tracheotomy, three weeks later. . .'I'm
not saying 'no absolutely', but I would wish to be persuaded'. So there
is a debate that goes on." (Consultant Anaesthetist, General Unit).
One of the (General Unit) patients in the study fell into this category.
She was an 83 year old, operated on for cancer of the bowel. She spent
three days on ITU where she was apparently resuscitated, ventilated and
treated for renal failure. She died three weeks later, having been
discharged to a Ward. Her daughter's view contrasts to that expressed
above. Despite the eventual outcome, she felt:
"They did a marvellous Job. They got her heart beating and her kidneys
working properly. . . they were absolutely marvellous. For a lady of 83
when she'd had such a serious operation. Because it must have cost a
hell of a lot of money, and to fight like they did for my mum at her
age. She had every chance, they were absolutely marvellous. . . in the
finish she Just gave up herself. She was wanting to go off. She was
asking everybody to put her to sleep. She'd Just had enough and she
'Just wanted to go to Jesus' she said. And then she went very, very
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peacefully. But in Intensive Care they were absolutely marvellous. • ."
The view stated to be the patient's appears nearer that put forward by
the Consultant (although, in practice he must have sanctioned this
woman's presence on the Unit). The Admitting Team, having made a
surgical investment in the patient would be likely to seek validation of
this decision by using whatever other interventions were at their
disposal (Admitting Teams were said usually to be the last group to
arrive at the decision to withdraw active support from a patient - they
bear ultimate responsibility for treatment or its discontinuation).
I.T.U., as viewed by the patient's daughter appears, as a discrete event
where her mother was successfully rescued from imminent death. She
values the social worth she feels is implied by concentrating such
expensive resources on her aged mother and is comforted that
'everything was tried'.
	 The eventual outcome is seen as a failure of
spirit rather than a failure of medical science and technology.
Discharge is a multi-disciplinary decision between the Anaesthetic and
Admitting Team and is negotiated around the patient-condition and the
bed-state. Generally, a consensus emerges: this appears a delicate
political situation where the various medical teams involved must not
feel that their clinical freedom or particular area of medical
competence within the bodily division of labour is being contravened.
In the General Unit problems generally only arose when there were
particular pressures on beds and at the time of the study (1989)
disagreements still appeared relatively rare.
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The situation in the Specialised Unit was more politically charged with
a continual pressure on beds. A 'free', 'emergency bed' was not
routinely available, given the desire to maximise bed-occupancy and
throughput figures, so that:
"The first hour every morning is people saying 'why?', 'I want my
patient. . . ' And you say (to one) 'how about you having your patient
up here?' and (to another) 'you do a patient on Wednesday'. It's like
that every single day. . •" (Consultant Anesthetist, Specialised Unit)
Here, the ability to admit a patient and the willingness to discharge
another were often intimately connected; one Consultant Anaesthetist
termed patient-discharge a 'political nightmare'.
Who arrives in the Intensive Care Unit is, therefore, partly a matter of
the politics and economics of the particular hospital. Political and
economic factors also influence the condition in which the patient
arrives. The General Unit was located in a hospital in a socially
deprived area of the city. Medical staff felt that patients, who they
described as a heavy-smoking, heavy-drinking population displaying a
high incidence of chronic illness, tended to present late-on in the
disease process. This had led those in charge of the Unit to emphasise
the use of highly invasive techniques, since it was felt a radical
response was necessitated. On the Specialised Unit, nurses felt that
by-pass patients were arriving on the Unit needing more technology
(lines for monitors and drips) and more drugs support, since they had
suffered greater deterioration pre-operatively than previous cohorts
(due to the length of Waiting-lists):
because there aren't beds, the 'heart patients'	 are either
dying on the waiting lists. . . and if they do make it to surgery, they
are that much more poorly. . . So as time goes on the patients do get
sicker, and sicker and sicker. . • They're on many more drugs after
theatre. We have a lot more patients dying on the Unit post-operatively
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and we have a lot of patients requiring more support for the heart in
terms of equipment, drugs, you know, very specialised support. That
cuts down their chances of survival." (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
This implies that delays in treatment will create a situation where the
need for greater technology use is demand-led by the deleterious effect
this has on the patient's condition. The longer one delays their
treatment, the greater the cost, both social and economic when it does
eventually take place; unless, of course, they die in the meantime.
Who arrives in Intensive Care will also relect the mix of Specialisms
in the hospital and, as was particularly clear in the Specialised Unit,
their relative political strength. Formally, admission and discharge
from the Units was described as 'a joint decision between the Admitting
and Anaesthetic Team'. However, the Specialised Unit is located at a
Supra-Regional Centre receiving national funding for cardiac and
'pioneer surgery' operations (rountinely necessitating ITU post-
operative support - these patients represented about two thirds of the
ITU bed occupants). 	 Cardiac and 'pioneer surgery' patients were
subject to quota targets. Failure to meet these meant less funding
and/or the inability to apply for higher quotas, carrying more funding.
Continual failure to meet quota targets might mean operations would be
moved to another hospital assessed as more 'efficient'. This had
created a market framework for operations paid for from Supra Regional
funding. Given the ITU bed shortage, this market mechanism only served
to exacerbate the competition for beds and had led to such informal
practices as rival teams apparently 'smuggling' patients into ITU beds
during the night and on occasion, reportedly, the manipulation of
patient deaths (given that a medical decision had been made to withdraw
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active support) around the bed-state. This involved the patient's death
being timed to coincide with the day that particular team needed the bed
for another patient (precluding its reallocation to another team):
". • . there's an awful lot of politics here and they'll keep a patient
going because they want the bed for Monday and things like that and I
don't like that and it does happen". (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit)
Technology was, therefore, being used to wrest control over another
scarce resource - ITU beds.
Overall, therefore, bed availability is crucial to who gains access to
ITU technology. One relative from the Specialised Unit was the mother
of twin sons both of whom had operations to modify their jaw. Both
should have been routinely admitted to ITU for 24 hours post-
operatively. In the event, the son who was least ill post-operatively
was the only one to be admitted to the Unit, since a bed was available
(they were operated on at different times). Several relatives
interviewed spoke of their distress that operations were initially
cancelled and rescheduled. Such pressure on beds represented a constant
pressure on Unit staff to discharge patients, sometimes before they felt
the optimum intensive treatment time had been achieved, for example:
"There's a lot of pressure on you to put a higher number of patients
through what facilities you've got when you know you shouldn't be doing
it. It's frustrating when you've spent hours looking after a patient,
days looking after a patient, whose been very ill. He's getting a bit
better and you think, 'This is it!' This patient shouldn't have
survived and he's done so well!' and then suddenly you're told there's
an emergency downstairs and he has to come to the Unit and the only
patient you can move out is the patient you've had problems with. But
he's now a bit better and you know if you send him to the Ward he'll not
get that one-to-one care and he's going to stand a good chance of not
pulling through. And those are the patients who go to the Ward and die.
. We have moved a patient from the Unit today who should stay there
until tomorrow for definite. He'll almost certainly be alright but that
Is not the best thing to do. . . and you go to the Unit General manager
and say 'What am I supposed to do?' and they say 'There's no more money
for beds'," (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
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Similarly:
II . . . and then at night, about 11 o'clock, they (admitting team
doctors) 'phone up and say there's a patient on the Ward and they want
him up here and they've got another patient up here and they want him
off. And, he's going off, and they'll tell you that, fait accompli,
'he's going off' because this one needs ventilating and you can do
nothing about it. . • you try and move a patient who shouldn't be moved
in order to try and accommodate that other patient. . •" (Consultant
Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
Nursing staff on the Specialised Unit also identified this problem:
II . . . they hurry patients out so quickly and you know that they're
going to come back within a week because they're not really ready to be
either off the ventilator or back on the Ward. . . you think 'if he had
another day he'd be 0. K.', yet they're pushing people in and out. . .
there's a lot of pressure amongst the different groups of doctors to let
them go". (Staff Nurse)
or:
". . . a couple of weeks ago there was a young girl who was bleeding
rather profusely (in the pioneer surgery ward) and they needed to get
her up here but we were full to our allocation and they couldn't get a
bed for her and the 'pioneer surgery team' were arguing with the Cardiac
Team about which patient of each team was well enough to go back to the
Ward. It was decided in the end that because it was a 'pioneer surgery'
patient who needed to come up to the Unit, a 'pioneer surgery' patient
had to go back down to the Ward and that's how they got the girl in.
And one of the Anaesthetists came up and chatted to me and said 'I'm so
fed-up with this'." (Staff Nurse)
The rational or 'efficient', or indeed 'ethical', use of resources in a
situation of heavily competing priorities, therefore, may become
enormously problematic. If no ITU bed is available at the hospital
where they are a patient, individuals can be transferred to an ITU at
another hospital. This carries its own risks (see, Bion, et al, 1988),
while such a bed may not be available.
Technology use in Intensive Care, therefore, relates to the mix of
patients, political economy factors such as those described and the care
philosophy of the Unit. 	 In neither ITU nor Obstetrics had technology
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been used as a cost-cutting device to reduce staff numbers and there was
a consciously articulated philosophy to keep the Intensive Care
nurse/midwife by the bedside (see Child, et al, 1984; Harvey, 1984).
Nevertheless, during staff shortages (from observations and interviews)
electronic monitors were clearly used to cover for the 'absent'
nurse/midwife and provide 'hard copy' data on the patient during such
absences.	 The care philosophy of the Unit is a social construct,
deriving in part from the medical beliefs of the Consultants in Charge.
In both Units the care ph ilosophy favoured early and aggressive
invasive techniques as a means of 'optimising' patient care. It also
related to the nature of the population served. The patients at the
General Unit, typified by medical staff as socially deprived and
chronically ill, were seen as warranting radical intervention. The
patients at the Specialised Unit (since it was based at a 'centre of
excellence') tended to have undergone very major, often innovative
surgery and, were often, therefore, particular* unstable.
The cardiac by-pass patients accounted for about one third of the
patients admitted to the Specialised Unit. They were routinely
admitted to the Unit for 24 hours post-operative care. Nurses actively
managed by-pass patients' care (this involved adjusting the patient's
treatment - titrating drugs and fluids and so on - and 'weaning' the
patient from artificial ventilation) as 'an extended role' duty. This
was carried out under strict protocols and involved nurses being
trained in the techniques and tested on their efficiency performance.
Nurses also on occasion unofficially 'weaned' non-by-pass patients.
Weaning from artificial ventilation is normally carried out by the
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anaesthetic staff. It involves adjusting the ventilator setting such
that ventilatory support is withdrawn gradually, culminating in
extubation (removing the plastic tube delivering air down the patient's
air way) and removal of the patient from the ventilator. The delegation
of this procedure to nurses appeared related to the time-constraints
involved in the turn-round of heart by-pass patients within the labour
process. Each cardiac bed rountinely remained empty for only 2 hours,
between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m., when the next by-pass patient would arrive.
At a formal level nurses are allowed to extubate patients but only under
the direct supervision of an anaesthetist. On the Specialised Unit
this took a negotiated form:
"Sometimes it is (supervised), sometimes it isn't. If it's a routine
over-night by-pass, they (nurses) tend to extubate early in the
morning Whenthere's, I mean, I've always said this is wrong, but we
extubate them in the morning when there's nobody (no doctors) around
(laughs), simply because if we don't extubate them for a few hours,
they're not alright in time to go back to the Ward in time for the next
one to come in (laughs). So we're sort of, not sailing close to the
wind, I mean, I consider it not to be ideal and we are living with the
constraints of what we've got. Having said that, there's always an
anaesthetist instantly available should we run into trouble and we can
hand ventilate a patient while we wait a few minutes for an anaesthetist
to come and reintubate if necessary. So although, I don't consider it
ideal, I don't consider it unsafe." (Senior Sister)
This throughput demand, necesary in order to meet funding targets -
combined with the unwillingness of anaesthetists to be physically
present on the Unit 24 hours a day - conspired to devolve tasks to the
nurses both formally and informally. Delegation was achieved by virtue
of the anaesthetist continuing to be present on the Unit (formal
requirement) or nearby (informal requirement). This contrasts with the
manufacturing shop floor where delegation often enables the delegator to
be totally absent. It is related to the danger and uncertainty of
outcome involved in the transaction, for example, if the patient's
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condition deteriorates during the weaning process - medical assistance
is required; and if re-intubation is necessary a doctor needs to
perform this (ITU nurses may only carry out this highly dangerous
procedure in the most dire circumstances). The political economy of
throughput, therefore, influenced which patients had access to ITU
technology in the first place, what technology (for example, the amount)
was used on the patient, how it was used (for example, for early and
aggressive intervention) and the division of labour surrounding its use
at both a formal and informal level.	 It also influenced how long the
patient remained on the Unit, given that there were pressures and
counter-pressures (from different Admitting doctors) on the anaesthetic
staff to discharge one patient in order to admit another. One may
conjecture whether high productivity figures represent the 'efficient'
use of technological resources if patients are discharged before the
optimum care period.
iii) The Ethics of 'Withdrawal' and Death on the ITU 
Unit death rates tend to average between 10%-20%. Some deaths follow
the withdrawal of technological support where death has been Judged
unavoidable or continuing life untenable. Active euthanasia remains
illegal. Parsons (1951) and Scheff (1963) have pointed to the social
norms and decision-rules which dictate active medical intervention.
Clearly such criteria operate around withdrawal of active support,
although these have not generally been formalized or explicated. The
'Intensive Care Society' (a professional body) supports the notion of a
'gradual' withdrawal of support, mimicing as closely as possible
'natural' death, which (notwithstanding heart-attacks and massive
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bleeds) tends to be a gradual process. Arguably more emotionally
tolerable to patients' relatives, it is more legally defensible should a
dispute arise following 'withdrawal' (see next chapter). Such decisions
may lead to contention if all parties involved (medical staff, nursing
staff and patient relatives) are not in agreement or arrive at the
decision at widely differing points in time. (The method of withdrawal
may also be contentious, even where all parties agree it is necessary.)
Anspach (1987) found that doctors and nurses arrived at 'life and death'
decisions via different routes, often coming to opposite conclusions.
She found that Neonatal Intensive Care nurses would usually decide
before doctors that the infant would not recover. Nurses' perceptions
were said to 'transcend the technical' and were based on 'interactional
cues' gained from extended periods of bedside nursing, whereas doctors
relied primarily on technical data which was achievable whilst spending
very little time with the patient. Thus, Anspach maintains that doctors
and nurses use different epistemologies in making 'life and death
decisions'.
'Withdrawal of active support' is a Joint-decision between ITU and the
Admitting Team Consultants. Agreement is not always achieved, since
medical opinion may vary. In such cases withdrawal will not proceed:
"It is difficult when you wish to withdraw treatment and your Consultant
colleagues sometimes may not quite agree, or may totally disagree. And
it's very important, you don't actually go against them. Discuss it.
And say 'O.K., well, let's give it a bit longer'. That's what tends to
happen. It tends to take longer than it should do to come to the
conclusion that was originally decided." (Consultant Anaesthetist,
Specialised Unit)
The legal responsibility for 'withdrawal' rests with medical
consultants. Generally, patients' relatives are not actively involved
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in the decision (although it would be unlikely to proceed in the face of
bitter opposition by relatives) but are kept informed of medical
thinking on the matter. 	 Anspach (1987, p.230) has commented:
n . • • those who have the most patient contact (the nurses) and the most
at stake (the patients) have the least authority in life and death
decisions".
Four of the thirty relatives in the study expressed doubts about whether
treatment should have been continued to the point that it had. In three
cases the patient had eventually died and in the fourth case, although
the patient survived he remained terminally ill. His wife commented:
"It makes you wonder whether it was all worth it".
Generally, neither consultants nor any other group involved can be one
hundred percent certain of the outcome for individual critically ill
patients. Thus, they tend to stress statistical probability, taking a
complex of factors into account:
"I don't know for sure when I say somebody's treatment should be
withdrawn. I can be 70% sure, 80% sure, statistically that is, but you
then might ask 'what's going to happen to the other 25-30% of
patients?'"
	 (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
Ensuring that the decision involves a number of suitably qualified
professionals, spreads the load of uncertainty and responsibility.
Nurses tended to feel that Consultants (from Admitting Teams
particularly), often delayed withdrawal decisions too long:
“ . . . more often it's that nurses feel that patients are being treated
when we think they shouldn't be. Perhaps there's no point or they
should be allowed to die with some dignity. . ." (Staff Nurse,
Specialised Unit)
"I mean what worries me is, how will I die?. . . I would hate to die on
an ITU. And I think, when we withdraw treatment from patients we all
say 'well, I wouldn't want to go through this'. You know, if ever I was
in this situation, somebody please stand up and say 'Will you let this
person die?'. . • " (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit).
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As reported by Anspach (1987), it seemed that ITU nurses usually
concluded that support should be withdrawn before doctors made this
decision:
u . . • they can let people go on and on and on and they really suffer
. . . and the relatives suffering watching them. I go off and cry
sometimes it's that bad." (Senior Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
It appeared that doctors were making a 'scientific' appraisal of the
situation based on probability of survival, taking into account 'hard'
data. This is an inexact calculation in the individual case (see
Chapter 8) and legal considerations add to the difficulty of arriving at
a decision. This may be skewed by Specialisation, such that, if the
element for which the particular doctor is responsible is improving,
s/he may de-emphasise the wider context. Furthermore, given the
emotional division of labour, doctors are able to 'walk away' from the
patient and their relatives; bed-side nurses are not and remain in the
emotional firing-line. As argued by Anspach (1987), it seemed that
nurses accessed different epistemologies from doctors, in making life
and death 'decisions'. They derived their assessment from what Anspach
calls 'interactional cues' and Hilary Rose (1988) terms 'experiential
knowledge', that is, knowing as part of labour and particularly women's
knowledge which is based historically on caring labour:
"As a profoundly sensuous activity, women's labour constitutes a
material reality which structures a distinctive understanding of the
social and natural world." (Rose, 1988, p.72)
The nurses' knowledge, therefore, arose from 'care' work based on the
patient as 'subject', rather than 'scientific' work (based on a
Cartesian model) of the patient as 'object'. Indicative of the
different epistemologies from which nursing and medical staff derive
their 'data' concerning whether or not (or when) active support should
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be withdrawn are their notions concerning 'an acceptable death' on the
Unit. Typically nurses responses would emphasise the patient as
'subject', for example:
"When somebody is allowed to die with dignity, in that treatment isn't
carried on when really it's pretty obvious that this patient is trying
to die" (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
For doctors, it revolved around "when all therapeutic interventions have
been exhausted and the patients death becomes unavoidable"; thus the
patient as 'object' is to the fore.
The patient as 'object' is in tension with an ethical approach
stressing freedom of individual choice in moral conduct and the
'authentication of self'. Ledermann (1986, p128) comments:
"In order to develop a medical approach which is existential in its
ethical content it is necessary to give up the objective standpoint of
scientism and to re-discover man's (sic.) subjective world."
Nurses, at the bedside, remained empathetically connected to the
patient and the patient's relative. As Bordo (1986) has pointed out, a
cognitively female espistemology emphasises connected-ness and empathy
rather than detachment and distance. In this context, nurses expressed
considerable concern about what they perceived as a lack of 'dignity' of
patients dying in ITU:
"And sometimes at the end when the doctors leave here and they've been
doing a cardiac massage and I think 'why don't you let the person go?'
and they leave them in such a mess with all the lines they've tried to
put in. . ." (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
"Sometimes I think there's no dignity at all in death in here because
quite often it comes at the end of a big cardiac arrest with somebody's
chest ripped open, you know, surgical instruments in their chest and all
people jumping up and down on them, bleeding everywhere. I mean, it can
be quite horrific. . . On the other hand, sometimes it's not a sudden,
violent thing but they've been slipping away for weeks but nobody will
make the decision to turn the drugs off which are keeping the blood
pressure up. I mean, it sounds awful, you have people absolutely
rotting away. Periphery shut-down and, you know, pressure sores
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everywhere and you feel guilty, • . and their mouths break-down and
they bleed and they look as if you haven't cleaned their mouth. They
look so uncared for and yet they have had everything done for them and
it still doesn't make any difference. It's so. .
	 (words fail her)"
(Senior Staff Nurse Specialised Unit)
If the patient looks 'uncared for' this is likely to cause considerable
distress to the nurse, since an integral part of basic nursing care is
to produce a patient who looks and feels comfortable and clean, Such
signs may erroneously appear to signal nursing neglect. The nursing of
'pioneer surgery' patients was a particularly contentious area, since
their survival rate remained relatively poor. Nurses were concerned
that sometimes, as they saw it, 'treatment' became 'experimentation'.
Concerned, as they were with the patient as 'subject', this perceived
archetypal treatment of them as 'objects' caused a particular
ontological disjuncture for the nurse at the bedside.
iv) Childbirth - individual manifestations. technological routines 
Much evidence now suggests that the instinctive state that enables a
woman to labour spontaneously is connected with a complex hormonal
equilibrium being achieved (Odent, 1984). The artificial disruption of
labour at any stage may intenupt the establishment of this and may lead
to further technological interventions to rectify the effects of the
disturbance. In Obstetrics, blood transfusions, antibiotic therapy and
the prevention of death resulting from rhesus incompatibility are
examples of medical interventions which have undoubtedly decreased
mortality. However, many techniques remain scientifically unvalidated.
Indeed, Obstetrics (and Gynaecology) is not one of the Specialities
which has practiced the highest level of evaluation (Tyson, et al,
1983).
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Medical opinion claims that the fall in the perinatal death rate is
attributable to the near total hospitalization achieved in Britain from
1970 onwards, for example:
“ 
.• . we realised that if we wanted to pursue our goal of reducing
maternal and perinatal mortality, then the only safe place to have a
baby is in a hospital environment. My generation . • . still remember
all that, going out on the Flying Squad, rescuing moribund mothers and
dead babies and bringing them to hospital." (Consultant Obstetrician)
The assertion that 'the only safe place to have a baby is in a
hospital' is disputed by Tew (1977, 1990). Using a 'risk-matched
sample', she compared mortality figures between home and hospital
deliveries and demonstrated home-births to have a lower mortality rate
(see also Richards 1978 and Kitzinger 1979, concerning the risks of
hospital birth). Overall the social class of the mother remains the
best predictive device of mortality/morbidity outcome in maternity cases
(Townsend and Davidson, 1982), such that:
" This is still the major problem one has to cope with, deprivation
within society." (Consultant Obstetrician)
Research indicates that delivery is safer when carried out by midwives,
and mother and child suffer more complications and additional
interventions with each increment of technology (Jordan, 1993).
As in Intensive Care, there are economic and political factors affecting
technology use. For example, one reason midwives liked to cross-check
electronic fetal monitors (by manual palpation and pinard stethoscope)
was that they were now, as one Staff Midwife put it, "quite old and
don't always work very well". The use of often aging equipment (due to
cash shortages), like midwifery labour shortages, is an aspect of
hospital obstetrics often ignored by those claiming hospital birth is
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safer than home-birth (for example, a midwife cannot be called upon to
work other than on a one-to-one basis during home birth).
	
A further
political economy influence, bearing on both areas, are the large
private companies, constituting a powerful lobby promoting the use of
technology, whose prime concern is the profit motive.
In obstetrics I intend to focus on electronic fetal monitoring (e.f.m.),
firstly, because this technology is common to both areas under review
and secondly, because it continues to be used routinely on many Labour
Wards (including the one studied). This is despite there being no
incontrovertable evidence to suggest that, for the majority of women,
it is more effective than the 'low-tech' alternatives available (Banta
and Thacker, 1979; Prentice and Lind, 1987).
Electronic monitoring is part of "a new order of Obstetric control"
(Arney, 1982, p.94). It was introduced into hospitals in the 1960's.
During labour, monitors record changes in the fetal heart in relation to
uterine contractions.
	 However, problems exist concerning the
interpretation of results. 	 Murphy (1981) demonstrated a 74% false
positive and 12.8% false negative rate of fetal distress with e.f.m.
(these are somewhat reduced when results are cross-checked by fetal
scalp blood sampling [Godfrey, 1985] - this technique may, however,
under-estimate the general degree of blood oxygenation [O'Connor, et al,
1979]).	 It is also possible that attaching a scalp electrode to the
baby's head causes it pain (Inch, 1982); one Staff Midwife commented:
"They tell you to put a clip on the baby's head when you're a student
and you just do and then I put one on this baby's head and it moved and
it suddenly clicks to you that the baby feels what you're doing and so I
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don't think I'd like to put that through my babe."
The introduction of e.f.m, coincided with the decline in perinatal
mortality and obstetricians inferred a causal effect (Edington, et al,
1975).	 Haverkamp (1979), however, found no differences in outcome
between women monitored by auscultation (fetal stethoscope) and those
monitored by e. f. m., except that the Caesarian rate was markedly higher
in the latter. It remains unproven that e.f.m. is responsible for the
decline in the perinatal mortality rate (Banta and Thacker 1979,
Prentice and Lind 1987). An alternative explanation lies in factors
such as: limitation of family size, abortion, better nutrition, genetic
counselling, better prenatal and neonatal care. Although by 1982 there
were five randomised trials on continuous e. f. m. supporting Banta and
Thacker's conclusion that it was of little use for low risk women,
these findings made minimal impact on the medical profession (Lumley,
1982 - she attributes this to the strength of the monitoring industry,
fear of malpractice and hospitals' unwillingness to provide a bedside
nurse [U.S. study]).	 The (U.S.) National Institute of Health and
Human Development, the World Health Organization (W.H.0.) and the (U.S.)
National Centre for Health Service Research (N.C.H.S.R.) also concluded
that continuous e.f.m. is of little benefit used routinely.
	
A study
to explore the benefits of continuous e.f.m. in reducing the incidence
of cerebral palsy found that this was not reduced in the group
randomized to this method of monitoring (Grant, et al, 1989). According
to recent findings, cerebral palsy is thought to result from a (as yet
unknown) uterine event, rather than stemming from birth injury. One
obstetrician interviewed commented:
"It's now becoming obvious that in the majority of babies who are found
to have brain damage following birth, it has nothing to do with the
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birth itself. Up until the late 1980's it was always assumed that if a
baby didn't measure up in mental terms, then it had to be to do with the
actual delivery. But now the thinking is that the majority of babies
who are born and have brain damage, it's an event during the course of
the pregnancy that has caused this, not the labour itself. And that's
why you will find that many obstetricians, knowing this, will say that
whatever happens they want to minimise the liklihood of being sued"
One might assume that if findings suggest that the majority of brain
damage does not occur during birth, this might prompt a move away from
the continuous monitoring of this event. However, the logic of the
obstetrician's comments are that this finding may merely reinforce the
use of continuous e.f.m., in order to confirm retrospectively that
nothing happened during the labour that might be thought to have
contributed to a 'damaged' baby. This indicates that in many cases the
monitor may be	 present primarily for the protection of the
obstetrician rather than the baby. A monitor print-out therefore aids
the obstetrician in retrospectively controlling the definition of what
occured during labour, Thus:
. . . litigation, this was one of the main reasons for obstetricians
insisting that their 'mums' have continuous fetal monitoring because if
they don't and anything goes wrong with that baby, then the lack of
fetal monitoring could well be blamed. . . Now you're quite right when
you say if everything's quite straightforward, normal contraction,
normal labour, no bleeding, no problems, a quick, easy delivery, then it
would be very difficult for somebody to prove that the obstetrician or
midwife had been negligent but you've only to go through one of those
cases. . ." (Consultant Obstetrician)
J.H.: "Whereas, if you've got it on paper, then you've got evidence
that nothing took place?"
Consultant Obstetrician: "Yes".
There is, however, no legal obligation to continuously electronically
monitor childbirth (there is also no legal requirement in Intensive Care
to keep a patient who is known to be dying attached to an electronic
monitor and yet this is the routine practice (see chapter 7]), 	 Such
'defensive' obstetrics is also related to the construction of women's
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bodies as chaotic (see, Smart, 1991), requiring vigilant monitoring to
detect any signs of the incipient deviance which may show itself at any
time.
Given the lack of incontrovertable evidence supporting the use of
continuous e.f.m., are the women at the Obstetric hospital given a
choice over the type of monitoring employed during their labour? The
hospital "Guidelines for Medical Staff and Midwives" (1990) state that
for the 'Management of Normal Labour at Term':
'Monitor fetus with continous monitoring with internal fetal scalp
electrode and intrauterine pressure catheter unless LOW RISK with clear
liquor and maternal mobility requested. In such cases intermittent
auscultation with pinard, or external monitoring with CTG at regular
intervals. All HIGH RISK or meconium stained liquor* continuous
monitoring with internal fetal scalp electrode and intrauterine pressure
catheter.'
As can be seen, even if the woman is in 'normal' labour, if she is 'high
risk', the technological intervention prescribed is greater. To be
intermittently monitored, the guidelines outline three criteria to be
fulfilled and 'maternal mobility' should have been 'requested' (if it is
not, the implication seems to be that continuous e.f.m. should be
applied, regardless of the first three criteria having been met).
The general guidelines emanate from the Clinical Practices Committee and
represent consensus management within the hospital. Staff also
*This is associated with fetal distress - the colour of the liquor will
be known if these guidelines are followed, since they require the
attendant to: 'Perform ARM - artificial rupture of the membranes - on
all patients when cervical dilation is greater than 3 cms. to confirm
normal liquor and encourage effective contraction'.
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recognised varying Consultant 'styles' and sometimes Consultants gave
written instructions either as protocols or annotations to patient
notes. Consultants clearly varied in the emphasis they placed on
continuous e.f.m., for example:
"We thought originally that monitoring was good and was something that
was beneficial to everyone. The evidence is not there and it was simply
not evaluated, like so many other things in medicine that are introduced
but are introduced without proper evaluation. . . I'm not saying
monitoring is wrong but the scientific evidence is that it isn't better
than a midwife oscultating every half hour in the first stage and after
every contraction in the second stage."
"At the moment we feel that it's still useful to have the baby's heart
rate monitored continuously. . .
The professional guidelines of the midwifery Code of Professional
Conduct also represented a point of reference for midwifery staff.
Overall, the organisation culture of the Obstetric Hospital strongly
favoured continuous internal e.f.m. - as one Staff Midwife put it:
"It's the done thing here to use a monitor". Various conventions about
monitoring also attended different types of pain relief, for example,
women with epidurals were always required to be fitted with an internal
monitor. Continuous e. f. m., usually internal, was applied during
induction or acceleration of labour. A complex situation, therefore,
existed which operated and could be interpreted at several levels,
leaving some scope in practice for negotiation. However:
"You've got to be very strong-minded not to have everybody monitored
because you're questioned repeatedly if you haven't got a patient
monitored. Repeatedly. And sometimes by the Sister in Charge. . .
And, of course, Miss Y's patients actually have to state they don't want
it in order not to get it." (Senior Sister)
Thus, labouring woman also had to be 'strong-minded' to resist the
obstetric routines if the midwife was committed to implementing them.
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In practice, either the woman had to express a preference not to be
monitored or her midwife must positively practice non-routine
intervention, which some, exceptionally, did:
"I wouldn't interfere if the woman was labouring normally. I would just
say 'this is what I'm happier with and if you don't mind either way, I'm
happier listening in with a pinard!" (Staff Midwife)
Generally, midwives felt more confident using continous e.f.m., since
many had trained at the Obstetric Hospital and were unused to relying
exclusively or predominantly on other techniques:
"Having trained in a very high-tech place. . .I suppose I haven't got
the experience or confidence, or I don't know any other way really. . .
I worry in myself if I'm conducting a labour and I'm just doing it on my
own back and I tend to worry more than with a monitor." (Staff Midwife)
This was reinforced by those in the medical (end midwifery) hierarchy
who were unsupportive of alternative practices. Midwife-anxiety was an
identifiable aspect in monitor use, which coalesced in the phrase: "I
feel safer using it". This is not the same as: "The baby is safer if I
use it", suggesting that the monitor addresses the midwife's
insecurities about birth, such that: "You tend to be more relaxed if
you're looking at a monitor". (Staff Midwife). Similarly,
". • . certainly when you've got it in black and white ('hard data') on
the monitor, you know you're alright, you're not worrying."
"You know you're alright" is distinct from "you know the baby's alright"
- which is the basis on which this technology has been propagated.
The protection offered' is not simply psychological (although many
midwives interviewed confessed to feeling considerable anxiety for the
baby during labour until they had actually witnessed it born in good
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health)*, but again continuous e.f.m. is seen to offer protection in
legal proceedings:
II 
• 0 0 I often think because of the way things are when you can be so
liable, if you have a trace, people will believe what they see. . . it
is a back-up for you . . . there's always someone who would be quite
happy to take you to Court for thousands of pounds." (Staff Midwife)
This represents defensive obstetrics: again the monitor is there to
protect the health care professional both at Law and against the chaotic
female body, notwithstanding any protection it may or may not give the
baby.
	
The concern of staff centres on missing genuine fetal distress -
moving to a forceps lift-out or Caesarian section unnecessarily appears
less problematic. The latter might be more difficult to prove, while
intervention itself may be taken to have forstalled disaster (even where
the baby is born in perfect condition). Furthermore, once in the
possession of a 'perfect' baby, the parents are unlikely to think of
pursuing a case of malpractice based on unnecessary treatment.
Some electronic monitor use was 'unthinking':
". • • because we're used to using them all the time, we're used to
looking at a monitor but if you're not careful, you can finish-up using
them all the time". (Staff Midwife)
For some, midwives using monitors, had become tantamount to a
compulsion:
*Dominique Pourre (Odent, 1984, p. 113), a midwife at Pithiviers, writes
of her previous midwifery practice using interventionist techniques and
emphasising pathology: ". . . I was so relieved by the sight of the
baby; I would think: 'That's it, a baby boy, here he is, alive! I can
hold him, I have the right. Oh, I was so scared he might not exist.
Yes, Just like you, the mother. I had the same feelings, the same
anxiety'. . ."
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• . it dust gets to you after a while, its like a drug. You need to
know after a time, that the fetal heart's banging on, banging on, all
the time. So that, you get a lady and she doesn't want it and you're
listening intermittently with a pinard, and I still tend to glance
across at the monitor.	 ." (Senior Sister Midwife).
The latter statement again references the needs of the midwife. It is
an almost loving invocation of technology and a revealing indication of
the extent of monitor use by this midwife. 	 It also signifies the
extent to which for some midwives an electronic monitor is an integral
part of the birth experience. This is encapsulated in the description
of 'a good birth' in entirely technical terms by one Staff Midwife: "A
nice trace, an intact perineum and good Apgar scores on the baby".
Thus, notwithstanding the inconclusive nature of the scientific claims
for continuous e.f.m., the vast majority of pressures in the Obstetric
Hospital worked towards its routine use: its prescribed use in the ever-
extending category of 'high risk' patients (see, Graham and Oakley,
1981; Oakley, 1984), its use to monitor the'effects of other
technological interventions (including much pain relief), the
psychological security and legal protection it is seen to offer midwives
and the procedural and retrospective control of (the definition of what
occured during labour) it offers obstetricians.
v) Informed Consent in Obstetrics 
Clearly if the midwife wished to resist routinely using internal e.f.m.,
It was helpful if she could cite the support of the mother, as well as
recording that there were no specific indications for this procedure.
This helped to spread the load of responsibility and cover her with the
various hierarchies and to an extent in law:
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H1 think certain Consultants prefer ladies to be internally monitored
unless they say specifically they don't want to be. But I think you can
get round that by saying, 'And how would you like to be monitored?' and
when you explain the differences, she tends to say she wants to be
externally monitored. You don't actually say how you asked her because
there are all sorts of different ways of asking questions to get
different answers." (Sister Midwife)
"I think, well, it isn't the way to do it (artificial rupture of the
membranes at 4 cms and application of fetal scalp electrode) but we have
come to find different ways round areas we don't necessarily agree with
. . . when women started appearing with Birth Plans, we all felt very
stressed by them: 'Do they think we don't know what we're doing?' but
now we rather like the idea of asking a woman if she wants something or
has any great feelings about not wanting something. . . then if a woman
turns round and says 'I don't think I want my membranes ruptured now, I
don't want anything for pain relief. I'd rather walk around a bit', we
can write that down in the notes and say 'patient prefers membranes to
be left intact. Good external trace'. . . We've found that a useful way
to get round some of the more interventionist rules that have been
foisted on us." (Senior Sister Midwife)
The latter exemplifies the use of technology and 'hard data', i.e. 'a
good external trace', to fend-off the use of other more invasive
technology and techniques (illustrating how the same technology can be
used to different - in this case counter-cultural - ends). Midwives,
therefore, are clearly aware of the bargaining opportunities offered to
them by 'informed consent' as well as those it, in principle, extends
to the labouring woman.
Social science methodology textbooks (for example, Moser and Kalton,
1971) have long pointed to the impact of framing questions in certain
ways in terms of eliciting particular answers. In the Delivery Room
some midwives were, therefore, asking questions in such a way as to
gain a particular response. If the expected response did not follow,
the question would often be re-presented in a different way. A
strategic use of questioning, in the guise of 'informed consent' was,
therefore, often used to either up-hold or circumvent obstetric policy,
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depending on the midwife's orientation, From observation, framing
questions to uphold prevailing norms was more usual. 	 More generally,
questions were often couched in terms of "you don't mind if we. . . do
you?" (procedure conducted in the absence of objection) or were spiced
with euphemisms: " Shall we just 'pop' this in?" (fetal scalp electrode,
"jungle juice" (Syntocinon), "medicine" (Syntocinon). As Lovell (1980)
has pointed-out, a medical communication can lapse into a form of
deception when what is said is diluted or neutralised to the point of
distortion. Some midwives asked mothers: 'what do you want to do?',
others told them what was 'normal' practice - sometimes in the form
of statements of intent or a commentary on the action that was already
underway, for example:
"It's more 'we're going to monitor you' and if they come back and say
'no', fair enough, but if they don't. • ." (Sister Midwife)
". . . a lot of people just start automatically strapping it (the
monitor) to their leg* and tell them what they're doing, you know, as
they go along." (Staff Midwife)
One Consultant Obstetrician discussing negotiations with patients felt:
"No matter how complicated something is, you can simplify it, in the way
that, if you explain possible outcomes, 'if we do this or that or the
other', you will actually be able to get them to tell you the outcome
and the way to it that you really wish them to go, if they're sensible."
Clearly, from their own reports, many health care professionals were
often fully conscious of the strategies they employed.
*Sometimes midwives attached fetal scalp electrodes without any
explanation or consultation:
", . . we didn't want internal monitoring. John (husband) said he
turned round, looked back and he (the baby) was all wired up. They
didn't even ask. They just did it while I was 'out', while I was
asleep." (Antenatal Interview)
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Several midwives believed that women who did not want to be continuously
monitored would state this unsolicited on arrival at the Labour Ward:
H . 
• . they've heard of our system. . • they know they've got to speak
early or else they'll get monitored" (Sister Midwife)
It was felt that such dissenters would tend to be middle class:
"On the whole, the mums who definitely don't want to be monitored are
the middle class mums. But all the others who you see come here, we do
it. It's our practice. But they do have a choice to say 'well, no we
don't want it'" (Sister Midwife)
The above midwife states that the (by implication) working class woman
has a 'choice' to object to monitoring but are working class women in
an alien clinical environment likely to do this? Do they realise they
have a 'choice' in the sense that 'choice' implies being able to
conceive an alternative as realistic? Thus, social class may become
part of the assessment of what is suitable in terms of technology for
the woman giving birth. As argued by Shaw (1974), women from different
social class backgrounds on occasion are likely to receive different
treatment according to pre-conceived notions of what is appropriate for
each group. Other research has found that middle class women do want a
more active birth, whilst working class women want a medically managed
labour, which they associate with speed, ease and safety (Nelson, 1983).
From observation, it seemed that the announcement that the woman who
had arrived in labour was 'a social worker' was sufficient to make
certain midwives roll their eyes cynically and 'tut' impatiently, and
'teachers' were sometimes viewed with a similar suspicion, that their
demands might be 'unreasonable'. Conveying similar antagonistic
sentiments were stories, elevated to mythical status, of informed middle
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class women who came in wanting 'natural childbirth' and 'end up having
everything' (spoken with relish), contrasted with the flexible but
uninformed working class woman who 'sailed-through' her labour.
Midwives were, therefore, well-aware that many women did now expect some
right of consultation in childbirth, for example:
"I know my own approach to women has changed over the last few years
. . . when I first qualified . . I always explained things but it never
occurred to me that I ought to specifically seek someone's consent. . .
women have had more chance to read and see things in the press which
maybe in some cases has fired them in not very helpful ways to us but
that really has made them more vocal about what they want and don't want
and I know I have changed my attitude." (Senior Sister Midwife)
Many midwives felt a certain ambiguity about some women wanting a
greater say in how they gave birth.	 Clearly, a woman's wishes have
to be balanced against questions of her own and her child's safety.
However, midwives often expressed the desire that the woman and her
birth-partner were well-informed <but not too well-informed) and that
they knew what they wanted from the labour (but were not too insistent).
Most midwives preferred them to be sufficiently informed to enter into
rational discussion but this was tempered by a fear that such knowledge
would cause them to challenge definitions put forward by staff. The
issue is one of control. Who is to be in control and how is that
control to be maintained? The detail of this forms the next chapter.
vi) Conclusion 
An assessment of a medical technology should include factors such as;
health benefits and risks of the technology, its financial effects and
impact on social systems and values (Banta and Thacker, 1979).
However, this is only one side of the story. Complementary to this, I
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feel, is a consideration of how social forces and social relations shape
technology and its use. Social, political and economic factors are
centrally relevant to the way medical technology is used: in other
words, the use of technology is not simply 'medically' or indeed,
'technologically' determined. This aids an understanding of why some .
medical technologies are used despite a lack of confirmatory evidence of
their health benefits and despite their risks. In many cases the
extensive nature of medical technology use, as Waitzkin (1990) has
pointed-out, is only rational if viewed within a political economy
framework. At the same time, control (including the management of
uncertainty) by the medical profession, as an occupational interest
group and as agents of State and male power, is of central importance.
In ITU, I have considered factors and rationales influencing decision-
making and organisational outcomes around technology use in terms of the
political economy of through-put, particularly in the Specialised Unit
where 'ethical' decisions had become susceptible to market mechanisms.
McKinley and Stoeckle (1988, p. 192) have noted how fiscal crises and
regulatory efforts "are transforming the shape, content and even the
moral basis of health care." The market for Obstetric and Intensive
Care technology and pharmacology has made considerable profits for
commercial companies involved in its manufacture. These products have
to some extent contributed to beneficial outcomes but these have been
overstated. In Obstetrics this has led to a considerable disjuncture
between incontrovertable evidence and routine Obstetric practice; while
the situation in Intensive Care remains largely unassessed. 	 Waitzkin
(1990) discussing continuous electronic monitoring for myocardial
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infarction (heart attack) patients, points-out that its extensive
application is not rational in terms of effectiveness but is in terms
of its facilitation of capital accumulation. Thus, he speaks of the
'irrationalities' of health policy "that make sense when seen from the
standpoint of the capital profit structure" (Waitzkin, 1990, p.218).
Technologies such as computerized axial tomography (whole body scanner)
and eletronic fetal monitoring reflect very similar dynamics. Thus:
"Without fundamental changes in the organisation of private capital,
costly innovations of dubious effectiveness will continue to plague the
health sector" (Waitzkin, 1990, p.218).
Waitzkin's contribution, whilst valid, appears rather economically
deterministic and I would wish to locate any analysis more firmly in the
social relations of both technology design and use. If we consider the
power relations of medical practice it becomes evident that technology
has a central role to play. Medicine is riven with uncertainty (Parsons
1951, Fox 1957, 1979, Davis 1960, Scheff 1963, Robinson 1973).
Medical technology has become an essential part of the medical
'conjuring trick', as Hart (1985) terms it, and as such is central to
the manipulation and management of uncertainty in the medical situation
(see chapter 8): this is the exercise of control at a symbolic level.
At the practical level of the labour process, control is also an aspect
of technology use. I have already discussed this in terms of
controlling the patient, by submitting them to surveillance, coupled
with a positivistic (and dualistic) approach which renders them as
'object'. This acts in tandem with drug technology, such as pain relief
in obstetrics or sedation in Intensive Care, which aids the control of
the patient's behaviour as well as their 'symptoms' (sometimes these
may be viewed as synonymous). I also argue that in obstetrics,
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electronic fetal monitoring is used as a surveillance device of
midwifery conduct, rendering it more visible to doctors
<superordinates), potentially, facilitating increased control over the
subordinate group. The political use of 'informed consent' was also
discussed, pointing-out how this 'ethical' notion may be.strategically
manipulated to either obstruct or (usually) uphold obstetric regeimes.
Selective technology use, hinging on social class assessments was noted.
In tension with its potential for surveillance of midwifery practice,
midwives often viewed continuous electronic fetal monitoring as a source
of psychological security and legal protection should their practice be
challenged. Similarly, it aided the Obstetrician in retrospectively
controlling the definition of what had occured and, therefore, what they
might be held responsible for during labour; notwithstanding any
positive or iatrogenic effect it may have upon the individual birth.
I also considered the ethics around the 'withdrawal of active
support', and the different epistemological stances and ontological
experiences of doctors and nurses. The, usually, 'gradual' withdrawal
of support was noted, allowing relatives (and staff) time to adapt to
this decision. It 	 mimicking of 'natural' death also guarded against
litigation; again aiding the physician in retrospectively controlling
the definition of what occured. This raises the question of the role
n
of medical technology in the regulation of birth and death within a
legal- rational society. It is to this, together with a more detailed
I ,
exposition of the role of technology as a control device within the
labour process that I now turn my attention.
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LABOUR PROCESS OF SERVICE DELIVERY AT BOTH ENDS OF LIFE 
'Control' has been a central focus of the labour process debate. This
chapter uses labour process analysis to further examine control issues
around technology use in ITU and Obstetrics. The implications for the
process of being born and dying are then considered.
i) The Labour Process and the Division of Labour 
The labour process is central to Marx's analysis of capitalism. It is
not only where labour meets capital but where capital is created. In
the wage/effort bargain, workers will clearly wish to maximise the
payment they receive. Capitalists will similarly wish to maximise the
surplus value that they extract from workers. 	 Their interests are not
merely different but in conflict.	 The labour process is, therefore,
not just a technical description of a mode of working but implies a
process geared to the production of surplus value. Thus, Marx argues
that the processes of capitalist production are incessantly restructured
by capitalism's principal driving force, the accumulation of capital.
Technology represents an engine of change whereby the labour process is
transformed aiding the reassertion of managerial control and further
maximising the extraction of surplus value. Galbraith (1967) argues
that the very pursuit of rational means to maximise profitability and
efficiency, which was the driving force of nineteenth century
capitalism, led to the development of new technologies which radically
altered the organisation of work, the form of financial investment end
ownership, and the class structure of society.
-190-
Although Baran and Sweezy (1966) in their analysis of monopoly
capitalism recognised the crucial role of technological change, they
made no attempt to analyse systematically the types of technological
change characterising this stage of capitalist development; this was
left to Braverman (1974). Braverman's primary focus . is the degradation
of work in the twentieth century. Identifying the types of
technological change characteristic of monopoly capitalism, he analyses
their impact on the nature of work organisation. He describes how the
application of modern management techniques, combined with
mechanisation/automation, secures the real subordination of labour and
de-skills work in the office and manufacturing shop floor. He suggests
that the separation of conception (management) from execution (labour)
of tasks provides the driving force of the modern organisation and
control of the labour process. This is combined with a routinisation
of work whereby tasks are increasingly sub-divided. 	 The in-built
tendency under capitalism to increase productivity so as to cheapen
commodities on the competitive market has the effect of continually
revolutionisipg the means of production. The general trend is one of
increasing automation allowing a decrease in the productive labour
force. At the same time, the increasing scale of capitalist
organisation necessitates an increase in the number of workers employed
in control, co-ordination and regulation of the transfer of value.
However, like manual workers, the majority of 'non-productive' workers
are equally subject to scrutiny and Tayloristic methods of
rationalisation and differentiation (sub-division of work into simple,
repetitive operations) of the tasks they perform. The result is
'deskilling'r where labour is reduced to the repetitive performance of
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mechanical tasks and an intensification of work is achieved. Deskilling
involves the worker being: "systematically robbed of a craft heritage"
(Braverman,	 1974, p,6).
A continuing debate has arisen from Braverman's work, concentrating
largely on either deskilling and/or strategies of management control
(for example, Zimbalist 1979, Wood 1982, Knights, et al 1985, Knights
and Willmott 1986), Others have considered Braverman's methodological
and theoretical assumptions (Burawoy 1978, Littler and Salaman 1982),
Braverman, whilst generally acknowleged to have provided a valuable
contribution, has been extensively criticised over the years.
Criticisms include:
- that 'craft work' is romanticised (Cutler, 1978);
- that the process of 'deskilling' is abstracted from the specific
material and ideological conditions that favour it (Brighton Labour
Process Group 1977, Elger 1982);
- that in stressing Taylorism as the predominant managerial approach
Braverman ignores the complexity and multiplicity of control relations
(Gorz 1976, Freidman 1977, Ramsey 1977, Edwards 1979, Burawoy 1979,
Nichols 1980, Wilkinson 1983, Child 1985, Storey 1985, Knights and
Collinson 1985, Littler 1990);
- that a restricted view of gender relations is presented (Philips and
Taylor 1978, West 1982, Beechey 1982, Knights and Collinson 1985);
- that the contemporary labour process frequently involves re-skilling
as well as de-skilling (Knights, et al, 1985);
- that the role of the 'subject' is under-theorized <Aronowitz 1978,
Elger 1979, Cressey and MacInnes 1980, Littler and Salaman 1982, Knights
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and Willmott 1990, Thompson 1990);
- that Braverman's use of the concept of 'skill' simplifies a complex
phenomenon, since in practice 'skill' is socially as well as technically
constructed (Rubery 1980, Pollert 1981).
Some have argued that such wide-ranging qualifications to the core
theory have eroded it to the point of disintigration (Storey, Kelly,
Rose and Jones, Coombs, all 1985). Following Thompson (1990), I feel
that labour process theory can still provide a viable general framework
for understanding the organisation of work in capitalist society.
A labour process approach to health care must be seen within a general
Marxist perspective in this sector. As Aglietta (1979) points out, a
major strategic requirement for the preservation of the wage relation is
the necessity to reduce the value of the social reproduction of labour
power represented by the production of collectively consumed use values.
These must be restructured so as to reduce the cost of the service
commodities provided. Carchedi (1977), has termed this an
intensification of the rate of appropriation of surplus labour (as
opposed to surplus value).	 Aglietta argues that the restructuring of
the service industries will necessitate major transformations of their
labour processes. This in effect keeps down the cost of 'the social
wage' and maximises the return on capital investment represented by
fixed assets in the National Health Service. The increased throughput
of patients is part of the intensification of productivity for employees
in the N.H.S. Such intensification of work serves to cheapen health
'commodities' on the internal market being created within health care.
-193-
This has its origins in the Griffiths Report (1983) which argued for
private sector principles in N.H.S. management and began to regulate
conduct within narrow economic criteria. Performance indicators were
also introduced to enhance employee accountability to management. This
was extended by the Department of Health White Paper in 1989, which
proposed an internal market in the N.H.S. and emphasised efficiency-
seeking, self-governing hospitals with competition for patients between
hospitals.
In their recent work, some American theoreticians have called into
question the continued professional dominance, autonomy and control of
the medical profession. For example, McKinlay (1982) and Larson (1977,
1979) argue that doctors are being proletarianized, since they are
increasingly employed in large bureaucracies where they are unable to
retain control over the conduct of their work. McKinley and Stoeckle
(1988) point to changes resulting from corporate involvement in health
care and new management techniques leading to further loss of control on
the part of doctors over the location and content of their work. Haug
(1973, 1977, Haug and Lavin, 1983) also argues that the professions
(including medicine) are being de-professionalised. She specifically
links this claim to the implementation of new information technology in
the service sector. She feels this undermines the authority and
exclusivity of physicians' knowledge and they become merely 'experts',
on a par with managers. Others dispute the proletarianization and de-
professionalisation thesis. Friedson (1983, 1986) argues that, although
a process of 'restratification' has taken place, whereby some individual
professionals (who do not belong to the 'elite') may have lost their
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capacity to exercise control, for the professions as corporate bodies,
this is not the case. He points to the continued strength of the
Professional Associations to regulate and codify their work. Navarro
(1988) also disputes the proletarianization theory, arguing that doctors
never were the dominant force in shaping the form taken by medicine,
other, often conflicting, social, political and economic forces were.
He argues that doctors retain considerable skill and influence that
prohibit them being seen as part of the proletariat. Annandale (1989),
using case study material from obstetrics, suggests that there is a
disjuncture between the obstetricians' inability to protect their
interests as a corporate body and their ability to control the
organization of everyday medical work. She therefore calls for more
theoretical clarity concerning professional behaviour at the macro and
micro level.
In broad terms I am in agreement with Navarro's proposition that
medicine was always shaped by social, political and economic forces.
Doctors never had complete autonomy and control over the circumstances
of their work (the exposure of the National Health Service to market
forces is however likely to bring this into sharper relief). At the
level of the workplace doctors remain the dominant group and it will be
these workplace relations of dominantion and subordination that will
form the focus of the remainder of the chapter. Haug's contention that
de-professionalization in medicine is associated with the implementation
of new information technology has not been evident in Britain and I
argue in this thesis that clinical technology enhances their power by
further mobilizing the medical model, helping to mask continuing
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uncertainty and being used in such away as to increase control over
subordinate groups, including patients.
Labour process analysis concerns itself with the detailed control
exercised at the point of production and the general control exerted
within the system (Edwards, 1990), for example, in relation to the
regulation of birth and death it is possible not only to see the
control purposes this serves within the context of inter-occupational
power struggles but also how this reinforces power relations within
wider society. Although recognising, as Hyman (1975) has specified,
that workplace control and negotiations operate within a framework of
higher-levels of decision-making (these include the detailed terms and
conditions of employment; the structure and policies of labour force
management; other areas of managerial decision-making, such as
investment programmes, financial arrangements and so on), the point of
conflict, nevertheless, remains the point of production, since it is
'the frontier of control' (Goodrich, 1975), where the struggle for power
within the productive process takes place. In health care the point of
production may be taken to be the point of service delivery. 	 We
shall now look at control issues around technology in service delivery
in ITU and Obstetrics.
ii) Control and Regulation in Obstetrics and ITU 
The Normal/Abnormal Divide in Obstetrics 
The National Health Service is highly hierarchical, patterned with
relations of professional domination and subordination. These are
structured by patriarchial and class relations in the wider society.
Friedson (1970, 1977) has emphasised the extent to which the medical
profession seeks to exercise control over related and adjacent
occupations. The occupational colonisation of midwifery by the medical
profession (Donnison, 1977; Oakley, 1976; Gamarnikov, 1978; Witz, 1985,
1992) has already been outlined.
Witz, focuses on the protracted debate around proposals for midwives'
registration between 1860 and the passing of the Midwives Act in 1902.
She describes how doctors progressively limited the sphere of
competence of midwives and undermined their attempts to become a self-
regulating profession. This involved the 'creaming off' of skills and
tasks from midwifery and a 'pre-emptive incorporation' of other skills,
i.e. skills or tasks are incorporated by one profession before they can
be fully assimilated by another. Rather than opting to exercise
complete incorporation of the midwife into nurse-like subservience, the
medical profession followed a strategy which subordinated midwives in a
restricted and reduced role. She explains this in terms of the time-
commitment that labour entails for its attendant and the fact that poor
women in labour were not only time-consuming but unremunerative. This
is comparable to Intensive Care where the nurse acts in a 'caretaker'
role for the absent and expensive Anaesthetist.	 The Registration of
-197-
Midwives Act (1902) formalised the 'normal'/'abnormal' divide between
midwifery and medicine, enabling doctors to regulate and police this
boundary (Witz, 1985, 1992),
Thus, Obstetricians are concerned with the identification of the
pathological or 'potentially pathological' (see Haire, 1978) in
pregnancy and childbirth.	 Rothman (1982) argues that a concern
with pathology represents a 'man's eye view of womens' bodies', wherein
womens' reproductive physiology is seen as a complex (one might add,
chaotic) deviation from the male 'norm' and stressful to the entire
body.
Thus, 'normalcy' - that which is not construed as 'pathological' or
'abnormal' - is also a matter of medical definition. It is, therefore,
a socio-political construct, rather than a statistical average
(MacIntyre, 1977). Illustrative of the historical relativism of
obstetric 'normalacy', one Consultant Obstetrician defined the midwife
role as: "anything which falls outside what in the current sense is a
'normal' labour."	 Specific constructs of 'normal' and 'abnormal'
derive (as Rothman suggests) not only from a medical word-view but,
since medical science is both cognitively male and largely peopled by
men, a male world-view. Christine Webb (1986, p.9) writes:
"Women give and receive health care in a male-dominated setting.
Although the majority of both patients and health workeryare women, the
structures and ideas which control the system are masculine. Even where
women are treated and cared for by other women, these workers are
trained in and authorised by male-defined values and practices."
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The definition of the events of pregnancy and birth as 'normal' or
'abnormal' are, therefore, fundamental to the struggle over who controls
childbirth.	 Furthermore, since the early twentieth century, the
notion of 'pathological potential' has meant that pregnancy is defined
as 'normal' only in retrospect. This allows obstetricians overall
charge from the moment pregnancy is 'diagnosed'. The use of a 'risk
allocation' does not reduce the obstetrically perceived uncertainty,
since it is impossible to predict in individual cases who will develop
problems. All women, therefore, are prone to the obstetric gaze (see,
Arney, 1982), often filtered through the lens of technology.
Commonsense notions of 'normal' childbirth might substitute 'natural'
for 'normal' and suggest that what is being described is something in
its natural state. This would be mistaken. Marieskind (1980, p. 255),
for example, argues that Caesarian Section is now "a routine, expected
'normal procedure'". Similarly, if we take the term 'normal delivery',
as presently constructed within medical terminology in Britain, the
error of such a commonsense reading becomes apparent. A 'normal
delivery' refers simply to a non-instrumental vaginal delivery; the
labour itself could be highly technological, for example:
"She was being internally monitored and she'd had
artificial rupture of the membranes. . . . She'd had Pethidine 
• b • She had a repeat dose of Pethidine. . • and an epidural 
• . . so she'd got a drip up. . .	 She'd not made very much progress.
• • . so they started some Syntocinon • Eventually she. . • had a
'Normal' Delivery at seven o'clock. She was topped-up and there was
pain relief all through, so she was very comfortable even when the baby
was delivered." (Staff Midwife)
Functional to the maintenance of such a definition of a 'normal
delivery' is the fact that midwifery and obstetrics divide labour into
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distinct stages: (latent first stage), first stage, second stage,
delivery, third stage. In this way a 'normal delivery' can be viewed as
a discrete event belying the processional nature of experience*.
This 'separation' of the nature of the 'delivery' from the details of
the 'labour' is clearly visible in the following account:
"She had spontaneous rupture of membranes and there was clear lychor
draining, so the baby wasn't distressed. We put her on an internal 
monitor_ because she had an epidural. • • she'd got a drip 
to stop her dehyrating. . . because she wasn't contracting very well.
.they decided to put up some Syntocinon	 . • and we put in an intra 
uterine pressure catheter. . . And she ended up, she needed a Forceps 
Delivery and for that she had to have an episiotomy. • . She wasn't
disappointed about having a forceps delivery. I think the Midwives are
more disappointed when someone you've looked after for all those hours
ends-up with forceps. It's so nice to deliver yourself" (Staff Midwife)
With this degree of technological intervention it seems almost academic
whether one more intervention is made at the end. 'It's so nice to
deliver yourself' represents a considerable disiumture from what has
gone before. Even had a 'normal delivery' been achieved; the mother
could scarcely be said to be in control of the birth.
Both labours described above are highly technological. In the
hospital statistics one will appear as a i ttlormal Delivery' the other as
a 'Forceps Delivery'. Unpacked, the difference is not as great as it
initially sounds.
*As one pregnant woman in the study commented: ".	 • 	 describe it
(labour) in three different stages and I never thought of separating the
three different stages. I just thought of it as from beginning to end".
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'Abnormal' occurances during labour requiring the presence of a doctor
included: maternal bleeding, maternal medical problems, meconium in the
lychor, maternal pain between contractions, severe tears, a fetal heart
trace flat for 20 minutes or more, 'no progress being made'. The latter
is measured by the Partogram, in effect a time-table (Rothman, 1990).
It charts various indications of 'progress in labour' but is centrally
based on the proposition of an ideal curve of cervical dilation. As a
yardstick for measuring the 'normalcy' of labour, it contributes to the
parameters within which the woman must be managed. It, therefore,
exerts control over the midwife's professional conduct as well as
representing a powerful performance indicator, whereby the labouring
woman is Judged and may be found wanting. 	 As an 'idealised frame of
reference', it is open to the comment made by DeVries (1985, p.111)
about 'protocols', i.e. since : ". .	 any variation is regarded as
abnormal, this routine view of birth anticipates intervention". Doctors
must also be informed about any 'delay in Second Stage', this is again
governed by obstetric 'time-limits', but how strictly these are adhered
to will depend on an assessment by the midwife of the condition of the
mother and baby. The midwife, therefore, retains some discretion over
the situation.
Fetal distress (if the baby's heart rate is too high, too low or is
experiencing decelerations) also requires the doctor to be called. This
is a contentious area.	 Readings are open to different interpretations
and no consensus exists regarding the precise definition of 'fetal
distress', thus:
"It's Just being confident enough to know what is 'normal' and there are
slight, um, like if a woman is in second stage, it's normal to get
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decelerations on a trace."(Staff Midwife)
"If there's fetal distress that I think (hesitates), I suppose you
should never say it's ever normal if there are decelerations, but that I
feel are worrying enough to refer to a doctor, then I would do; if there
are decelerations that are incompatiable with the stage she's at. . ."
(Senior Sister Midwife)
In practice, therefore,	 the midwife may exercise some discretion,
interpreting signs within the context of labour as a whole.
Annandale (1988) notes the way in which midwives re-negotiate obstetric
'risk' in aspects of labour.
Midwives expressed themselves very carefully concerning the
normal/abnormal divide. This underlines its highly political nature.
The most serious midwifery misconduct is "exceeding their duties"
British Medical Journal, 186 (1974). However, it is 	 evident that
'abnormal' is not only a socio-political category (socially constructed
and then used to further the power relations of a particular group), it
is a category which is constructed and reconstructed in practice.
Kirkham (1986, p.36) talks of midwives needing to mount a "defence of
normalcy in the face of male-dominated obstetrics and its attendant
technology and medical ideology"; such reconstructions of 'pathology' in
context are attempts to do Just that. The extent to which individual
midwives were prepared to negotiate the procedural structure varied.
If midwives are managing patients within the limits of the
'normal'/'abnormal' divide and within the strictures of protocols and
the time-tabling of the Partagram, their brief becomes comparable to the
Intensive Care nurse and the assertion that midwives are becoming
obstetric nurses becomes the more sustainable. The distinction is
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between the subservience of the obstetric nurse who is the 'hand-maiden'
of the doctor and the subordination of the midwife who maintains some
degree of autonomy (Witz, 1985). The extent to which midwives within
the Obstetric Hospital couched their aspirations and conduct in terms of
Independent Practitioner status varied between midwives and appeared to
depend on their willingness to negotiate the procedural structure and
accept responsibility for justifying their actions:
"I think it depends how confident you are. • . because you are
responsible for your actions. You have to be prepared to stand up and
say 'I did this because I felt it was necessary'. I used to be a more
of a 'toe the line job' but now, you do sort of start to say 'well do we
need to do this?'" (Senior Sister)
The Fragmentation of Midwifery Competence 
The 'normal'/'abnormal' divide governing the division of labour around
childbirth undermines any notion that care will necessarily be provided
by one person. At the Obstetric Hospital there is little continuity of
care. Women in labour are not likely to have met their carers during
the antenatal period (due to the system of rotation - every six months
for the majority of staff) and continuity is likely to be further
fractured by the shift system.*
Fragmentation of competence within the labour process whether it be
through the task division of labour or the failure to follow the process
through to completion has been associated with dissatisfaction and an
*The House of Commons Health Committee Report on Midwifery Services
(February, 1992) endorses greater continuity of care and recommends that
the hospital should ensure that the labouring woman has a midwife with
whom she has been able to form a relationship during pregnancy.
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undermining of worker's control (Blauner, 1964).	 The midwife undertook
responsibility for the labouring woman only for the duration of an
eight hour shift. Given an average first labour of twelve hours,
primagravidas in particular, are unlikely to be cared for continuously
by one midwife:
"If you think of a primagravida and a normal labour, you think of our
shifts, there's no way you're going to see her through to the end."
(Staff Midwife)
These mothers might particularly welcome a continuity of professional
carer and yet are the least likely to achieve that. Several
interviewees hoped they would labour with one midwife but recognised
this was improbable.
For midwives the eight hour shift represented a considerable
fragmentation of their competence and experience as midwives. The
following provides a good illustration:
"I looked after a lady last night but I didn't actually deliver her. I
looked after her until she was fully (dilated) but I didn't actually
deliver her. The last delivery I did I took over in second stage, so I
didn't actually look after her in labour". (Staff Midwife)
In the first delivery the midwife is the main professional carer during
the labour but not the delivery, in the second she fulfils this role for
the delivery but not the labour. Many midwives expressed their
dissatisfaction with this mode of work organisation. Occasionally, they
voluntarily continued beyond the end of a shift, for example, when the
'delivery' was imminent, or the labour had been particularly traumatic.
Many midwives wished to care for the woman throughout labour and
ideally to have involvement in her antenatal care. Occasionally
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midwives had met the woman on the previous rotation:
u . • . having known them antenatally and having been there for their
birth, makes me feel more like part of it." (Staff Midwife)
Not only are the labouring woman and her midwife likely never to have
met before, they are also never likely to meet again - making the birth
a socially discontinuous event within the hospital experience.
Midwives usually did not remember the names of women whose births they
had recently attended. Women often did not remember the name of the
midwife who had attended their baby's birth.	 One Senior Midwife
recounted delivering a woman's second child, whose first child, by
coincidence, she had also delivered (derived from patient's notes):
"Not that either of us remembered each other", she added plaintively.
Very occasionally, on a one-off basis, it was possible for a midwife to
transfer from the Antenatal Ward to the Labour Ward with the labouring
woman. This entailed the midwife (on her own initiative) seeking the
approval of the Sister in Charge and arranging cover. One Staff Midwife
had done this several times. Her account is quoted at some length
since, as well as lacking the fragmentation of work organisation
described earlier, it also illustrates the possibility of a non-
technological, non-interventionist birth (to a woman with a previous
Caesarian Section) in a highly technological hospital::
u . . . a second baby, the first time she'd had a Caesarian Section for
fetal distress in the first stage and a general anaesthetic. A horrible
labour. She didn't feel in control. She didn't know what was happening
and it was all over really quickly, so she hated the first time. . . I
had her and about six or seven women to look after, who were okay, they
didn't need much looking after. So I Just sat with this woman for a
long time, talking about what she wanted from her labour, pain relief,
what she expected to happen. And she was really worried she was going
to have a Section again. So we chatted for a long, long time. Listened
in, monitored the baby's heart beat now and again and rang up her
husband as the labour progressed and by about half past three in the
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afternoon she was in really strong, good labour. So we went for a walk,
which was really nice, off the Ward, the three of us went for a walk and
by 4 o'clock she decided she wanted gas and air, so we walked down here
(Labour Ward). It was really nice, Just the three of us, no
interference from anybody else. Just got the nightie and a few other
things, walked down here. Walked into a room. Shut the door. And she
wanted to walk around, so she walked around for a bit. She didn't want
to get on the delivery bed because she had a bad memory of getting onto
the delivery bed and being whisked along the corridor on this bed,
feeling as if she was going to fall off. Feeling really unhappy about
the whole thing. So she didn't use the bed. We put the bed away. Put
the mattress on the floor and a bean bag and by about 10 to 5 she had a
really strong urge that she wanted to push and I hadn't examined her at
all. She'd been examined before, in the morning, before I came on and
was said to be in early labour and so at 10 to 5 she Just squatted down
on the bean bag, and I could see the head and she Just started pushing
and she progressed to a nice normal delivery, with not a tear or
anything. Which she was really worried about having stitches. It was a
fantastic delivery. Really controlled, really slow. And I think it
wouldn't have been as good if she hadn't had the whole afternoon with me
to get to know me and I got to know her and what she was frightened of
and she said that she felt safe and that she trusted me, which is the
most important thing and it was Just very nice. Very special. And I
was feeling very privileged to be there with her and her husband and
then her mother brought in her other child and the three of them Just
sat there, getting to know the new baby. It was really nice."
This midwife had spent the whole afternoon with this woman learning
about her hopes and fears for the forthcoming birth and establishing a
trust-relationship with her (this is exceptional since labouring women
appear to largely be left to their own devices on the Antenatal Wards).
The midwife is confident in accepting responsibility for the woman's
care and creates the circumstances where the woman feels 'safe' to give
herself up to the labour.
The organisational fragmentation of midwifery competence is functional
to obstetric domination. The shift system and rotation deny the
possibility of any linkage between the individual midwife and individual
pregnant woman. This undermines any ongoing midwifery proprietorial
interest in the individual patient on a client/profesional basis and
-206-
inhibits the development of a relationship over time between women as
midwives and birth-givers (who together might forge a powerful alliance
against male obstetrics - see Flint, 1988). Fragmentation of continuity
is a good-fit with the obstetric model of childbirth both as a
mechanical event rather than a psycho-social process and as a
phenomenon fractured into distinct stages. 	 Fragmentation is also
traceable to a male image of the world, stressing 'separateness'
('objectivity') - the discontinuous - rather than female
'connectedness' (subjectivity).
Continuity of relationship between the midwife and the labouring woman
was also fractured by staff shortages which entailed the simultaneous
care of more than one patient. Midwives tended to prefer to use
electronic fetal monitoring at such times, allowing them to "pop in and
out and check it (the monitor)" (Staff Midwife). The monitor print-out
provided retrospective details covering her absence. Midwives
perceived 'natural' labours as more labour-intensive and so impractical
at such times. In principle staff shortages would more easily be
absorbed if all labouring women were attached to electronic fetal
monitors, relayed through a central console staffed by a Senior Midwife.
However, this option had been consciously rejected by the Director of
Obstetric Services in favour of keeping the midwife by the bedside in
the Delivery Room (eves if this was not always achievable in practice).
This reflected the philosophy that monitor readings should be seen in
the context of the patient as a whole (this may not always be adhered to
in practice and is in tension, for example, with the high status
attached to 'hard data'). This corresponds to the conscious philosophy
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within ITU of retaining a one-to-one bedside nurse and does not indicate
any conscious effort to use technology as a cost-cutting device to
reduce staffing and thereby intensify work (Child, et al, 1984, Harvey
1984). Nevertheless, monitors were used to alleviate staff shortages on
both ITU (not the Specialised Unit) and the Labour Ward, covering for
the temporarily absent nurse/midwife.
The Extended Role 
The use of the 'extended role' involves the nurse or midwife acting in
a proxy capacity covering specific medical tasks. This represents a
sub-contraction of selective tasks to a subordinate adjacent profession,
whilst remaining under the ownership and control of the dominant group.
All ITU nurses and midwives are expected to carry-out 'extended role'
functions; the tasks involved are determined by the Consultant(s).
Therefore, what constitutes an 'extended role' varies from one hospital
to another (and sometimes between Consultants). Nurses/midwives are
instructed and tested in extended role procedures; 'written up' if
proficient.	 Examples of 'extended role' tasks are:
- ITU: taking blood from a line, hymofiltration, extubation, changing
of trachiotomy tubes, weaning from a ventilator;
- 04tetrics: induction of labour (Senior Sisters only)4 5iting intra
venous infusions (Sisters only), verification of fetal heart trace as
'acceptable' on Admission (Sister in Charge only), taking blood (Sisters
only), suturing simple tears and episiotomies, topping-up epidurals,
putting in drips (emergency only).
Midwives at the Obstetric Hospital had greater proxy medical duties than
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is usual, although some midwives felt this 'responsibility' co-existed
with a considerable degree of medical 'interference':
"I think in some cases we have more responsibility than Sisters in other
hospitals but probably we also have more outside interference (from
doctors). If you can have both. We induce patients in labour, which is
an abnormal thing, which many hospitals don't allow midwives to do, and
until a couple of years ago, we also sited all the intraveneous
infusions. . ." (Sister Midwife)
This Sister perceived a paradox between the 'responsibility' delegated
to midwives and the medically interventionist environment. It seemed
more likely, however, that one begat the other and that the extent of
medical colonisation of childbirth within the hospital meant that the
wide-ranging extended role duties served potentially to incorporate the
midwife still further into the medical model and away from the more
traditional midwife role. 	 A Consultant Obstetrician felt:
"Twenty years ago they (midwives) couldn't do anything apart from
deliver babies. But now they've been given responsibility because
they're good at it, of rupturing membranes whenever necessary, applying
fetal scalp electrodes."
His comments seem to convey the sentiment that medical interventions of
any order are more skilled and worthwhile than merely helping to bring
another human being into the world.
In ITU in particular, there were considerable conflicts around
'extended role' duties. 	 Although many nurses valued the benefits they
felt these afforded the patient (e.g. not waiting for a doctor to
arrive) and as enhancing their own competence, they were critical of
under-resourcing, since they were expected to absorb such work without
any increase in staffing. It represented, therefore, not only
'upskilling' but an intensification of work and some felt it carried an
unacceptable risk to patients, since it meant that nurses were operating
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under increased pressure and time-constraints. In effect, extended role
duties had partly been used to enable increased patient-throughput (see,
for example, chapter 6 in relation to the weaning of by-pass patients)
and provide an extension of medical treatments using a subordinate group
to facilitate this:
"This Unit has developed dramatically over the last 5 years, it's doing
a lot more now. To keep up with that , without the co-operation of the
nurses, a lot of the treatments just couldn't be given and a lot of that
co-operation involves extending the role further and I think that if
you're not prepared to do that you shouldn't be working here. " (Senior
Sister, Specialised Unit)
In practice nurses often dictated quite marked changes in the patient's
management, without extra financial recognition for this responsibility:
"We may be,expected to do more than perhaps we're prepared to, or feel
we ought to, as nurses. Because we tend to take a lot on ourselves with
this extended role. . .they're very time-consuming. It's just extra"
(Sister, General Unit)
Some nurses feared a lack of support if "something went wrong":
"I think sometimes were doing things were probably not covered for. . .
we were talking about it yesterday. You're doing things and if
something went wrong you probably wouldn't get any back-up for doing it.
You've got a little competence card saying you're competent in doing A.
B. C. and D. but you don't know how much back-up you'd get holding this
competence card if something did go wrong." (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
Given the comments below, this fear seemed not unfounded:
il . . . they're (nurses) 'signed' to say that they've been taught that
procedure. They're then assessed as being competent in doing it, it
might be only once more but then it is up to them. Just because I
signed today that nurse X is capable of giving an IV drug and tomorrow
she makes a balls-up of the whole lot, then it's nothing to do with me
I'm afraid. It's up to her to stand up in Court and say 'Yes , I did it
wrong'. Well the first thing there, is 'Well, have you ever been
taught?' and they have a certificate to say they have. 	 So the Judge
or whatever says, 'Well, why didn't you follow the procedures you were
taught?' If she can't Justify why , well, then it's her head on the
line, it's nothing to do with me." (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit)
Many nurses saw a danger of incorporation into the medical role:
"If you do any more, you're bordering on the medical model really as
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opposed to nursing and really we're here as nurses not as doctors"
(Staff Nurse, General Unit)
This fear of further incorporation stemmed from a positive emphasis on
basic nursing care and many feared a continued increase in what they
perceived as technical duties would detract from this:
"I think when you've got staff shortages and you've taken on all these
extended roles you still haven't got a justifiable excuse for standards
of patient care dropping, even if you're busy and you've got four staff
off sick, if you're still doing the extended roles and ignoring the
basic patient care, such as mouth care, bed-bathing and turning of
patients, then something's wrong. You've got your priorities wrong
because at the end of the day, whether you're on the Ward or on ITU,
you're still a nurse. We're not doctors, we're not Anaesthetists, we're
nurses." (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
III
. . . the little details, the finer points. You're the only one whose
going to do that. The doctors aren't going to do that sort of thing. .
. if we don't do it no-one else is going to come along and do it.
Somebody else might come along and give the I. V. drugs or do some
recordings but they're not going to do the basic things, the human
things really." (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
The nurse spends the entire shift at the bedside with the patient, thus,
gaining an 'experiential knowledge' (Rose, 1988) of the patient based
on caring labour. This results in a radically different epistemology to
that of doctors (Anspach, 1987). 	 Arguably, nurses will continue to
gain 'experiential knowledge' of the patient as a human subject to the
extent that they continue to care for their basic needs. To jettison
this function, perhaps to an unskilled, auxiliary group, may entail a
move towards the view of the patient as work 'object'.
Intensive Care is predicated on the basis of one-to-one holistic nursing
care and some nurses saw the 'extended role' as supporting this:
H . . . when you're sat at the end of the bed and you can give
antibiotics or whatever or drugs or take blood gases. It's nice to be
able to do that . . ,it makes you feel as if you're caring for the
patient completely really." (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
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Overall, whether the 'extended role' was viewed positively or negatively
depended on whether it was seen as an integral part of total patient
care or a technical addition to basic nursing care, and was further
influenced by questions of viability in terms of nurse-workload/patient-
safety. The majority, in any case, felt it had 'gone far enough'.
However, since the use of the 'extended role' in ITU appears closely
linked to the political and economic restructuring of the N.H.S., the
nurses' ability to resist this trend must be in some doubt.
Midwives, generally viewed the 'extended role' positively, relating it
to 'total patient care'/continuity of care for the patient:
"We've looked after her all through her labour and it's a nice way to
end if she does need suturing, Just to suture. Also she's not having a
strange face popping in to stitch down below." (Staff Midwife)
Suturing was a newly acquired extended role and midwives anticipated
complaints from medical students and junior doctors who were no longer
gaining experience in repairing simple tears (this had happened
concerning drips, which had been withdrawn from their repertoire).
Some midwives wanted to do simple forceps 'lift-outs':
• • when you know the baby isn't going to come and you think 'I've
got to get the doctor to put the forceps on, I'm here, why can't I Just
do it now?'" (Staff Midwife)
This echoes a long-standing debate. Mrs. Elizabeth Nihill in the
eighteenth century ("A Treatise on the Art of Midwifery") maintained:
I cannot comprehend why women are not capable of completing this
business when begun, without calling in men to their assistance who are
often sent for when the work is nearly finished; and then the midwife,
who has taken all the pains is counted as little value and the young men
command all the praise." (Aveling, 1872, p.109)
The patient might indeed prefer a forceps delivery performed by an
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experienced midwife rather than an inexperienced doctor*. However,
midwives conducting forceps deliveries would represent a major breach of
the 'normal/'abnormal' divide and from their inception the use of
forceps has been Jealously guarded by the male medical profession
(Rushden 1991). On the other hand, the 'extended role generally in
Obstetrics represents a breach of the 'normal'/'abnormal' divide -
although, the tasks are only delegated to the midwives and remain under
medical Jurisdiction.
Not all midwives welcomed 'extended role' tasks, again the fear was
further incorporation into the medical model:
II . 
• . if we get too much on the medical side, I think you'll lose the
essence of being a midwife, which is being 'with the woman'. . . I don't
think we should get too technical or get too much into the Obstetric
Team, we should stay within our role which is to be with the woman and
to see she has the best experience she can." (Staff Midwife)
To risk being 'too much in the Obsetric Team' is to court the
possibility of midwives becoming tantamount to Obstetric nurses. This
will arguably be the probable outcome if midwives take on extra
technical proxy tasks which remain under the control of doctors. To
take on the care of the labouring woman in its entirety, including
*During the birth of my first child the doctor applying the forceps
told the Senior Registrar supervising him that this was only his second
forceps delivery.
the use of forceps, under their own autonomous control and regulation
would, of course, be a different matter.
The Seduction of Sedation 
Strauss, et al (1982) point to a considerable amount of 'sentimental
work' carried out by health care professionals to gain the trust and co-
operation of their patients, allowing 'instrumental work' to proceed
unhindered. 'Sentimental work' emphasises the consensus producing
aspect of emotional work. In doing so, it de-emphasises the possible
conflicts of interest involved, which may lead to manipulation and
coercion. It also ignores the power relations between actors which will
structure exchanges. I now wish to discuss a major avenue open to
health care professionals which may be used in conjunction or
substantially instead of 'sentimental work' - drug technology.
Generally, in Britain, ventilator patients are given sedatives. These
are used, for example, to facilitate intubation and aid tolerance to the
ventilator. During weaning from the ventilator, sedation will be
reduced allowing the patient to take over more of the breathing. Until
the mid-1980's patients on ventilators were paralysed. There has been a
general move away from this (except for certain conditions and some
Units), given concerns over accidential disconnection and fears that
paralysed patients may sometimes remain distressed but unable to
communicate this.
	 Ventilators are also generally more sophisticated
(allowing patients to take some breaths for themselves, where they are
able), making 'fighting the ventilator' less likely. However:
Is . 
• . in the mid-70's this was dealt with by paralysing the patients.
They very soon stopped fighting the ventilator. It doesn't take away
the reason they and the ventilator aren't getting on but it stops them
fighting. . . " (Consultant Intensivist, General Unit)
Thus, complete control was gained over the patient to effect treatment.
It was the policy of both Units to administer 'light sedation'. In the
General Unit this philosophy was inconsistently applied:
"My concern is that we do over-sedate. . . we find a suitable level of
sedation and then we stick to it, whereas, what we should be doing, and
I wish the nursing staff would do it, we should hunt the level of
sedation up and down. . ." (Consultant in Charge, General Unit)
Both Units operated a 'sliding scale regime' for sedation: the doctor
wrote down a range within which the nurse was allowed to adjust the
dosage. Nurses on the General Unit reported that they often found it
necessary to go beyond this range (with the sanction of the Sister in
Charge). This would be retrospectively 'written up' by the doctor:
II , 
• . if you need to go over what they (doctors) have put down as a
maximum, you normally do tend to. . . I would always go up to a Sister
or Charge Nurse and say, 'Look, you know, he's on 5 mls. of sedation,
which is the maximum, but he really does need more' because the majority
of the time they do need more and the doctors are quite happy, most of
the time, with what you've done."(Staff Nurse, General Unit)
This suggests a notional 'maximum' dose which is not the general maximum
dose in practice. At the Specialised Unit too, nurses spoke of
informally 'turning-up' sedation. Thus, in addition to informally
weaning patients from ventilation, ITU nurses also informally adjusted
sedated beyond their formally recognised limits to do so.
Particularly in the General Unit, the easy management and control of
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the patient was a central concern in deciding 'appropriate' sedation.
"We sedate the patients with a continuous infusion, so we actually
titrate the rate according to how awake they are and we try to keep
them not totally flat in the majority of cases. . . . when the
Anaesthetist wants to wean somebody off the ventilator, the sedation
does depress the patient's own ventilation, so they want that stopped and
then we can run into problems . . 	 where they become unmanageable
without any sedation."(Sister, General Unit)
. • . you can always tell if someone needs more sedation, particularly,
if you're starting to wean the sedation off. . . you'd always tell the
doctor when he arrived 'Well, look, he was getting out of control and
I've put his sedation up' (Staff Nurse, Genera]. Unit)
A nurse who had worked at both Units commented: .
"They (patients) are more sedated here (General Unit). But it's blind
sedation I feel. They just sedate. They don't try different drugs to
see if one drug would work the best or better than the one they've got.
And they also use vast doses of sedation with some patients and it's
still not sufficient . . . my philosophy would be, if it's not working,
withdraw it and find out what the underlying problem is don't just mask
it up with gallons of sedation. . . whereas here, they just carry on,
give some more." (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
ITU nurses are generally able to exert a high degree of control over
their semi/unconscious charges. They are used to carrying out a high
level of routine procedural care and patient-observations, unhindered by
the patient's own interventions and may not, therefore, be tolerant of
behaviour which maykinterpreted as unco-operative:
"There are still Units who believe paralysis is a way of managing
patients. It's much more difficult for the nursing staff if the patient
moves about, much easier if they lie still." (Consultant Intensivist,
General Unit)
"Some patients are very co-operative, they Just lie there . . ." (Staff
Nurse, General Unit)
Sedation may become as much for the comfort and convenience of the
nurse as the patient:
"I think there is an attitude, which I try and fight against but which I
succelmb to as well, that the 'proper' ITU patient lies there and doesn't
mov and doesn't do anything and it's very tempting to over-sedate
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Treating the staff really by treating the patient." (Staff Nurse,
Specialised Unit)
Control, therefore, emerged as a central issue around sedation. In the
General Unit a major aspect of sedation appeared to be to control and
su9ress the patient. In the Specialised Unit, although sedation was
used to su9ress 'uncooperative' behaviour, the philosophy held sway
that co-operation was more likely from a patient sufficiently alert to
understand what was occuring and be capable of being reassured.
Sedation was seen as a means of manipulating co-operation, but this time
the emphasis was on achieving co-operation, where possible by turning
the sedation down. Nonetheless at the Specialised Unit:
". . . if patients can't be controlled by good analgesia, discretion and
sympathetic nursing care, then they will get small bonus doses of maybe
an hypnotic. . ." (Consultant Intensivist, Specialised Unit)
Midwives too, may find it easier, to secure co-operation and/or
compliance from labouring women by administering drugs. At the
Obstetric Hospital 52% (1989) of births involved some form of
anaesthetic involvement (General Anaesthetic or epidurals); one third
(1989) involved epidural anaesthesia (59.87. primagravidas). When the
woman arrived at the hospital, unless she was pronounced in 'established
labour', she was admitted to an Antenatal Ward. Here women reported
feeling very much left to their own devices, for example:
"• . . I felt they thought I was being a bit of a silly girl really
getting upset and distressed. 	 . I never saw any of the day staff at
all, until they just came and said 'we're - sending you down to the
Delivery Suite( • • so I didn't feel the staff on the Ward were perhaps
sympathetic at all." (Postnatal Interview)
It is arguable that this lack of affective support added to the need for
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chemical pain relief. Rosengren and Devault (1963, p.202) have termed
chemical pain relief a 'technical, mechanical and personally neutral
means' of relieving pain, which renders it complementary to a
mechanistic view of labour. Unless the woman developed complications
or progressed to late first stage, the signal for her transfer to the
Labour Ward was when she, or the staff, felt she required chemical pain
relief.* Requiring pain relief, therefore, tended to be the main pre-
requisite for transfer from the Antenatal Ward. This builds-in the
assumption that pain relief will be required as a feature of transfer.
Epidurals are available 24 hours a day on demand - notwithstanding
contra-indication. The degree of pressure midwives exerted concerning
epidurals varied (as with other forms of pain relief). 	 Some midwives
appeared reluctant to deal with the pain of labour, making them quick to
suggest this course of action. Others positively enjoyed conducting
labours where very little pain relief was used precisely because these
made more demands on their resources, for example:
• . I really enjoyed looking after her (a woman labouring without
chemical pain relief) because you have to give your total. So that can
be very satisfying." (Sister Midwife).
* As an in-patient at the Hospital (for five weeks intermittently)
before the birth of my second child, I came to know some staff quite
well. Several advised me (including a Registrar Obstetrician) to leave
it as long as possible before transferring to the Labour Ward, because
of the physical constraints and policy measures this was likely to
involve (for example, the likiihood of continuous e.f.m., artificial
rupture of the membranes, immobility). Hence, I did not transfer until
7 cms. dilated. This troubled some staff who kept suggesting that I
might like to 'go down and get something for the pain'.
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As argued in chapter 4, it is possible to see the labouring woman and
the pain relief system as a socio-technical system. Following on from
this the degree of open-ness or closedness of the socio-technical system
is related to the degree of alienation experienced by the worker
(Blauner, 1964). The degree of open-ness or closed-ness refers to the
possibility of the worker intervening in the process; closed-ness is
associated with alienation. 	 Oakley (1981a) maintains that there is an
association between a highly technological birth and post-natal
depression.
Moreover, in both areas, if the	 patient did not appear to be in pain
or out of control, the situation appeared more generally under control;
less uncertain. One was not, therefore, merely using the (drug)
technology to mask pain but to mask uncertainty. In ITU, a Consultant
at the General Unit, felt it was sometimes necessary to either heavily
sedate or paralyse patients in order to re-establish control;
". • . it (the use of heavy sedation or paralysing agents) is done
occasionally in this ITU when things are out of control just as a way of
regaining control of the situation."
Sedation, therefore, is one aspect of technology that aids the
management of uncertainty in acute medical situations.
Midwives also used birth partners to control patients (see Arney and
Neil 1982, Rothman 1982). They felt that, especially in advanced
labour, a woman would more effectively take instructions from a familiar
voice. This appeared partly compensatory for their own lack of prior
relationship with the woman:
"I mean, they will relate to a voice they know rather than someone who
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they haven't seen, well haven't ever seen really." (Staff Midwife)
"They're very good (birth partners), very helpful. They know the woman
far better than you do. They can help you, especially when the going
gets tough. She's more likely to listen to them than some woman she's
met for the first time a couple of hours ago" (Staff Midwife)
Danzinger (1979) has noted that the interactions of hospital staff with
the labouring woman and her birth partner tend to encourage a norm of
"manageable patient behaviour", advantageous to the hospital work
routine rather than the promotion of a choice of birth options. Thus,
birth partners may be enlisted to 'police' the patient's behaviour and
ensure her compliance (particularly when they are the woman's sexual
partner - given patriarchial relations):
"They'll talk to their partner and try and reassure them or perhaps get
a bit angry with them if they're losing control. They can perhaps calm
her down and shout at her a bit better than you can" (Staff Midwife)
"If you get somebody who is going to be very unco-operative, you need
someone who can actually get through to them." (Staff Midwife)
Some commentators (Rothman 1982, Odent 1984, Barbour 1986) question
whether a male partner's presence is necessarily supportive to women in
labour. Rothman suggests that the father as 'coach' or in a 'directive'
or 'supervisory' role exemplifies the traditional patriarchial role .
In Intensive Care matters were rather different, since relatives were
generally asked to leave when the patient was receiving treatment.
Relatives were, however, sometimes used to 'police' the patient from
pulling at tubes, ventilator tubing, and so on , especially in the case
of children (who were more lightly sedated) but predominantly in ITU,
sedation was used.
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Changing Skills in ITU and the Labour Ward 
In both ITU/ Obstetrics it seemed nursing/midwifery staff used
monitoring technology in concert with their original craft techniques.
For example, most midwives continued to palpate contractions manually
despite the woman being continuously electronically monitored. In Ill)
nurses continued to stress the importance of 'looking at the patient':
their complexion, respiration, demeanour, and some monitor readings were
cross-checked, for example, blood pressure readings would periodically
be taken 'on the cuff' (Child, et al, 1984, Harvey 1984). Electronic
monitor results were, therefore, viewed within the context of data
available from other sources and not treated uncritically:
"Personally, if the woman was wired-up to all the machines that are
possible, I would still rely on my hands. . . I would never turn to the
machine and say 'Goodness me, those contractions are going right off the
top of the paper, she must be in really strong labour" (Staff Midwife)
Indeed, external electronic recording of contractions was considered
potentially inaccurate thus, doctors often asked midwives: "What do
they palpate like?" During the birth of my second child the midwife
told the Registrar that my contractions were far stronger than shown
onthe monitor and this happened during observations.	 Conversely:
"On the trace they might be contracting brilliantly and on palpation
they're not going to get the patient to second stage. . ." (Senior
Sister Midwife)
Midwives also often asked mothers about the strength of their
contractions. Thus, indicating that the manual skill of palpation was
still used and valued by midwives, that doctors still recognised the
accuracy of palpation and that midwives still tended to ask the mother
how she perceived the strength of contractions despite continuous
electronic monitoring. 	 Generally, midwives only listened to the
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fetal heart during electronic monitoring if the readings were causing
concern; this was apparent from both interview and observation
(sometimes a midwife said she had 'confirmed' a monitor reading with the
pinard). Some, however, continued to use a pinard periodically to
cross-check the accuracy of the machine, a few did so regularly:
. • . even if a woman is being monitored internally or she's got an
epidural, I always use a pinard to listen, at least every half an hour
in first stage and definitely after every contraction in second stage."
(Staff Midwife)
. . . there's nothing like your own ears, you know, because even
monitors can be deceiving at times." (Staff Midwife)
Machines may be mal-functioning due to age and external monitors may
double the signal (representing an abnormally low heart-rate as normal),
occasionally they would pick-up 'artifacts' like the mother's own
heartbeat or pulse.
The manual palpation of electronically monitored contractions also
yielded additional information that could not be obtained from the
machine, for example, the position of the baby and whether the baby's
head was dstending. It also meant that physical contact was made with
the labouring woman, since palpation entailed the midwife sitting with
her hand on the woman's abdomen; many women found this physical contact
reassuring. The latter was also a positive by-product of the continued
manual monitoring to cross-check electronic instrumentation on Intensive
Care (Harvey, 1984).	 Although electronic monitoring had not led to a
deskilling of the midwives'competence in assessing the patient on a
more manual, craft and sensual bases, it had in some cases undermined
their confidence in relying exclusively on such methods.
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Continuous electronic monitoring in obstetrics impact on the labour
process in other significant ways however. The monitor print-out acts
as a surveillance device over midwifery practice (since the trace had
to be annotated with all treatment - or care, for example, if the
patient was turned over - alongside the reading at that time). This
renders the conduct of the midwife highly visible (even during
attendance at a 'normal' labour); as well as monitoring the performance
of the mother (the latter noted by Arney, 1982). It, therefore,
potentially undermines the control of both. Given that information is
power, the fact that some doctors bypassed the midwife, gaining
information directly from the trace further erodes her control (I have,
however, noted some negotiation by midwives in this area, for example,
fetal distress was not always immediately reported to doctors although
medically defined as 'abnormal').
Conclusions 
Braverman has linked intensification of work with routinisation of tasks
and deskilling (increasing task differentiation). In ITU and Obstetrics
the nurse/midwife had been the subject of 'upskilling' ('extended role'
duties). In using the term 'upskilling', I am aware of the political
nature of 'skill' and recognise that within a different ideological
setting, less technical and more nurturing care-based skills (such as
those carried out traditionally by the nurse) might be considered
'superior'. In the Specialised ITU, in particular, given specific
material conditions (the implementation of an internal 'market' for
specialised operations), 'upskilling' has been linked with an
intensification of work, while in both ITU and obstetrics the range of
medical treatments given and the intensification of medical
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interventions generally, has also largely been facilitated in this way.
This represents an extension of the medical model in both areas and a
further incorporation of nurses and midwives into this framework.
Despite 'upskilling' a procedural routinisation and regulation of work
has taken place in these areas (this is associated with the 'deskilling'
of the patient in the art of coping and decision-making around birth and
critical illness/death), such that routine technological procedures
have increasingly been adopted around the conduct of birth and death.
The next section looks at the impact of this procedural routinisation
and asks what purposes it serves.
iii) The Regulation of Birth and Death 
The doctor's grasp over life starts with the monthly prenatal
check-up when he decides if and how the fetus shall be born; it
ends with his decision to abandon further resttitation"
(Illich, 1976, p.45).
Routine technological procedures have increasingly been adopted around
birth and death. It is primarily the regulation by technology of death
that is explored here, since much has already been written on the
routinisation of birth (see, for example, Mariskind 1980, Oakley 1980,
Rothman 1982, 1990, DeVries 1985).
Time is a key feature of work organisation. Giddens (1979, p.210) sees
"the control of time as a resource in the structure of domination" and
cites Mumford's (1973) characterisation of the clock as "the
quintessential power machine in industrial society." <There are no
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clocks in the birthing rooms designed by Michel Odent at Pithviers
COdent, 1984]).
Medical timetables structure physical processes and events, creating
sanctioned definitions and medical controls (Roth, 1963). Time-tabling
is a feature of both ITU and Obstetrics (the Partagram is also a type of
time-table, see Rothman, 1990). In both areas 'observations' are
recorded at set time intervals (depending often on the perceived
condition of the patient). "Time limits" are also set concerning the
progress of the patient. For example, doctors sometimes gave a
critically ill patient 48 hours to improve pending a decision to 'pull-
out'. Similarly, the labouring woman may be given a specified number of
hours to progress before further intervention is undertaken. In
Intensive Care time-limits often contained a hidden social agenda. They
allowed time for both relatives and staff to absorb the fact that the
patient was about to be 'allowed' to die (in Obstetrics too they may be
used to	 signal that if 'progress' does not occur, a substantial
intervention will take place). Apportioning time around birth and death
(which is integral to the mechanistic approach) appears a good-fit with
the perceptions of 'reality' of many labouring women/patient's
relatives, who often expected accurate information about how long it
would take a baby to be born/their relative to die (this is only
possible with Caesarian Section and 'brain death').
When it is decided that all therapeutic interventions have been
exhausted, with no apparent improvement in the patient's condition,
'withdrawal of active support' may be invoked:
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. . • they won't die unless you withdraw the treatment. They're on
such a large amount of drugs and that you can keep them alive for
however many weeks." (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
Implementation of this decision also involves the management of time and
is highly socially structured. It generally does not represent a
'switching off' of technology as depicted in popular mythology (this
applies only to 'brain death' but a process of withdrawal.
Support tends to be withdrawn gradually in order to regulate the
patient's physiological decline. Thus, there is a procedural attempt to
regulate, rout inise and produce a standard death. This mirrors concerns
to routinise birth (see Marieskind, 1980). 	 Devries (1985) comments:
"The experience of birth is influenced by the degree to which it has
become a standardized rountine"
The same may also be said of death.
The drugs supporting the cardiac function are usually the first to be
withdrawn:
". • .	 we don't tend to withdraw everything instantly. We tend to 
pull out on various systems. In other words, you pull out on heart
support, take away some of the drugs keeping the blood pressure up. And
then pull out on respiratory support, turn the oxygen down." (Consultant
Intensivist, Specialised Unit)
In death as in life the body is viewed systemically and treated, or in
this case, treatment with-held, on a systemic basis. The withdrawal of
technological support makes 'death' very visible:
"The first patient I paid attention to dying was a girl, a 'pioneer
surgery' girl. She was on a monitor and had all her infusions and was
on a ventilator. . . It is very strange really. . . you can watch the
blood pressure, watch the heart rate, see everything that happens. . .
you can't just take them off the ventilator really. So I was quite
fascinated in a way to see how people could die. But gradually their
heart just fails, their cardiac output just reduces and reduces. They
reduce the oxygen, so they put it at just room-air, so that they're not
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getting extra oxygen . . . but the ventilator will still keep their
chest moving and won't stop until they switch if off; they have to wait
for the heart to stop." (Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
The ventilator continuing to inflate and deflate the chest of the dead
patient, may initially cause some ambiguity for the relative(s) about
whether the patient is dead or alive (the most extreme ambiguity is
'brain death'). At the same time, there is the graphic depiction of
death on the oscilloscope. Significantly the 'straight green line' on
the oscilloscope has become a compelling late twentieth century image of
death, while the electronic alarm signal has replaced the (organic)
death rattle in the popular consciousness. Arguably this indicates the
extent to which 'high-technology' death has now been absorbed into the
range of possible expectations of 'normal' death (see Mariskind, 1980,
who argues that Caesarian Section has now come to be seen as a part of
'normal' birth experience).
The Impression Management of Death 
If the drugs supporting the patient's various systems were simply
'switched off' (even allowing for the continued attachment to the
ventilator) death would probably occur very abruptly. This would
arguably render medical staff more susceptable to charges of
positively 'killing' the patient and relatedly, death would appear
less like 'non-technological death', which, notwithstanding the provisos
rehearsed below, tends to occur over a number of hours:
"If someone's going to die.	 Unless it's a road traffic accident, or a
traumatic bleed, or a sudden bleed or they've had a heart attack, they
die slowly. They die in 6 hours, 12 hours. They don't suddenly drop
down dead , on the whole. And it's better generally, if the relative
has a little time with their loved one before they die and so . . .give
them a little time with them deteriorating, withholding treatment. I
think it's better to take things away slowly rather than switch things
off. It's still only a relative thing. It may be only 2-3 hours, it
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may be just a morning. It is also not as positive as switching things
off. If you're withdrawing something they're on, it's not the same as
switching things off. They usually ask you about this. They say, 'Are
you going to switch the ventilator off?'. We say 'no, we're not'.
Because that's a very positive act, as near to pointing a gun at someone
and shooting them. You've not only made the decision to withdraw
treatment, you've actually done it and so it's a withdrawal 
process. "(Consultant Intensivist, Specialised Unit)
This model of withdrawal as a process is favoured by the British
Intensive Care Society. It is also the preferred method of withdrawal
in the United States where patients' relatives have at times resorted
to litigation over such issues:
"So the actual switching off of a patient is a very difficult situation
and it actually hits the press sometimes in the States. Recently there
was a person who was being ventilated for twenty years in the States. .
." (Consultant Intensivist, Specialised Unit)
The strategy to withdraw technological support in stages, in order to
'mimic' the more gradual decline of 'natural' death therefore, appears
to serve a dual purpose. It allows time for the emotional adaption of
the patient's relatives (and the health care professionals) to the
patient's imminent death. It also allows death to be presented as a
less dramatic disjuncture. If death appeared too abrupt or
professionally induced this might become the subject of litigation.
Legal considerations were, therefore, greatly to the fore where
withdrawal of technological intervention attended death.*
Nevertheless, having decided on withdrawal, the 'gradual' method of
proceeding is not always uncontentious. On the Specialised Unit, a
Consultant Anaesthetist described a recent occurrence where nursing and
*This might not be the case, for example, in a country such as The
Netherlands, where euthanasia is not illigal.
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medical staff had disagreed, not about the necessity for withdrawal but
about how this should be carried out:
u 
• . . three of the Consultants on Intensive Care had discussed when
to withdraw treatment on this child who obviously 'wasn't doing' and
we'd had him there for a long time and the Paediatric Consultant
eventually agreed that it was a good idea and the nursing staff thought
it was a good idea. Everyone was happy that treatment was withdrawn.
And this child was still responding individually, was able to open his
eyes and was breathing half of his breaths himself, so he was able to do
everything. So he fulfilled the criteria of brain stem death in no way
at all. So you can't switch him off, switch his ventilator off because
he will keep on breathing and we could withdraw his support: his heart
was pounding away, his volume, his fluids, because they were actually
keeping his pressure up, and allow him to just settle down peacefully on
the ventilator, give him some pain killers, let him sedate, let him
drift off to sleep. Nice peaceful death. The nursing staff felt that
this was such a protracted way to die for a child with the parents
around, that they were insisting that he was extubated, that the tube
was taken out and that he was allowed to sit in the arms of his parents
and die that way. X (one of the Consultant Intensivists) had a lot of
problems. He had a lot of heart-ache over it and it got quite heated on
the Unit . . . . it upset X, it upset the nursing staff and they got
round it by (hesitates), they had to do what the consensus of medical
opinion says because they are the people who are in control of those
patients. . ." (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
In this context the Consultant stressed that the medical staff were not
only responsible for the patient's treatment but they, as he termed it
would, 'carry the can' in the case of complaint. Clearly litigation was
feared should the child be extubated prior to the cessation of his
heartbeat. It can be seen that the use of technology around death is as
much affected by legal considerations as is the use of technology around
birth: so that fear of litigation affects the way in which we die as
well as the way we are born/give birth.
A Technological Rite of Passage 
'Brain death' is perhaps the ultimate technological death. It becomes
apparent that it is only the technology that is affording the patient
the appearance of life. 'Brain death' describes the situation where the
brain stem is massively damaged or destroyed and there is no
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communication between any neuronal activity in the brain and the rest of
the body. Fundamentally, the patient will not breathe unassisted. The
contention is: that one is essentially ventilating a corpse. 	 Meanwhile
the bed is blocked and the relatives may be left with false hopes for
the patient's survival. The patient may look perfectly well, as if
merely asleep: they will be pink, their heart will be pounding, their
chest rising and falling. This is likely to present an incredibly
ambiguous, distressing and unintelligible spectacle to the relatives
(contention has raged in the past in the media about this area and
continues to surface from time to time):
"The patient's pink, warm, you know, and sometimes there's, you know,
hardly a scratch or graze on them really. Their head's taken all the
injury and sometimes you can't really see any visible signs". (Staff
Nurse, General Unit)
11 
0 0 0 and the children, they look like angels, little angels. Dreadful
for the relatives. Dreadful, dreadful." (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
Some regulatory technique is necessitated by this impasse, since the
patient does not fulfil the 'normal' criteria of 'death', for example,
no heartbeat, cessation of breathing, complexion turning blue. Some
other criteria must , therefore, be substituted for these in order to
allow disconnection from the ventilator. Thus, 'brain death' is the
occasion when death on the ITU is at its most formally regulated.
Statutorily laid-down tests (agreed by the Royal Colleges) are performed
(twice) to determine its presence. These tests represent a 'diagnostic
procedure'; they confirm the diagnosis of 'death'. This represents a
statutory, procedural regulation of death necessitated by technological
innovation. Prior to the introduction of 'brain death' criteria the
patient stayed on the ventilator until the whole brain died which:
n . 
• • could take months. And the brain just starts liquifying and
comes out through the ears, basically, and everywhere else. . . " (Staff
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Nurse, Specialised Unit)
The criteria embodied in the tests represent a policy based on
positivistic medical science which attempts to 'objectify' and,
thereby, formalise and regulate this uncertain situation where the
patient may appear alive but is deemed to be clinically dead.
One respondent faced the situation of her husband being declared brain
dead. She felt great confidence in the 'brain death' criteria, as she
put it: 'they do it by the book'. She felt her husband 'wasn't there
any more'. An Evangelical Christian, despite the technological nature
and setting of her husband's death, she reported that she had "an image
of J. (her husband) as freer and happier than he ever had been and I had
in a way to celebrate with him, be happy with him". She had an
impression of her husband "praising the Lord, dancing with the Lord".
By choice, she had not been present when the ventilator had been turned-
off and remained in the Waiting Room seeing him afterwards. When she
saw him, she felt: "God had taken him home". The mystical in the face
of the technological. The religious experience of this woman concerning
her husband's death seemed unaffected by the human agency involved in
its regulation and the technological nature of its enactment.
In practice, once the first set of brain death criteria tests had been
performed, if the patient met the criteria, they were 'dead' and the
second set were a formality:
"The first round the patient is dead anyway. There's no need to do a
second set of tests. It is a pure formality. Round one is to let you
know there is no way out. And round two is to let other people know;
So you've made the decision on the first set of tests, that this person
isn't going to survive and you say, 'Well, I'll go and discuss with the
relatives, go and discuss with the Consultants and anybody else, the
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nursing staff, that this is the situation'. Then you go on and do
something about it. . ." (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
Some nurses preferred to watch the ' criteria' being 'demonstrated' on a
patient, since this helped to establish in their minds that the patient
was dead. Some Consultants allowed patients' relatives to be present
while the second set of tests were conducted for the same reason:
"Frequently I ask the relatives if they wish to be with me for the
second set of tests. . . It's one or two relatives or I've had 5 or 6 in
at one time, there when you perform 'the last tests'" (Consultant
Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
The assurances of science are back-up by the absolution of the priest in
"the last Tests" (as a Consultant Anaesthetist termed them). It seems
significant that doctors, these modern-day priests (Szasz 1974, Oakley
1981a, Hart 1985), should perform these 'last tests'. These scientific
Last Rites, in a technological society. It is here that science and
religion link hands to encircle the supplicant; they appear in concert,
not in opposition. Both are permeated with ritual, an order of service
and ceremony, not to mention drama:
"It's very important that you realise what's likely to happen because
they obviously will grieve as soon as you make the final test. The
final test is to see that they will not respond to being disconnected
from the ventilator. The response would be to try and take respiratory
gasps and breathe. Now you say: 'I will take them off the ventilator
and if they do not actually breathe. I do not intend, that fulfils the
criteria for brain stem death, I will not connect him back up to it'.
That gets you out of the problem of putting him back on and saying:
'Well look I'll have to switch him back off because he's dead'. So,
that is effectively the death switch. If I don't put him back on
because he's fulfilling the criteria, it's not quite the same thing. It
allow them to see you do it, they see it. He's not responding. He's
not breathing. . ." (Consultant Anaesthetist)
So end these technological rites of passage. Not reconnecting the
patient, may appear less proactive than disconnecting the patient after
reconnection.	 In addition to the desire to spare the relatives the
trauma of a further connection and disconnection of the patient to and
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from the ventilator, this strategy again appears to project a more
passive act (as with the gradual withdrawal process) - confirmatory
that the patient is dead rather than actively 'killing' them, as a
disconnection following a re-connection may be interpreted.
The regulation of birth and death in legal-rationl society has been
accompanied by its increasing bureauffatisation:
"It's a lot more paperwork. Everyone is getting a lot more legal
orientated. Everything is documented." (Staff Midwife)
All must be recorded for possible retrospective audit. There is a
formalisation of practices, an adherence to rules and procedures which
aid a regulation of the event, producing, as far as possible a
standardized, uniform event; defensible if necessary in a Court of Law.
Thus, litigation affects practice at both ends of life. What is an
'acceptable' birth or death to a large extent becomes defined legally
and organisationally: it is not left to the individual to decide.
Euthanasia, on the one hand, and giving birth without the attendance of
\
a qualified health care professional, on the other, are only the most
extreme examples of this more general phenomenon.
In obstetrics electronic monitoring has played a central role in
providing a legally admissible record of the fetal heart; although this
is not a legal requirement.	 A similar situation exists in Intensive
Care. There is no legal imperative to keep the patient attached to
monitors when they are known to be dying or if active support has been
withdrawn. In some Units monitors are turned-off or covered (at the
discretion of the doctor or senior nurse). This was not the usual
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procedure on the Units studied.	 A Senior Staff Nurse commented:
"The worst time is usually if somebody's dying or they've
pulled-out and you've told the relatives nothing else can be done and
the heart will Just fail. They sit waiting and watching the monitor"
At such times, another Staff Nurse felt like 'a prison warder'
intruding on intense emotional intimacy. She would prefer to:
"Let them spend more time with their relative and don't fuss about
'they've got to be turned now'. I mean, if they're dying, they're dying.
Leave them. Shut the curtains. Does it make any difference what the
'observations' are? Why don't you write at the end of it 'patient
deteriorated and died peacefully'. That's enough to cover you legally.
Does it matter what the blood pressure was at 6 o'clock, 8 o'clock..."
Conclusion 
Death must not only be regulated, it must be seen to be regulated.
Similarly birth - Obstetricians equate a controlled birth with a safe
birth and an unmanaged birth with a dangerous disregard for the safety
of the mother and the child. Nothing must be left to chance. It
follows, therefore, that uncertainty, which is a major feature of the
medical labour process, must be managed, and medical technology is a
major weapon in this ideological battle. It is to this proposition that
the next chapter turns.
Chapter 8 
CHALLENGE AS OPPORTUNITY: Control and the Manipulation of Uncertainty 
Since control is bound-up with the ability to dominate, or at least
predict, the course of events, a possible challenge to control is
presented by 'uncertainty'. Uncertainty is a quality long-recognised as
endemic to medical situations (Parsons 1951, Fox 1957, 1979, Davis 1960,
Scheff 1963) and is the subject of this chapter. Davis (1960) argues
that not only is uncertainty present in medical situations but that what
he termed 'functional uncertainty' is used strategically by doctors in
the management of patients and patients' relatives to avoid time-
consuming and potentially emotionally distressing encounters; this is
essentially 'uncertainty' as an avoidance strategy. 	 In other words,
doctors made patients' poor prognoses appear more uncertain than they
had by that time become in order to obviate the necessity directly to
confront patient and patient-relatives' responses to such unfavourable
projections. Following on from this, this chapter suggests that
uncertainty may, paradoxically, be proactively pressed into the service
of medical control. The argument is that 'uncertainty' may be viewed as
a resource in the labour process which the medical profession may
manipulate along a continuum of lesser to greater 'uncertainty',
according to their control interests. Technology, the
operationalization of positivism, is pivotal to this process.
"Projected Instrumental Certainty", where the situation appears more
controlled (by technology) in terms of producing a favourable outcome
than is demonstrably likely to be the case is argued to typify Intensive
Care and 'end-game' Obstetrics (when technology has been brought to bear
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on the reproductive self). Indeed, in Intensive Care, it was the
proposition that critically ill patients could benefit from rigorous and
sustained technological intervention supporting the cardio vascular
system that formed the basis of the creation of the area and (usually)
Anaesthetists ownership of it. On the other hand, "Projected
Instrumental Uncertainty", where uncertainty is emphasised in the form
of open-ended risk, typifies the Obstetric enterprise and establises
maternity cases under the 'ownership' of Obstetricians; technology then
becomes a major weapon brought-in by doctors to address this projected
open-ended risk. Once technology becomes employed in labour, the
projection moves to one of "Projected Instrumental Certainty" - where
technology and the medical profession project an image of having
everything under control. It is concluded that uncertainty is
manipulated towards or away from greater uncertainty to reflect the
control interests of the dominant group, that is, doctors.
i) Uncertainty and Control 
Few people handle uncertainty well and so seek ways to reduce it or, if
that is not possible, cope with it (Malinowski 1948, originally 1926).
Diverse coping mechanisms may evolve over time to manage 'uncertainty',
such as magical or religious rituals (Felson and Gmelch, 1979) - or
medico-legal rituals, as I suggest around the 'enactment' of brain death
criteria in chapter 7 or mote generally around the impulse to produce
the 'standardized' birth or death. Alternatively, there may be a
strategy of rigorously gathering scientific evidence about the likely
consequence of possible actions (Janis and Mann, 1977): this is salient
to electronic monitoring, although in this context, it may take place
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in advance of action (treatment), 'in real time' or retrospective to
treatment. I am further arguing that technology itself is used by
doctors to 'cope' with uncertainty, i.e. manage uncertainty and, indeed
further, to manipulate 'uncertainty'.
The importance of uncertainty in treatment and disease to the
relationship between doctor and patient was first identified by Parsons
(1951).	 Doctors must develop stategies to cope with uncertainty (Fox
1957, 1979, Scheff 1963), while certainty in the area of diagnosis need
not imply certainty in therapy <Robinson, 1973). Often the problem of
uncertainty obscures both diagnosis and prognosis and presents a problem
in communicating the unknown and problematic to the patient and their
relatives in a solution-demanding culture (Davis, 1960). 'Uncertainty'
may result from: incomplete or imperfect mastery of available knowledge,
limitations of current medical knowledge or a combination of both (Fox
1957, 1979). Fox argues that doctors are socialised over time into
coping with uncertainty, while factors like clinical experience add to
their reassurance. Stemming from Fox's first point, it is noteworthy,
that since obstetrics is a Consultant-led rather than Consultmt-based
Specialism, Labour Wards in Britain will be served by Junior Doctors
and, for example, newly rotated Senior House Officer's are likely to
experience a greater degree of uncertainty. 	 Davis (1960, however, in
his longtitudinal study of the understandings and expectations of the
relatives of paralytic poliomyelitis sufferers, identified uncertainty
not simply as a problem for the doctor but an opportunity to use
uncertainty strategically in the management of patients and their
relatives. Davis seeks to distinguish between 'real' uncertainty as a
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clinical and scientific phenomenon and the uses to which 'real or
pretended' uncertainty is applied. He found that 'functional
uncertainty' served the managerial ends of doctors and other health care
professionals in their interactions with patients and their families:
reducing time expenditure, avoiding the effort of full and frank
discussion and the 'unmanageable' reactions this was feared to provoke.
In this case, the exaggerated unpredictability that families continued
to believe attended their children's cases, denied them the facility to
make rational decisions within a realistic framework. 'Functional
uncertainty' was not achieved by lying but by omitting information and
the use of jargon in an obscurantist manner. 'Functional uncertainty'
was used in order to avoid confronting onerous emotional situations that
might generate grief or resentment on the part of the patient or their
relatives; doctors justified this approach as allowing the
patient/relatives to 'discover' gradually and for themselves the full-
extent of the malaise (Davis 1960).
I would argue further that 'uncertainty' appears as a resource which is
manipulated by doctors in order to gain 'ownership' and compliance
within given situations. It is manipulated on a continuum towards or
away from greater uncertainty: this exploitation of the 'unknown'
representing either 'projected instrumental uncertainty' (which typifies
the justification of the Obstetric enterprise) or 'projected
instrumental certainty' (which typifies ITU and 'end-game' Obstetrics).
This is a proactive process (not merely reactive and defensive as
described by Davis 1960), involving active prospecting, intimately
connected in these two areas with a colonisation of an area of interest,
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wherein the role of technology is central to the negotiation of
'uncertainty'; as well as being a more general control resource within
the labour process. Medicine is a positivist science and technology is
the operationalsation of positivism, structured by social relations.
Positivism describes the world in physical terms which leads to a
reification of processes and persons/patients. Reification, turning
that which is addressed into an object, is complemented by turning the
solution into a commodity.
ii) Intensive Care - projected instrumental certainty 
The establishment of a science is said to rely on describing and
categorising within the field of study. Foucault (1971, 1973, 1977)
sees medicalisation as an aspect of the rationalization of society
through the domination of scientific categories. In this way the
medical model takes phenomena and redefines and reorganises them in
terms of a particular expert-framework which gives that expert group
access, domination and ownership within the situation; a mobilization of
power towards the exercise of control. Prior to the development of
ventilator technology, ITU's did not exist in Britain and anaesthetists
in promoting the development of this technology incorporated this into a
power-base i.e. the Intensive Therapy Unit (prior to this Anaesthetists
had no hospital beds or Ward area under their control). 	 ITU at its
present level of development has succeeded in identifying disease
patterns but is left with the problem of: "not knowing at this stage of
medical knowledge how best to treat them." (Consultant Anaesthetist)
This leads to the problem of establishing a greater certainty of
probable outcome for the individual patient, since ITU involves scarce
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and highly expensive resources (which given the current political
climate of financial audit, doctors are likely to be increasingly
called upon to justify).	 Although ITU's have achieved major
improvements in survival chances for some conditions previously
considered life threatening, evidence is less conclusive on the benefits
and costs of treatment for the complex illnesses from which the majority
of ITU patients suffer (Kings Fund Report, 1989). At the same time,
there are concerns about the ill effects which may arise from ITU
procedures in terms of patient dignity, privacy, autonomy and the fact
that they may produce more harm than benefit (Kings Fund Report, 1989).
This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that all medical science may be
seen to some extent as experimentation, again emphasising the
uncertainty of the situation;
"All treatment is research. . . you can't be sure of the response. . .
you can't be 100% sure about anything. . . You treat somebody and then
you view the response and that's an experiment." (Consultant
Anaesthetist)
Given that some treatments are more easily demonstrable as beneficial
than others, there are large numbers of treatments and interventions
whose beneficial effects and/or long-term safety have never been
scientifically validated <Enkin and Chalmers, 1982). The Specialised
Unit, in particular, is likely to treat patients who have undergone
techniques which are highly innovative. However, if we take the case of
'pioneer surgery':
". . . they're perfecting it as they go along. . ." (Staff Nurse,
Specialised Unit)
"They're experimenting on them. I'd never have 'pioneer surgery',
that's how it's made me." (Senior Sister, Specialised Unit)
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Within this context 'pioneer surgery' merely constitutes one end of a
continuum of uncertainty surrounding treatment, rather than
representing any major disjuncture in terms of guaranteed beneficial
outcome. Uncertainty is, therefore, endemic to the medical situation,
merely occuring in a particularly acute form, given the critical nature
of the patients in Intensive Care. This must be managed in some way if
the patient or their relatives are not to lose 'faith' and the doctor
is not to lose 'face'.
Uncertainty, then, is the antithesis of inevitability: inevitability
means there can only be one possible outcome and this is usually not the
case in ITU. In essence the problem emerges as:
"I'm not sure we know which patients to treat. I'm not sure we know
when to quit." (Consultant Anaesthetist),
When to go in with all technology blazing and when to pull-out?
Theoretical uncertainty makes such doctors reluctant to accept the
inevitablity of particular outcomes. A considerable debate is,
therefore, possible over who is, and who is not, appropriate for
admission to Intensive Care. As we saw earlier, in practice this will
take place against a political economy backdrop with social 'scenery'
which may be moved on and off the stage; this will include the
'scientific' quantification of social values in, for example, attempting
to calculate 'Quallies' - 'Quality of Life Years' of possible survivors.
Apache II (Acute Physiological and Chronic Health Evaluation, see
Wagner, et al, 1986) is a scoring system involving a positivistic
calculation of the degree of derangement from the physiological norm.
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This is already used in some Units as one of the measures determining
who will be taken into Intensive care and/or the degree of likely
nursing-dependency. 	 Some doctors have used Apache categorisation to
attempt to predict survival in groups of patients with particular
diseases. Others now wish to extend this to predict outcome in
individual cases. This is a strategy of 'projected instrumental
certainty', a working definition of who is successfully treatable
based on statistical probability. In fact, it is never possible to move
with any certainty from a statistical probability of something happening
to predicting accurately its occurrence in an individual case. Over and
above this, such a strategy still relies on the formulation of a policy
of inclusion/exclusion, in that, it is still necessary to decide where
to draw the line in terms of which patients to treat even using such an
assessment.
Not only is there a degree of uncertainty surrounding survival but there
may be uncertainty around the degree of lasting impairment that the
patient has suffered, in the first instance, for example, the degree of
brain damage was often difficult to establish with any certainty. For
example, Anspach (1987) describes the difficulties involved in making
'life and death' decisions in Neonatal Intensive Care, given the
'uncertainty' of prognosis. Noting different epistemologies amongst
doctors (technical/scientific) and nurses (affective/interactional), she
is critical of:
"A culture which allows only certain types of knowledge to be used as
the criteria of 'certainty' which may impel physicians to continue
supporting an infant life long after this may be appropriate." (Anspach,
1987, p.229)
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In general, even when a prognosis becomes more certain, it may be
uncertain whether or not the patient would wish to survive given, for
example, quadraplegia (paralysis from the neck-down). Relatives
occasionally interpreted as evasive or uncaring the fact that doctors
were reluctant to commit themselves to long-term improvement
prognostications even though this was likely to reflect the doctors' own
real uncertainty within the situation.
Given the medical 'conjuring trick orientation' (Hart 1985), science
and technology in ITU may be seen to act as generating 'projected
instrumental certainty' and thereby masking the degree of uncertainty
present within the situation. This is achieved in a number of ways.
Intensive Care technology overall tends to be imbued by patients, their
relatives (and the general public) with ideological notions of
(miraculous) 'cure' (even when it is merely supportive of vital
functions). The popular media play a central role in this process (see
Karpf, 1988). This is especially the case with ventilator technology,
since many patient's relatives do not appreciate (at least at some stage
In the proceedings) that it is actually possible to die on a ventilator.
Massive interventions of drugs technology keep the patient sedated, thus
they appear to be in a quiet, controlled state. Sedation emerged as
intimately connected with patient control (see chapter 7). Controlling
the patient was associated with appearing to control the situation, that
is, if the patient did not appear to be in pain or out of control, then
the situation appeared more under control; less uncertain. Indeed
sometimes it was necessary to either heavily sedate or paralyse the
patient in order to "regain control over the situation" (Consultant
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Anaesthetist, General Unit).	 Other aspects of the drugs cocktail
massively and invisibly support such elements as the patient's cardiac
and renal function, resulting in the visible display of what may be near
normal physiological readings on the electronic monitor:
"A patient can die on an ITU with relatively normal physiological
values" (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
The illusion, topped up with 'wishful thinking' on the part of patients'
relatives is near complete. In practice brain death is the most extreme
example of things being not what they physiologically seem because they
are masked by technology: the patient is pink, breathing and appears to
be alive but, it transpires that the patient is certifiable as dead:
". • • it has to be stated to them (relatives) that the patient is, in
fact, dead and that the heart-rate and the blood pressure mean nothing."
(Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
". . . they may well be 'dead as a door nail' but if the ventilator is
still plugged in and switched on, their chest is still going up and
down, that's all the family consider - 'they're breathing'." (Staff
Nurse, Speicalised Unit)
". • . because they watch the monitor and they see the heartbeat, they
say 'how can they be dead, they've got a heart beat?" (Staff Nurse,
General Unit)
This is not to deny that ITU saves the lives of people who would
otherwise die but it is to assert that this outcome is, in fact, far
from certain in the individual case and that technology may serve to
mask this fact from patients' relatives. This results in a 'projected
instrumental certainty' which works towards the interests of doctors,
since if one cannot be seen to be exercising control within a situation,
one may lose credibility and, eventually, 'ownership' within the labour
process. This makes technology mystifying not only in its
inaccessibility to the inexpert (emphasising the control it, therefore,
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gives to the expert) but in its ability to prevent the disclosure of the
extent to which we live in an uncertain, unpredictable world. Popper
(1961) challenged the notion of certainty, emphasising that we could
never be dealing with more than a 'probablity' that something would
happen and more recently 'Chaos Theory' (Gleick, 1987) has recognised:
"Where chaos begins, classical science stops.. . . 'chaos' is a science
of process rather than state, of becoming rather than being. (Gleick,
1987, pp.3-5). Chaos theory is, therefore, dynamic. It deals in
randomness and complexity. It questions determinism and sees order and
chaos as existing simultaneously within complex processes. Developed in
meterorology, where for example, weather systems obeyed mathematical
rules but never repeated themselves, containing 'instability' at every
point: ". . . it is well known that a chain of events can have a point
of crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos meant that such
points were everywhere. They were pervasive. . ." (Gleick, 1987, p.23).
Thus, Tritton (1986, p.37) wrote that the unexpected possibilities
extended to: "physiological and psychiatric medicine, economic
forecasting, and perhaps the evolution of society". 	 As with pain
relief in both ITU and labour, 'off the peg' solutions may mask rather
than reveal the processes with which we must ultimately find more
complex, flexible and human ways to engage.
'Projected instrumental certainty' may be reinforced by other policy
measures within Intensive Care which promote uniformity, enhancing
notions of predictability, as a defence against possible adverse
criticism (or, worse still, litigation) on the part of patients'
relatives, for example, 'standardized' birth and death (or the
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'withdrawal of support'), as discussed in the previous chapter.
Additionally, for example, in the General Unit there was a move towards
the implementation of 'standardized terminology' in order to try and
eliminate the lack of uniformity in communication from staff to
relatives. This bureacratization involved all staff treating the
patient agreeing a 'term for the day', for example, 'critically ill but
stable' to describe the patient's condition. This would presumably
serve to reinforce the notion amongst patients' relatives that
something about the patient's condition could be encapsulated with
certainty and objectivity and distilled into a standardized phrase.
Added to which, in this context, withdrawal of active support is
presented as "a hard, objective decision" (Anaesthetic Registrar) and
the tests for 'brain stem death': "very hard guidelines" (Anaesthetic
Consultant), "very firm criteria" (Anesthetic Registrar).
Positivistic methodology (with its 'model of certainty') and technology
which represents applied positivism, are central to this process.
?
The contention that 'projected instrumental certainty' is in operation
overall within the Intensive Care manifestation of acute medicine, does
not preclude the use of 'functional uncertainty' (Davies 1960) in
certain specific situations, for example when individual doctors are
unwilling to deal with the consequences of telling a patient's
relatives that death is about to occur. What is being argued is that
'uncertainty' is a resource which is manipulated by the medical
profession in order to gain an initial professional stake in the
situation (they may manipulate it towards greater 'uncertainty', as
initially in Obstetrics, or away from extensive 'uncertainty', as in
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Intensive Care). Thus, 'uncertainty' is further managed within the
developing labour process in order to enhance medical control within the
situation and, for example, in Obstetrics once technology is applied
'projected instrumental certainty' comes to the fore. So that, in
Intensive Care, while ITU doctors and nurses will rarely, if ever, tell
the patient's relatives that the patient will certainly survive and, in
general tend, where the patient is particularly unstable, to paint a
'black picture' to the relatives, making any improvement 'a bonus': in
contrast, the image that is presented on a sensory level is one of
'projected instrumental certainty' - that all is under control,.
iii) Obstetrics - 'Prolected Instrumental Uncertainty' 
The admission and acknowledgement by doctors of 'uncertainty' within a
situation might be felt to be inevitably a source of weakness,
underlining their infallibility. In Obstetrics, however, this
proposition has been turned on its head and 'uncertainty' becomes a
strength from the doctor's point of view: we cannot know for certain who
will be overtaken by 'potential pathology', so that you must comply with
our instructions and advice in order to minimise the possibility of
disaster (see, Tew, 1977 1990, Oakley 1980). Technologies, instruments,
drugs and treatment regimes represent, therefore, an attempt not only to
control the birthing woman but an attempt to manage uncertainty of the
birth process itself.
If accurate prediction of morbidity and mortality in childbirth were
possible in the individual case, the strategy of 'projected instrumental
uncertainty' could not be pursued. Uncertainty is, in a sense, open-
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ended risk. The degree of risk as it is applied to the individual
Obstetric case is really an expression of a statistical probability that
a particular thing will occur, based on an epidemiological analysis of
women with similar characteristics. However, although there are four
times as many women allocated to the low-risk category as the high-risk,
the two groups lose the same number of babies in the perinatal period.
Obstetrics, therefore, formulates the management of all pregnant women
in terms of the 'worst case scenario'. The exercise becomes one of
damage limitation, an attempt to forstall disaster. In this way it is
clear that 'risk' appears in Obstetrics to be 'weighted' more heavily
than its theoretical probability of occurring. What has been called the
'maximin approach' to childbirth: "choosing the alternative that makes
the best of the worst possible outcome, regardless of the probability
that that outcome will occur" (Brody and Thompson, 1981, p.977) is only
possible because of 'projected instrumental uncertainty'.
Uncertainty around childbirth is both 'real' and exaggerated. It is
Impossible to forecast accurately the development and eventual outcome
of any pregnancy. Since doctors have to manage uncertainty for
themselves, as well as for their patients, this will be compensated for
by clinical experience (Fox, 1957) but also often by the indiscriminate
use of technology; whereby they can claim to be 'doing something' and be
seen to be using the latest devices (this is also a 'good fit' with the
role of technology in regulating 'work' and its use in the regulation
and control of subordinates). Many aspects of birth remain a mystery to
medicine. It cannot be predicted accurately when or how or even if
(given miscarriage and Caesarian section) a woman will go into labour:
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II . . . because no-one knows what the situation will be like at the time
of labour. .•" (Consultant Obstetrician)
The subtle inter-relationship of different elements of the birth process
are not understood. The time of delivery cannot be accurately predicted
(except for elective Caesarian section). The nature of many congenital
diseases remains uncertain. Cerebral palsy, for example, was long
thought to be a birth injury resulting from skull compression during
labour, whereas recent research suggests that it is caused by an as yet
unknown intra uterine event. Again, given the experimental nature of
medicine, the effect of certain therapies or interventions cannot be
predicted accurately in the individual case:
"We can't necessarily say what the outcome will be of a particular
course of action. . ." (Consultant Obstetrician)
At the same time, 'projected instrumental uncertainty' around potential
pathology exaggerates the generality of risk and overplays the ability
of the Obstetric profession to deal with unpredictable disaster when it
does occur (for example, many babies still die in utero well into
pregnancy without doctors being able to either predict or prevent such
occurances despite regular Antenatal Clinic attendance by the mother or,
Indeed, necessarily be able to explain them retrospectively).
Furthermore, iatrogenic aspects of technology are under-played, as are
the possibilies of viable alternatives, while questions of scientific
validation are glossed-over (see chapters 5 and 6). Given that the
degree of uncertainty is constructed as open-ended, the potential for
precautions aimed at averting disaster become equally infinite. This is
the Obstetricians' justification for the routine use of technology which
Is seen as the profession's best ally in achieving routinisation,
standardization and control within the birth process. With the
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application of technology, we move to a 'model of certainty' posited by
a positivistic methodology opera tionalised in'technology, as a remedy
for the "uncertainty" of childbirth.
'Uncertainty' is also the 'bottom-line' of the argument against home-
deliveries, some women may be defined as 'high-risk' but all are defined
as at risk:
". . . there is no way you can tell ahead of time which mother will not
run into problems." (Consultant Obstetrician)
Thus constructed, the onus falls on the Obstetrician 'to do something'\
to control the situation and make it 'more certain'. Thus, to appear to
do nothing may be seen by the patient (or the Obstetrician's peers) as a
non-decision, non-treatment, a sin of omission. Such that:
"Sometimes the most difficult thing is to do nothing" (Obstetric
Registrar).
In medicine generally, Scheff (1963) argues, Judging an ill-person well
is seen as more to be avoided than Judging a well-person ill, within
this model, observation and diagnosis is seen as neutral and innocuous,
and unnecessary surgery may be viewed as 'healthy conservatism':
". • . physicians and the public typically overvalue medical treatment
relative to non-ti-eatment as a course of action in the face of
uncertainty, and that this over-valuation results in the creation as
well as prevention of impairment." (Scheff, 1963, p.253)
At the same time, Scheff (1963) has noted that medical decision-making
in circumstances of uncertainty is not vastly different in its basic
logic from legal or statistical decision-making. He maintains that
doctors' adaptive strategies in the face of uncertainty will
frequently be influenced by contingency pressures (fears of litigation
would be an aspect of this, as would, political and economic
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considerations). The main response to this situation, Scheff argues,
will be either over-investigation or a probability strategy (one may
speculate that G.P, budget holders may find it contingent on them to
apply the second strategy, if they do not already do so). In
Obstetrics, 'risk-scoring' and categorisation of the pregnant woman is
associated with the latter (probability strategy), whilst the subjection
of the whole population of labouring women to similar treatment regimes
based on Obstetric policy is related to the former (over-treatment).
Economic and political considerations over 'through-put' are examples of
contingent pressures on treatment-regimes in Intensive Care (see chapter
6).
Medical sociology has long recognised uncertainty as a central problem
for the chronic and terminally ill (Glaser and Strauss 1968, Conrad
1987, Mishel 1984, Molleman, et al 1984). However, for many pregnant
women, especially first-time mothers, uncertainty and fear of the
'unknown' were a source of considerable stress. First-time mothers
wanted to know what labour 'felt' like and were fearful of the pain they
expected to experience. Both midwives and obstetricians were reluctant
to attempt to describe what birth 'felt' like (discussed more fully in
chapter 9), so that, it appeared uncertain as to how, or even if, the
birth process could be described and midwives and obstetricians (and
often birthing women themselves both before and after the birth)
regularly claimed that it was impossible to describe labour; although
many tried (usually giving a mechanical description of the various
'stages' - which I as a woman who has given birth twice found difficult
to relate to in experiential terms - see Appendix X for an 'exceptional'
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account). Perceived difficulties of description amongst health care
professionals were associated with: the variability in the physical
aspects of individual labours; how these would be perceived by
individual women; the fact that some midwives and most of the
Obstetricians (all but one Consultant Obstetrician at the Obstetric
Hospital were male) had never given birth; finding words of adequate
intensity to describe the experience. In one sense, I might as well
have asked Intensive Care staff what it was like to die.
Conclusion 
Pregnant women were well aware of the 'uncertainty' with which the birth
process was viewed by health care professionals and the majority had no
alternative view to that of the biomedical model with which to organise
and make-sense of this open-ended experience. The women were not the
'experts' in the biomedical model and so in this sense they did not
expect to be in control of their birth experience. They expected to
submit themselves to the hospital regime, they did not, in a sense,
expect to be in control and the medical stress on 'uncertainty' served
to reinforce the notion that such a submission was necessary. However,
uncertainty does not necessarily imply the worst possible outcome is
about to occur, it merely means we do not yet know what the exact
details of the outcome will be (there is inherently no necessary threat,
eliciting pessimism). Around birth 'projected instrumental
uncertainty', however, appears to generate anxiety (amongst birthing
women), for example:
"I mean, I am worried, not knowing what's going to happen. . . I just
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want to get it over with." (Antenatal Interview)
and greater likelihood of compliance with mechanisms (such as
technology) which the dominant group (doctors) argue will help to
control the outcome of pregnancy and labour, but which may equally be
seen as controlling the women themselves. Part of this process involves
the use of the baby in opposition to the mother to bring her into line
if she does not comply with 'medical advice'.
Why does 'uncertainty' in childbirth lead Obstetricians to demand that
women submit themselves to rigid standardized routines and yet, at the
same time, the argument of 'uncertainty' is used to implore women to be
more flexible over how they give birth? The answer seems to lie in
power and control, since the woman is invariably cajoled to be flexible
towards more intervention and not towards less. This is a further
extension of what Marcuse (1964) has termed 'repressive tolerance' from
the field of production to that of reproduction, whereby scientific-
technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new
forms of social control within a society whose dominant interests
(capitalism, patriarchy and racism) demand repression; the 'system' on
one level delivering the 'goods' (the 'need' for which has first been
created), buying-off discontent and repulsing all alternatives with the
hegemony of the bio-medical model: it is to a more detailed exploration
of this that the next chapter proceeds.
CHAPTER 9 
MEDICALIZATION, TECHNICAL RATIONALITY AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF CARE, 
CURE. COPING AND ABSOLUTION 
"This society turns everything it touches
into a potential source of progress and of
exploitation, of drudgery and satisfaction,
and freedom and of oppression." (Marcuse, 1964,
p.78)
This chapter starts from the proposition, discussed earlier (see chapter
5) that life has become increasingly medicalized (Zola 1972, Illich
1976) and examines the perspectives of maternity patients and ITU ex-
patient relatives in this light. It explores the predominance of the
biomedical model and the way in which a medico-technological mystique
has developed, whereby not only doctors but technology have come to be
seen by the lay-public as possessing miraculous curative powers. The
role of 'celebratory reporting' (Karpf, 1988) in this process is noted.
The commodification of care, cure, coping and absolution in capitalist,
patriarchial society is considered, resulting in technical rationality
becoming the only rational response, de-politicised as scientific fact
(Marcuse, 1964).
i) The Medicalization of Life-experience 
The 'technologizing' of birth and critical illness/death has been
intimately connected with the increasing 'medicalization' of experience.
'Medicalization' emphasises the medical enterprise as not merely
'scientific' but social (Zola 1972, Illich 1976). Medicalization leads
to social iatrogenesis; promoting dependency and lowering levels of
tolerance for discomfort and pain, de-skilling the population and de-
legitimizing the possibilities for self-care (Illich, 1976).
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The white-heat of technological child birth 
"Birth and death tie mankind with the unknown
in ways that other status passages do not."
(Devries, 1981, p.1075)
In Western industrial society, by the time the pregnant woman goes into
labour she will already have undergone a period of antenatal care
Involving various tests, techniques and equipment that will have
initiated her further into a biomedical and technological approach to
birth. She will, therefore, be 'softened up' for what lies ahead in the
Delivery Room. This may be juxtaposed against antenatal interviews with
pregnant women, which indicated a considerable degree of fear and
Ignorance surrounding giving birth. This was thrown into particular
relief during one afternoon's interviewing, in the convergence of
comments between a 43 year old, highly educated, professional, upper
middle class woman and a young working class, unemployed, Irish girl of
18, both pregnant for the first time. Given their very different social
characteristics, this seemed significant. I was reminded of
conversations I had with my own friends when we were newly pregnant and
realising that we were similarly ignorant about our bodies and how they
would react in pregnancy and childbirth.
Interviewees cited the onset of labour as a particular area where
responses might be confused in the light of lack of knowledge, for
example:
"And I had no warning at all. . . And I said 'Oh, my waters have gone'.
And it was hilarious. I'm 36 nearly. . . we dashed to the Mothercare
book, looking up what to do when your waters break. . . and then I said
'I've had a show' and he said 'No it's not'. . . So we looked in the
book again. . ." (Postnatal Interview)
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Another woman, admitted to an Antenatal Ward in early labour in the
middle of the night, felt she was coping badly in comparison with the
other women in the ward who she assumed were also in labour. They were
not and it is difficult to see how she could make this mistake if she
knew very much about labouring women:
"I thought, 'I'm the only one moaning with these contractions' and I was
grabbing the blankets and blowing into them, trying to hush myself. . .
And I thought (astonished voice) 'And they're just lying there'. And
the most I heard, one woman just took a sigh or two. And I thought
'she's coping well'. And it made me feel all the worse. And I thought
'Oh, I'm probably over-reacting'." (Postnatal Interview)
The majority of women knew little of their own mother's experiences of
giving birth; despite this being part of their own personal history (and
perhaps psychology). 	 Accounts that were given often concentrated on
extraneous facts about what their mother was doing when she went into
labour, how their father reacted, some comment made about them when
first-born. A few, all working class, knew absolutely nothing about
their own birth. One would not necessarily expect medical details, in
that their mothers would probably have been given very little medical
information themselves, but one might perhaps expect a greater inter-
generational exchange about how they experienced birth. A sexual
connotation appears inescapable. 	 The artist Judy Chicago in
undertaking 'The Birth Project', a series of art works exploring the
experience of birth discovered;
u . . . that the birth process, so central to human existence, is
virtually a 'taboo' area for open human expression. Little attests to
or explains or symbolizes or honors or renders this primary experience.
. ." (Chicago, 1985, p.19)
Given the sexual connotation and medicalization , it seems almost more
acceptable to say one had a 'bad' birth. One is then often given
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'permission' to rehearse the (usually) medical details, Just like any
other account of a medical operation. But a 'good' birth leads to a
more confused response.	 Usually the immediate reaction is either that
the labour must have been quick and easy (and is, therefore, being
evaluated positively in terms of these qualities) or disbelief tends to
be elicited that anyone could enjoy labour except perversely. For
example, one interviewee (a 20 year old, working class woman having her
second child) refering to her first labour commented, "I enjoyed it".
Embarassment and social sanction was immediately registered by her
partner who was present: "She's a weirdo", he said. At this point she
became defensive and said, "I am weird like that". To which I responded
that in that case I must be too, since I had very much enjoyed the
second time I gave birth. Is one allowed to 'enjoy' a 'medical' event?
Is one allowed to 'enjoy' an experience bound-up with the notion of
'pain' and involving the reproductive organs? Feelings about birth,
like those about death are seldom publically unpackaged and, in this
sense, they are both taboo subjects (see Feifel, 1963).
It seemed fairly straightforward to ask midwives and obstetricians how
they would describe birth to a woman who has never had a baby. Both
groups are, after all, intimately connected with reproduction. The
revealing response of one Consultant Obstetrician was to issue a
disclaimer: "I'm not sure that I have ever been asked to do that or that
I would begin to try". 	 Eventually, he added: "I think it's such an
individual experience", this in apparent contradiction with his earlier
comparison of childbirth to "having a tooth out", when addressing pain
relief. Clearly both midwives and obstetricians felt happier describing
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childbirth in terms of anatomical mechanics with the proviso that
variations could occur (with exceptions, see Appendix IX). They were
not description I could particularly relate to as someone who has
experienced two labours.
Such aspects as those described above add to the uncertainty surrounding
birth. Uncertainty and fear of the 'unknown' were, in fact, a source of
some considerable stress in the lives of pregnant women. They were well
aware of the 'uncertainty' and 'risk' with which pregnancy was imbued by
health care professionals and the majority had no alternative model of
childbirth to that of the biomedical model with which to organise and
make-sense of this 'open-ended' experience (see concluding chapter)*:
"You just don't know what to expect". (Antenatal Interview)
"I really don't know what to expect. I really don't. I haven't got a
clue. . . but I'm not kidding myself. I don't beleive it's going to be
really pleasant and 'pop goes the weasel'." (Antenatal Interview)
First-time mothers were uncertain what to expect of labour and others
did not know how their current pregnancy and labour would progress.
This was not just a matter of the birth process but the nature of
hospital policy and how this would be brought to bear on the former. In
a sense, the women did not expect to be in control and the hospital
regime, together with the stress on the 'uncertainty' of the situation,
* Currer, 1986, has noted that women's experience and image of
childbearing varies between different ethnic groups - in acknowledgement
of this complexity my sample excluded women who were not white British,
since to include the expectations and attitudes of ethnic minority women
would have constituted a separate study outside the scope of this
particular work.
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served to reinforce this. This allowed, in the majority of cases, for a
considerable technological hegemony to apply, while it is clear that
some women specifically saw 'high-tech' care as 'modern' and, therefore,
felt it to be necessarily of superior quality (see Michaelson, 1988, who
found that working classs women tended to equate high-technology care
with quality care and Nelson, 1983, who found that working class women
wanted a more medically managed, passive, interventionist birth).
Middle class women were more inclined to say they wanted to keep
technological intervention to the minimum, although I do not feel this
can be seen as indicating opposition to the biomedical model of birth as
such. All expected to have some form of technological intervention,
usually at least electronic fetal monitoring and/or some form of
chemical pain relief as part of their birth experience. In relation to
electronic fetal monitoring, for example, three women were convinced
that this type of monitoring had saved the life of a previous baby
during labour (there was no recognition that fetal distress could
possibly have been detected by other means, such as the use of a pinard
stethoscope), while some interviewees who were uncertain about how they
wanted to be monitored also seemed to feel continuous electronic fetal
monitoring nevertheless represented the safest option. This implies
that the medical profession has in many cases won the ideological battle
in persuading women that continuous electronic fetal monitoring is the
safest routine option, despite the lack of firm confirmatory evidence.
It also suggests a more general socialisation into the biomedical model
and its artefacts.
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Birth can be an empowering experience for a woman, a realisation of
primal creative powers (Odent, 1984) but, many women interviewed
antentally viewed it with fatalism, a very disempowering emotion:
"It's just something I've got to go through" (Antenatal Interview)
"I know I can't get out of it now (giving birth)" (Antenatal Interview)
"I'm Just hoping this one's quick, so I can go back to sleep" (Antenatal
Interview)
"I just want to get it over with". (Antenatal Interview)
Many women wanted birth 'to be over with'; they wanted it to be quick
and they wanted it to be in the past; for the majority it was a means to
an end: a wanted baby, or the near-inevitable consequence of conception:
an unwanted baby. The majority moved towards childbirth with very
little apparent trust in nature or themselves, expecting intervention
and (male) technology to be a 'normal' part of their labour, such that:
. . . trust in nature has been replaced by trust in technology, as
tests and machines and instruments become the necessary paraphernalia of
birth." (Oakley, 1981a, p.15)
Women were fearful, the majority extremely so, about the degree of pain
they were likely to experience in labour. How they were going to cope
with this pain was something which exercised them greatly; this
typically led to the response:
"I want as little pain as possible. . ." (Antenatal Interview)
Only very occasionally women re-defined the pain of childbirth, for
example:
"I'm really looking forward to it now (giving birth), pain and all"
(Antenatal Interview)
"I enjoyed it actually last time with her (daughter). . . Enjoyed it.
All of it, yes, all of it. I enjoyed having the baby. I enjoyed the
pain, everything . • •" (Antenatal Interview)
Often it seemed women expressed the desire, antenatally not to have an
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epidural, not because they wanted to feel themselves giving birth or
because they associated it with a higher incidence of forceps delivery
but because they feared the pain of the epidural procedure itself ( a
needle into the epidural space surrounding the spinal column, leaving a
catheter in place to pass an anaesthetic drug into this area). A few
women wanted as 'natural' or 'normal' a birth as possible, what they
meant by this was, however, highly problematic, for example: "As normal
as possible. I want an epidural again" (Antenatal Interview). 	 Within
this context 'normal' seemed to imply a vaginal delivery; in this sense
It is being used as British obstetrics would define such a delivery.
But it indicates that epidurals (like Caesarian Sections, see Mariskind
1980) has come to be seen as a 'normal' aspect of childbirth.
"What do you want to experience from the birth?" appeared, in the
conventional sense, a badly formed question since many women seemed to
be completely non-plussed by it; in other words the question did not
make sense to them. This is revealing in itself. It seemed the
majority did not look for a positive experience from the birth or feel
that they had much choice in terms of input. It can be derived from
their answers that the vast majority, regardless of social class, wanted
it to be easy, quick and with as little pain as possible. Therefore,
when I asked them to tell me what they hoped to experience from the
birth the exchange usually culminated in their telling me what type of
chemical pain relief they hoped to use. Only 3 of the 20 wanted to try
to labour without chemical pain relief (in the event none did - although
four of the women had only a minimal amount of gas and air at the end of
the 'first stage'). The confidence to cope without chemical pain relief
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was not promoted by the majority of health care professionals. For
example, there was a considerable emphasis on Pain Relief Lectures in
the hospital - describing Pethedine, Gas and Air and epidurals (the
latter at great length) and the issue of pain relief was one of the
first to be broached when the woman entered the Delivery Room, often in
such a way that an expectation of chemical pain relief was built into
the enquiry, e.g. "What pain relief were you thinking of having?"
By contrast with their antenatal conceptualisation of the experience of
labour as a description of a type of chemical pain relief (technology),
retrospectively, a quarter of the women were extremely positive about
their birth experience, another quarter were positive overall (with some
aspect they were particularly positive about). Women in both these
groups saw childbirth retrospectively as:	 'an indescribable
experience', 'a unique experience', 'it's like nothing I've encountered
before really' (see Appendix XI 'Birth Stories' for fuller abstracts
from birth accounts, both positive and negative). They used words such
as 'thrill', 'excitement' and 'amazement', although many said it had
also been 'very, very painful'. The remaining women, approximately half
the whole group, while valuing the eventual outcome (the baby) expressed
varying degrees of disappointment to horror about what had transpired
during labour and how they experienced childbirth. 'Surprise' permeates
the accounts of the women who positively evaluated their labours, shock
is more evident in the remainder. A feeling came through many of the
interviews with first-time mothers that the women felt themselves to
have been initiated into an area of shared knowledge and experience from
which they had previously been excluded, for example:
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"I know what it's like now, I really know. . . It's a nice feeling,
knowing." (Postnatal Interview)
The first group of women were the subject of less intervention and gave
birth generally without epidural anaesthesia and usually without
instrumental delivery. One might feel they were 'lucky' to have had
straightforward labours but one would then have to explain why informal
scanning of Labour Ward records suggests that the degree of intervention
correlates positively with the attendance of particular midwives.*
ITU the making of a miracle 
". • . Intensive Care is but the
culmination of a public worship organised
around a medical priesthood struggling
against death." (Illich, 1976, pp.87-114)
In Intensive Care the expert-technological world-view is 'writ-large'.
Illich talks of "the medicalization of the miracle" (1976, p.123),
whereby:
"The patient is strapped down and controlled like a spaceman and then
displayed on television. These heroic performances serve as a rain-
dance for millions, a liturgy in which realistic hopes for autonomous
life are transmuted into the delusion that doctors will deliver health
from outer space".
It was apparent from talking to ex-ITU patient relatives in the wake of
the experience that the majority still extolled the virtue of high-
technology care, whether or not this had resulted in the eventual
*This appears confirmatory of the fact that some midwives regularly seek
to 'negotiate' the obstetric guidelines towards less technological
intervention.
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survival of the patient (this with noteable exceptions, five of thirty
interviewed, wondered along the lines: 'was it all worth it?').
Many commentators (Szasz 1974, Ehrenreich 1978, Oakley 1981, Hart 1985)
have pointed to the role of doctors as modern-day priests and magicians.
Such that, the model of 'certainty' presented by positivism is
underpinned with the power derived from the mythical status of medicine.
This allows doctors the moral certainty needed to shore-up the practical
'uncertainty' under which they practice. 	 However, not only the doctor
is cast in the role of miracle worker, medical technology is often
viewed as possessing mythical powers of detection and healing; indeed
many respondents appeared to assume the supreme efficacy of technology
as an appropriate response to 'mend' the body. For example:
"If you've got to go into Intensive Care to have a Job done, you know, a
rush Job like. . . Personally, I don't think they should have left it
so long. . . I think they should have gone in and got the Job done. . .
It could have been if they'd done the Job at the start it wouldn't have
come to this." (Relative, General Unit)
Similarly:
H	 SO to me, it was Just another Job they were doing with all that
machinery." (Relative, Specialised Unit)
This image of the body as a machine, promoted and reinforced by medical
science itself, provides a good-fit between purveyor and client of
capitalist and patriarchial medical services. This non-affective,
technical approach to care, coping and 'curing' is, therefore,
complementary to a mechanical view of the body. Both are deeply rooted
in a cognitively male dualistic world-view (see Harding 1981, Keller
1985, Bordo 1986).
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Relatives in ITU often refered to the ventilator as a 'life-support
machine', often appearing to believe that death while attached to such a
machine was impossible:
". • . the relatives tend to think the ventilator is keeping them alive,
whereas it's only working the lungs, it's not working the heart and the
brain. . . 1' (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
"When I went, God, I was watching all these machines going round.
That's keeping him alive! Short of his own brain, that's keeping him
alive." (Relative, General Unit)
In fact, the ventilator supports only the lung-function, if the heart
stops, the patient will die. However:
"While the patient is on the ventilator, this builds-up their hopes
(relatives) because many of them think that these are miracle machines.
. . " (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
"I really felt confident when I saw the way they were handling him and I
saw all the equipment there, I felt 'he'll get through'." (Relative,
General Unit)
Given the perception that machines and doctors have power over life and
death, this might be accompanied by the fear that a decision will be
made to 'switch-off' the patient:
"Many a night I expected them to ring-up and say they were switching the
life support machine off." (Relative, General Unit)
"I thought, one night they're going to ring-up and say 'come up to the
hospital, we've got to switch it off'. I fully expected that."
(Relative, General Unit)
". • . relatives and the general public seem to think you can just turn-
off patients. . . " (Staff Nurse, General Unit)
This might also result in patients' relatives sometimes asking ITU
Consultants to: 'switch everything off doctor' because they felt the
patient had 'suffered enough'. In practice, as we have seen, the
decision to withdraw active support was usually a lengthy process
involving several senior medical staff and was generally implemented
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as a gradual withdrawal process not a 'switching off' (which applied
only when 'brain death' criteria had been fulfilled).
Intensive Care technology, such as monitors, ventilators and drugs
supporting the various bodily functions may be seen as themselves
curative:
m . • • some of them (relatives) think the equipment makes them better.
It's very difficult for them to uderstand that it only supports them."
(Senior Sister, General Unit)
This is associated with a masking of uncertainty, whereby the situation
is projected as 'under control', appearing less uncertain than it may
remain. For example, sometimes the drugs given to maintain the
patient's heart rate and blood pressure at a 'reasonable' level
represent a massive level of support and may give a false picture of the
patient's possibility of long-term survival. Not only relatives but
clinicians who do not have regular contact with ITU may be misled:
m . • • many clinicians will come onto an ITU and have a look at a
patient's blood pressure and see that it's normal. And look at the
heart rate and see that's normal. And look at the gas exchange and see
it's good. And they might see the patient's passing urine and, it's
happened many times, they say, you know, 'Oh, the patient's doing quite
well'. What they don't see is that the patient's actually dying. And
you can still die with relatively normal physiological values because
you're receiving so much support" (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised
Unit)
What is crucial is the balance between physiological function and the
level of therapeutic support. Normal physiology is when the patient is
doing it all themselves:
m . . . if to maintain normal values, you're having to work like a slave
with all kinds of support going, then the chances are that the patient
is very, very sick". (Consultant Anaesthetist, Specialised Unit)
The degree to which the patient's physiological functioning is being
artificially enhanced may, therefore, not be apparent to the lay person,
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who may cherish the belief, at least at some level, that medical science
has now wrested control over nature to the extent that it may be
expected that nothing will 'go wrong'; death may be averted almost
indefinitely. That is to say, medical technology has taken on a kudos
which both derives from and reinforces the mystical esteem in which
doctors are held:
u . . . people expect so much, expect people to have things done and
expect them to live. You know, people don't expect their relatives to
die of heart surgery any more. It happens (two 'routine' by-pass
patients had died on the Unit the previous week). It's like my
husband's a G. P., you know, people 'phone up and don't expect their
Granny of 93 to die. . ." (Senior Staff Nurse, Specialised Unit)
ell . . . but we've now led people to expect that we can do so well and do
so much that the disappointment they feel when they learn that they're
going to die or their relative will die, is very hard for them to take
because they expect that we will be able to put things right."
(Consultant Obstetrician who sub-specialises in Gynaecological Oncology)
In the case of 'pioneer surgery', the patients' relatives were, however,
well- aware of the uncertainty of outcome and they were well-versed in
the techniques to be employed, while patients were closely vetted for
suitability before the start of treatment. Pioneer surgery appeared to
be accepted by relatives as high-risk but a desperate last resort to
restore the patient to health. However, in practice, for many other
patients (at the time of interview) the eventual outcome remained
uncertain (having survived ITU) and some were still terminally ill.
Birth and death in a technological environment 
, Options available in both Obstetrics and ITU derive from the same
paradigm (Kuhn, 1970), the biomedical model:
"People are not responsible for their own health, their own illness,
their own births and death: doctors are saviours, miracle-workers,
mechanics, culture heroes." (Oakley 1981a, p.15)
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The lay-person tends to typically over-value medical treatment to non-
treatment in the face of uncertainty and similarly over-values a
positive result (Scheff 1963).
Fundamentally, in terms of critical illness and death being enacted in
Intensive Care or giving birth in a highly technological hospital, it
seemed that this level of technology did not represent a major
disjuncture from the rest of the individual's life. Their workplaces
and/or domestic lives were patterned with automation. Rather than one
being able to analyse birth and death as a biological event, a cultural
event and now a technological event, it seemed that technology was very
much part of their culture, a taken for granted aspect of people's
everyday lives. An extreme example may be found in one respondent whose
interview took place surrounded by: satellite television equipment,
video, compact disc player, tape deck, a disk player which he said
deciphered videos, and all packed into the tiny front room of a terraced
house. In the light of this, the technological setting in which birth
or death took place did not represent a major disjuncture, in
technological terms from the rest of their lives. In other words, high
technology has become an integral part of popular culture, since it now
so fundamentally permeates people's everyday lives. Thus:
"Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through
technology but as technology, and the latter provides the great
legitimation of the expanding political power which absorbs all spheres
of culture." (Marcuse, 1964, p. 158)
Indeed, why would high technology be absent from the individual's health
care experience, given its prevalence elsewhere? In Obstetrics, we have
noted that what is considered within the range of 'normal' birth has
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changed over time and now includes procedures such as Caesarian Section
(Mariskind, 1980) and, I would argue, epidurals; high technology also
appears to have been assimilated into the 'normal' range of possible
accompaniments surrounding death,,
The expert-technological worldview is put forward as only rational means
of addressing the 'potential pathology'/'projected instrumental
uncertainty' of pregnancy as presently constructed. Furthermore,
medical science puts itself forward as a suitable antidote to the
chaotic unreliability of women's bodies, given the 'female' connection
to chaotic nature (see Merchant 1980, Harding and Hintikka 1983, Easlea
1983, Lloyd 1984, Keller 1985, Smart 1991). The message is clear: men
can better the procreative efforts of women by the application of
science and technology (see, for example, Easlea 1981 on the
relationship between science and patriarchy), while in ITU a mortal
struggle is waged with technology against the prospect of death.
Thus, Gouldner (1976, p.260) has commented:
"Scientific and technological power serve, in part as the secularised
symbol of the unlimited potency and cosmic unification once provided by
religion. Science and technology assume a panacea-like character: given
only time, the fantasy is that all problems will capitulate to it. Man
is really Promethean and there is presumably nothing he cannot
accomplish."
One major purveyor of medical mythology is the media. This is
especially the case for ITU which is valued for its dramatic content and
miracle, against-the-odds cures: such phenomena were described by some
ex-ITU patient relatives as 'they'd (the staff) never seen anything like
It (patient's recovery)', 'even the nurses were suprised (at patient
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recovering)'. There seemed to be a desire to believe in 'the
exceptional' case and the miraculous nature of cure. One man whose
wife had been a patient on the General Unit had, at the time, asked the
doctor whether there was any drug in the world, however expensive, which
could cure her condition (he said his nephew was a millionaire and could
have made such a purchase). The doctor told him there was no such drug.
Several respondents seemed to feel that 'cure' was associated with the
doctor suddenly alighting on the 'right drug' for the patient. Karpf
(1988, p.161) writes of the existence of a "modern myth that personal
tragedy and the uncertainties of human existence can be resolved by
technology." Thus, the media may glamourise and exaggerate the benefits
of some techniques (Karpf terms this "celebratory reporting"), while
ignoring the 'downside' of the procedure*. Media reporting regularly
depicts dramatic break-throughs in health care, epoch making drug
therapies, 'against the odds' patient recoveries. Birth and death in
popular film is often quick, dramatic but uncomplicated; even if,
simultaneously, it may be depicted as agony. Currently in 'soap operas'
and such like, the patient is never shown languishing on a hospital ward
but rather, they are always 'fighting for their lives' in Intensive Care
whose dramatic content appears irresistible to all concerned. Media
images and messages about birth and death are all the more salient in a
society such as our own, where birth and death are only rarely viewed at
first hand and where a 'silence' pertains around their detailed
unpackaging as in some way unwholesome.
*On occasion, however, the 'quality' media does mount noteable
critiques, for example, concerning 'brain death' ('Pancirama s , October
1980) and induction of labour (for example, 'Horizon', January 1975),
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ii) The commodification of care. cure, coping and absolution 
"A comfortable, smooth, reasonable,
democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced
industrial civilizations, a token of technical
progress. . • In this universe, technology also
provides the great rationalization of the
unfreedom of man and demonstrates the 'technical'
impossibility of being autonomous, of
determining one's own life. For this unfreedom
appears neither as irrational nor as political,
but rather as submission to the technical
apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and
increases the productivity of labour" (Marcuse,
1964, p.1)
The commodification of care, 'cure', coping and absolution , results
from an alliance between capitalism, patriarchy and positivism. In
positivism there is the reification of process and people, whereby they
become objectified. This approach, rooted in Cartesian dualism, is
cognitively male (see Harding 1981, Keller 1985, Bordo 1986). 	 Once
'objectified' people and their 'illnesses' may be met with ag article of
treatment. This is a 'good fit' with capitalism which reduces all
possible 'solutions' to ones that may be supplied by goods and services
rooted in the cash nexus (commodities); thereby, generating profit.
An alternative 'subjectivist' approach would require taking into account
the patient's world of experience. The patient as 'subject' would
become a central element concerned with doing rather than 'buying"
care, cure, and coping are, rather, commodified and an 'off the shelf"
package-solution is embraced. This will be illustrated by the ea le
of the use of chemical pain relief in labour:
The birth of my first child was a very technological affair and,
although it made me realise that under such technological circumstance%
one could still fall in love with one's child at the moment of birth, it
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was a very different experience to the second time I gave birth. This
labour was long too (not by comparison with the first - but 27 hours
from the onset of regular contractions). I laboured instinctually with
little pain relief and virtually no technological intervention.
Labour is generally defined as involving 'pain'. This definition makes
it susceptible to medical intervention in a way that its
conceptualisation as 'work' would not (Rothman, 1982). The location of
birth (and death) in hospital has emphasised their painful aspects and
obscured their potentially orgiastic qualities (see Gordon 1970, Wertz
and Wertz 1977). Odent (1984) believes that much pain in childbirth is
caused by health care professionals restricting the ability of women to
adopt different positions during labour. Pain relief has been central
to the exercise of control over birthing women by obstetricians (see,
for example, Grantley Dick-Read 1972, Arms 1975, Arney 1982).	 However,
given 'pain', how is it to be coped with?	 In principle there are a
number of options: one can bear pain, endure pain, resist pain, seek
to extinguish pain, transcend pain, transform pain or embrace pain and
'go with the flow' (this list is not exhaustive). It seems to me within
the biomedical model of the Obstetric Hospital, pain is reified and
coping is commodified. This may be seen as part of a more general
process, described by Marcuse (1964), whereby technology, bound-up as it
is with positivism, empiricism and the interests of the powerful in
society, pervades every area of life, while its rationale is de-
politicised and it becomes seen as the only way forward.
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The view expressed repeatedly within the Obstetric Hospital was that
women had 'different pain thresholds', for example:
"I think the important thing to describe is that every mother has a
different pain threshold, and if she's never had a baby, we don't know,
what her tolerance for labour is because their first question is always
the fear of pain. . . you can explain to women that they do have
different pain thresholds and that we do have a range of techniques that
are readily available for them to chase from which will accommodate the
particular kind of pain threshold they have." (Consultant Obstetrician)
Many women also felt they had a certain 'pain threshold' and many who
perceived labour to be difficult and distressing felt that their pain
threshold must be low (even where the degree of intervention appeared
traumatic by any standard). The notion of each woman having a
particular pain threshold appears ultimately rather dubious. From my
first labour I might imagine my pain threshold to be low (epidural for
pain relief) and from the second that it is high (gas and air at the end
of first stage). Doubt is also cast on this proposition by reportedly
certain midwives at the Obstetric Hospital repeatedly attending births
which have little technological intervention and result in normal
deliveries. Although this information is not monitored formally, the
Senior Midwife who managed the entire Delivery Suite said that she
scanned results informally and could in principle tell me which midwives
were repeatedly in practice associated with a low level of intervention.
This suggests that it is not invariably something 'objective' about
the mothers that is the prime determinate of extensive intervention.
The first intervention in labour is frequently around pain relief. This
often leads to other interventions, for example, a continuous trace must
be made to monitor the effect of giving Pethedine and, as we have seen,
epidurals require subsequent interventions, for example:
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"She needs an epidural, therefore she needs a drip, she needs internal
monitoring. Then she needs an internal catheter tube. . ." (Sister
Midwife).
conversely,
. she's still in control, in that she's not having to lose control
by using pain relief." (Sister Midwife)
If we take the proposition that women:
. . . do have different pain thresholds and that we do have a range of
techniques that are readily available for them to chase from which will
accommodate the particular kind of pain threshold they have."
(Consultant Obstetrician),
we quickly arrive at the situation where staff typically comment:
"I really don't mind whether they have nothing or they have an epidural,
which are the two extremes." (Consultant Obstetrician)
or
"It depends what people want, they have the information and they make
the choice. Who are we to say what's right or wrong?" (Sister Midwife)
There are a number of points at issue here. Given the level of policy
directives within this hospital (for example, that all women should have
their membranes ruptured at 4 centimeters dilation), it appears
significant that the decision regarding pain relief is left to the
woman, especially given the possible iatrogenic effects of, for example,
epidurals, discussed earlier. In the case of pain relief the baby is
rarely used against the woman as it is in other areas where she may seek
to exercise choice. It is also questionable whether all women do "have
the information" on which one can truly say they are exercising
'informed consent'. "Who are we to say what's right or wrong?" appears
incongruous when juxtaposed against the amount of constraints and
pressure routinely exerted on women to conform to certain obstetric
standards. It is also questionable how much choice is being exercised
given the narrowness of the product range (for as such it is being
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presented) on offer; that is to say, choices stem almost exclusively
from one paradigm (see Kuhn, 1970): the biomedical model. However, from
within this, the message is clear: pick the package that suits you.
Stoeckle (1988, p.81) argues that we are now being offered:
". . • forms of packaged care for relief, cure, prevention and
rehabilitation rather than services between persons."
He goes on to suggest that medicine has now become concerned with:
. . . marketing technologies and medical commodities to targeted
consumers." (Stoeckle, 1988, p.85)
In the case of pain relief targeting the woman's 'pain threshold'.
Now, this approach may be a good-fit with the current notion of the
'health consumer' propogated in the current political climate and it may
appear responsive to what may be termed consumer pressure groups
operating in this area, for example, the National Child Birth Trust, but
this would depend on a number of factors, for example, whether the
service was truly responsive to demands, whether the demands were
'informed' demands and the substance, range and quality of what was
being offered.
The National Childbirth Trust has called for anaesthetists to be on call
24 hours a day in as many hospitals as possible to give epidurals
(Kitzinger, 1987). This accessibility of epidural relief, however, is
a different question to the criteria determining availability in
individual cases, for example, whether an epidural is available on-
demand or whether there should be specific indication for use, one
midwife was adamant:
"I wouldn't tell them (labouring women) they were going to be fully
backed- up with epidurals and everything else because I think for a very
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long time in this hopsital, they were given the impression that you
can't get through labour without an epidural, and that was partly
because there was an Anaesthetist available to give an epidural at all
times. They used to actively encourage women to have epidurals. . .
what we didn't used to tell them, was that they would need to be
immobile, on a bed with a monitor attached, so it's very easy to sell
pain relief I think." (Senior Sister Midwife)
It is arguable that pain and chemical pain relief in labour should be
seen within a broader context than the emphasis on the negativity of
pain and the4V•Imodification of its control. It is a feature of selling
techniques generally that one de-emphasises or does not mention the
down-side of the product.
The commodification of pain relief was also evident in the comments of
women concerning the prospect of their birth experience (as already
described many of them couched this in terms of what pain relief they
expected to have). Several felt they wanted an epidural (11 of the 20
eventually laboured with epidural anaesthesia) and cited the fact that
their friends or relatives had selected this option by way of
explanation. There was almost an element of 'fashion' involved. Four
women had already decided to have an epidural as soon as they arrived at
the hospital in labour. One 18 year old commented antenatally:
"She (her sister) had an epidural. She had forceps and she was cut and
stitches and that. Most people who I talk to about going into labour
have had an epidural. No one I know yet has gone without it."
For women who decide beforehand that they want en epidural, this
represents the first and not the last resort, for example, one woman
asked her health visitor to show her "how to breathe, in case I can't
have one (an epidural)" (Antenatal Interview). It was clear that many
of the women did not see different types of pain relief on a continuum
in terms of an escalation of technology being used, for example, they
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might say they would have "nothing or an epidural". Pain relief systems
were also not necessarily viewed as associated with a particular
philosophy of birth and so, women might appear to fluctuate wildly in
terms of the birth-philosophies they might be thought to be tapping
into, for example, one woman said:
"Epidural? That's when you don't feel anything in the bottom half isn't
it? I think that would be a good idea but I was told there's a great
big needle they stick up your back. Up until then I was all for it and
then I thought 'Oh God!'. . . But I'd love to try this water thing, have
the baby in the water but that's not really around at the moment is it?
That appeals to me, but otherwise I think it's got to be the epidural."
(Antenatal Interview)
Similarly, a Senior Sister Midwife was surprised to be asked by a woman
'booked' for a 'water birth' (assuming labour progressed 'normally'), if
she would be able to have an epidural under water. Additionally, it
sometimes appears unclear why a certain sort of pain relief was opted
for in the first place, for example:
". • . but I said 'I'll go for the gas and air, see what that's all
about'. . • they gave me some gas and air and I said 'Oh I think I'll
have an epidural if I've got to hang about'. . . I wasn't in the mood
for Just twiggling my fingers. I Just wanted to get on with it. . •"
(Postnatal Interview)
It almost appears that this woman felt the epidural would in some sense
expedite labour; research suggests the reverse is likely to be the case
(Rosen, 1977).
Although Transcutaneous Nerve Stimulation (T.E.N.S.) was available in
the obstetric hospital, it was used by relatively few women and many
doctors and midwives appeared dismissive or silent on this method of
pain relief. One Sister Midwife commented revealingly:
"When it first arrived we weren't sure where it would fit in."
This is arguably associated with the fact that it does not fit easily
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into the biomedical model of care on offer, since it originally derives
from the practice of Chinese accupuncture. Webster (1979, 1981) has
shown how orthodox medical practice in the United States and Europe used
a variety of occupational strategies to contain Chinese accupuncture
pain-killing, controlling it by legal (and Parliamentary) means and, in
practice translated it into a discourse acceptable to medical science.
If pain is seen as the overwhelming defining characteristic of labour
and its negative connotation is presented as being well met from one of
the pain relief product range, then it is Just a matter of promoting
product awareness and letting the consumer make their choice. Given the
prevalent fear of pain amongst pregnant women and the knowledge that an
epidural is (when it works effectively) the only method (while the
patient remains conscious) which ensures a pain-free labour , this may
be thought the most up-to-date, 'state of the art' way to handle labour
pains; Just as Pethedine was cast in this role in the 1940's and '50's.
If this is the case, some women may expect to 'consume' an epidural as
part of the 'birth package', for example:
"There are some situations where an epidural is a really good idea and
very necessary and there are others where you know that if she hadn't
had an epidural she'd have been able to push that baby out.	 . .
Sometimes you get an inkling and you say 'I think you'll cope with the
gas and air' and she'll say 'I want an epidural'. It's like they've
missed out on something if they haven't had it. I know that's partly
because we're pushing them (epidurals). . . If you really need it, have
it, but if you don't it's a shame to miss the experience." (Sister
Midwife)
From a similar standpoint, a Senior Sister Midwife likened many women's
views about pain relief to: "the idea of utility, like the turn of the
Century, we started making little gadgets to make life easier. . ."
From this point of view, one progresses from 'why should I wash clothes
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by hand when I can use a washing machine?', 'why should I have to suffer
pain at the dentists if I can have a painless filling?' (the comparison
of pain at the Dentist with pain in childbirth was made by certain
obstetricians and several pregnant women). Clearly if the 'pain' of
labour is seen as comparable to that of an unanaesthetised tooth
extraction, this denies the social-psychological and sensual-sexual
aspects of childbirth. Complementary to the absence of the ',down-side'
of pain relief in such accounts is the silence surrounding the 'up-
side' of giving birth. The problem becomes: 'why should I have a
painful experience if I can have a pain-free one?':
"A lot of ladies want a pain-free labour". (Staff Midwife)
"I couldn't see the point really in having any pain. • • " (Postnatal
Interview)
This is significant, in that it indicates the desire to extinguish the
'pain' of labour, not merely to get it under control. Antenatally, it
seemed that many women were more concerned with what they did not want
to feel (severe pain or, in some cases, any pain) than what they did
want to feel or experience in labour. Some women believed that by
having an epidural they could avoid all pain. This was to under-
estimate the possibility that the technique might prove less than 100%
effective, the pain that might be involved in the procedure, the degree
of intervention that often accompanied and suaeeded the epidural and the
greater post-delivery pain that some women experienced after this
technique (see Crawford 1972, Beazley, et al, 1978). As one Senior
Sister Midwife put it:
II . 
• . whether they feel better by the time they have finished up having
syntocinon to augment it, and they've been in labour a longer time and
they've been in second stage for three hours I don't know. • ."
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One particular women provides an extreme illustration of the desire to
feel no pain. She was labouring with an epidural (I attended the
labour). Even before the baby was born she was asking the midwife about
the possibility of post-delivery pain. Like many women in the study she
enquired whether I had children and what the births were like. I
replied briefly that the first had been under epidural and had resulted
in a forceps delivery and the second was a 'normal' delivery with gas
and air. I was taken aback when she countered: "Which one did you
prefer?", given her desire (and those of many women) not to experience
the 'pain' of childbirth , I should not have been.
The commodification of pain relief in labour represents a relief from
pain by means of an external agency located in technology, and is often
associated with further interventions based on technology following in
its wake. The autonomous and creative power of coping from one's own
inner resources is undermined and the birth experience which carries an
empowering potential is subverted into 'off the peg' panaceas. Odent
(1984) emphasises the need for the labouring woman to contact
instinctual primitive urges deep within herself in order to birth-well.
Odent stresses the desirability for women not to be the subject of
routine interventions, painkilling drugs and synthetic hormones
(artificial oxytocin) since these undermine the achievement of a complex
hormonal equilibrium which facilitates a spontaneous delivery:
"Neurohormones with morphinelike functions, these 'endogenous opiates',
act as natural painkillers, not only protecting against pain but also
suppressing anxiety and inducting a general feeling of well-being. . .
But in order for the body's natural powers to come into play, they must
be left alone." (Odent, 1984, p.14)
This is the very opposite of an external technological-fix.
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The woman, socialised into the biomedical model, subject to the vagaries
of obstetric 'fashion'* and, in many cases, the willing victim of a
narrow range of 'birth-packages', may fail to even conceive of an
alternative and so conflict or dissonance may not occur in the first
place. Marcuse, writing of the 'false needs' that underpin the
productive system, states:
"Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and
consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what
others love and hate, belong to a category of false needs. Such needs
have a societal content and function which are determined by external
powers over which the individual has no control; the development and
satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much such
needs may have become the individuals's own, reproduced and fortified by
the conditions of his existence; no matter how much he identifies
himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue
to be what they were from the beginning - products of a society whose
dominant interests demands repression. . • In the last analysis, the
question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the
individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and
when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept
incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and
manipulated (down to their very instincts) [his parenthesis] their
answer cannot be taken as their own." (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 5-6)
A picture emerges of domination related in wider society to hegemony
(Gramsci 1971, Mann 1973) and within childbirth, this may be related to
the hegenomic medicalisation of the birth experience. As Lukes (1974,
p.23) maintains:
n . • . 'A' may exercise power over 'B' by getting him to do what he does
not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing,
shaping or determining his very wants."
Thus, Lukes (1974, p.24) asks:
II 
. . is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to
*The House of Commons Health Committee Report on Midwifery Services
(February, 1992), states that obstetrics has (like other branches of
medicine) been swept by "fashions in which treatments have been
Introduced because they are available and not because they are of proven
value."
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prevent people to whatever degree from having grievances by shaping
theirs perceptions, cognitions and preferences. . . To assume the absence
of gdevance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the
possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat."
Inhibiting change is the fact that "all liberation depends on the
consciousness of servitude" (Marcuse, 1964, p.7) and is "hampered by the
predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent, have
become the individual's own." Marcuse calls the gratification of these
'false' needs "repressive satisfaction". Since pain relief in labour
has the latent function of social control of the birthing woman its
'repressive tolerance' becomes manifest:
"Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a
powerful instrument of domination." (Marcuse, 1964, p.7)
and the paradox is revealed that one may pay a high price for
technologically induced freedom from pain in labour.
How far 'choice' is exercised in relation to pain relief in childbirth,
therefore, becomes questionable. The woman 'chooses' within a narrow
medicalized framework where high-technology predominates and low-
technology alternatives or radical/counter-cultural alternatives, such
as hypnotherapy, yoga, acupuncture or, indeed, coping from one's own
inner resources (since this too is a radical alternative within this
context) are either de-emphasised or non-existent. 'Freedom of choice'
becomes a matter of some mystification:
M . . . And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the
individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the
efficacy of the controls." (Marcuse, 1964, p.8)
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Conclusion 
To put forward the case for instinctual birthing is not to maintain that
technological intervention, including artificial pain relief (including
epidurals) is not at times indlspensable and may be life-saving; it is
to suggest that its routine and extensive use may not be in the
interests of the population it is purporting to serve. Such that, to
quote an obstetrician on this subject:
"Epidural block has a special contribution to the management of labour
in a select number of cases. It should, however, be regarded as an
exceptional measure and treated with due respect." (O'Driscoll, 1980)
The biomedical approach may be seen to be ultimately antagonistic to
notions such as instinctive birthing given the biomedical model's
positivist and technological core; in positivism:
"The metaphysical dimension, formerly a genuine field of rational
thought, becomes irrational and unscientific. . . non-operational ideas,
aspirations, memories and images have become expendable, irrational,
confusing or meaningless." (Marcuse, 1964, pp.173-187).
At the same time, the biomedical model, in view of its empiricism (and
in this case Obstetric vested interest in the ownership of the labour
process) will argue that labours are 'normal' only in retrospect and
that given the uncertainty that this projects (and the lack of
predictive capability in the individual case) all must be subject of the
same regime. Within this 'projected instrumental uncertainty', women
who do not wish to accept what is routinely on offer may easily be seen
as weird, recalcitrant and/or neurotic and irrational. In this sense,
Marcuse points-out, society alters the relation between the rational
and the irrational. On the one hand liberty is extended , since
technology may help in labOurs where there is specific indication for
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its use, while domination is intensified, given that the nature of the
technology itself is repressive, as are the social relations between
those who professionally 'own' the technology and those who labour with
it. For example, writers such as Ehrenreich (1978) have pointed out
that the medical system throws working class people, women and blacks
into an intimate dependency relationship with a white male, usually of
the upper or upper middle classes. This represents a powerful mechanism
for producing acquiescence in the overall social structure:
. •	 both the doctor-patient relationship and the entire structure of
medical services are not mere technical relations but social relations
which express and reinforce (often in subtle ways) the social relations
of the larger society, e. g. class, racial, sexual and age hierarchy,
individual isolation and passivity; and dependency on the social order
itself in the resolution of both individual and social problems."
(Ehrenreich, 1978, p.15)
Integral to all is the issue of control. Control is the mobilization of
power. To exercise control over ones own life is empowering and does
not sit easy in a society which promotes 'repressive tolerance' where
the right to choose is the right to consume, from a pre-ordained,
\	 I
circumscribed list, sanctioned as rational.
In contrast, Odent (1984, p.26) argues:
"On the day of birth, we encourage women in labour to give in to the
experience, to lose control, to forget all they have learned - all the
cultural images, all the behavioural patterns."
such that the woman in labour is:
. . . urged to trust what she feels, to move as she pleases, to take
any position she finds spontaneously." (Odent, 1984, p.41)
Odent emphasies that to give birth with satisfaction and without
complication it is desirable that the woman achieves an altered state of
consciousness not by means of drugs but from her own physiological and
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mental processes. Even when labour proves "especially difficult":
n . • . a woman must use every strength she has to bring her child into
the world. Unlike the majority of obstetricians, we trust the woman's
own capacities and potential during labour and this trust has been
constantly reinforced by our experiences at the clinic." (Odent, 1984,
p.98)
This model of birth is empowering to the mother, since Odent is not
controlling in that he does not seek to remove the mother from her
experience or try to dominate as a practitioner by the implementation of
protocols and regimes.	 Odent links his approach with a humanising and
feminising of birth. Birth becomes a personal experience with women in
control, primarily as mothers but also as midwives. This view of birth
emphasies freedom of expression by the mother and the sensual and sexual
aspects of birthing. It represents a different relation to science, to
nature, to health and healing and in the relationships between men and
women.	 Herzlich (1973) and Stacey (1986) amongst others, have pointed
out that there are two sets of theories dealing with health and illness:
those based on the 'objective' examination of physical signs of disease
and theories which see health and illness as modes of relationships, of
equilibrium and disequilibrium between people and their environment,
involving human factors, ecological aspects and social structures.
Odent's approach falls into the latter mode.
More generally, commodification in health care is also observable in
other trends. There is a commodification of body-parts where, for
example, the placenta becomes a saleable item (sold to the cosmetic
industry).* A more recent development is the practice of some medical
*Rather than continuing to be valued for its magical and sacred
properties as in so-call primitive societies, it becomes a marketable
item.
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Consultants in the United States of selling the patient a video film of
their operation as part of the care-package (reported on the 'Today'
programme, Radio 4, 23/7/91), More recently still, a private clinic
opened in London where for the payment of £350, 'sperm separation' can
be bought, enabling parents to choose (in effect buy) the sex of the
baby they conceive (B.B.C. 1 - 1 o'clock news bulletin 8/11/91). This
is, in addition to the sale of various body fluids such as blood (in
several countries), and breast milk and semen in the United States.
More generally, however, the 'solution' to the patient's 'problem' (and
pregnancy too is certainly problematised medically) may come to be seen
as residing in technology in the shape of a pill or a machine and the
more expensive the pill or the machine the better as far as many people
are concerned. That is to say, hi-tech and high cost solutions may
within capitalist society appear synonymous with high quality care: the
latest, the most expensive and, therefore, the best available, which
simply does not follow.	 Many health care professionals may also equate
the latest technology with 'good practice', such that the least
interventionist of the Obstetric Consultants felt:
"It's very important that any method or intervention is properly
evaluated. It's very difficult to do because there are some
practitioners at all grades who say: 'I want the best for my patient',
which is quite right but your reply to that is 'But there is no evidence
that what you are doing is the best for your patient'"
Similarly, as already noted, research findings indicate that many
working class women associate high-technology birthing with quality
care (Michaelson, 1988, p. 18) because they feel that everything
possible is being done; this is a familiar refrain in Intensive Care:
"When I went in there was all these pipes and things. A magnificent lot
of machinery on him. And I thought, 'That's it, they can do no more'."
(Relative, General Unit)
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In such circumstances in Intensive Care, if the patient does not
survive, a failure of spirit on the part of the patient may be put
forward as an alternative interpretation by relatives or staff to a
notion of a failure of science and technology or a criticism of the
policy that put the patient there in the first place. 	 It is
epigrammatic that a surgeon may feel 'the operation was a success but
the patient died', in Intensive Care, it seems the relative may feel
'the technology was a success but the patient died'. Unsuccessful
treatment may also be viewed as nevertheless reflecting a social
attribution of worth to the patient, for example, s/he received highly
expensive treatment although an old person. This is an alternative to
viewing the episode as a meddlesome interference in a terminal event at
the end of a long life. In ITU, therefore, there is some support for
Illich's (1976) contention that people now believe they have the right
to be 'professionally killed' having had vast amounts of money expended
In the process:
"He (sic. )has now lost his faith in his ability to die, the terminal
shape that health can take, and has made the right to be professionally
killed into a major issue. . . Death no longer occurs except as the
self-fulfilling prophercy of the medical man. . • Society, acting
through the medical system decides when and after what indignities and
multilations he (the patient) shall die. The medicalization of society
has brought the epoch of natural death to an end." (Illich, 1976, p.
103, pp. 148-150)
The latter may represent, for the patient's relative, a minor cheating
of death: even if one does not survive one at least shakes a
technological fist and gives death a run for its money. Such that:
". . . Technical death has won its victory over dying. Mechanical death
has conquered and destroyed all other deaths." (Mich, 1976, p. 210).
If one cannot prevent death, one can at least regularise and standaakze
it. At the same time, technology offers not only commodified cure and
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coping but the promise of absolution: one is absolved from guilt by the
application of technology: 'they tried everything'. This links with
the role of doctors as modern-day priests (see Szasz 1974, Oakley 1981,
Hart 1985). And even where cure is impossible as in 'brain death', one
is absolved from the fear that the patient is 'not really dead' by the
application of 'brain death criteria', which may be seen as a
technological rite of passage: refered to as 'the Last Tests', echoing
the 'Last Rites' of the Catholic Church.
Illich (1976, p.104) has termed this heroic medical "struggle against
death" a "phantom production of life expectancy as a commodity". As we
have seen, technology may of itself be seen to possess curative powers.
Patients may carry notions of the 'right' drug to remedy the situation.
More generally, this consumer orientation may imply the possibility of
buying or aquiring health or relief from pain like a commodity. Such
an orientation typifies a patriarchial capitalist society and can only
be reinforced by the fact that the NHS is now the subject of market
mechanisms, creating an internal market for health services. As
Gouldner (1976, p.245) has commented:
". . . there is a growing connection between consumerism, productivity,
science and technology, many in society tend to associate their
increased enjoyment of life - the improved living standard - with
technology."
It seems that they may also associate their increased expectations of
life-expectancy and a pain free existence with the same range of
phenomena.
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explores the role of medical technology in the structure of
medical domination of birth and death, stressing technology's pivotal
position at the intersection of control and uncertainty. I have adopted
a Marxist-feminist approach rooted in labour process analysis. Central
to the analysis has been a consideration of the biomedical model, since
along with class, gender and race, this represents a key power
relationship within health care delivery.
I have examined the contest for control within the labour process around
technology and its use in facilitating the achievement of a standardized
birth or death: a birth or death falling within certain parameters.
This regulation allows health care professionals retrospective control
(if necessary at Law) over the definition of what occurred, thus, more
easily defending their practice if challenged. At the same time, such
technological procedural regulation allows the opportunity for the
dominant group (doctors) to exert control over subordinate groups
involved in the process: midwives/nurses, patients/patients' relatives.
This procedural regulation of life events is a 'good fit' with a
mechanistic view of the body and the world.
Such a mechanistic approach, which leads to a reification of the
processes of health and illness, is conducive to a commodification of
health care 'solutions'. Solutions become located in external
technologies which may be 'bought' off-the-peg. Health becomes
something one 'buys' rather than something one actively achieves. From
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the patient's point of view, the emphasis is therefore on passivity: the
patient as 'object'.
The mechanical view of the body is a positivistic one but paradoxically,
the medical labour process is riven with uncertainty (see Parsons 1951,
Fox 1957, 1979, Davis 1960, Scheff 1963). Uncertainty, with its
overtones of open-ended risk, unpredictability and the unknown (possibly
unknowable), could represent a challenge to the doctor's expert
authority. However, I have argued that 'uncertainty' is a resource
within the health labour process which doctors from their dominant
ideological and material position, press into service to promote
°ownership' and compliance within the situation. To these ends,
uncertainty is manipulated along a continuum towards or away from
greater uncertainty. This represents a development of Davis' (1960)
concept of 'functional uncertainty' (see Chapter 8).
I have argued that the tension between methodological positivism and
practical uncertainty is managed and manipulated through the promise of
control through the application of technology. Thus, technology is used
to mask uncertainty, thereby enhancing ideological medical control.
Doctors are perceived to have the situation under control. Given the
social relations embedded in technology and the social relations that
structure its use, this leads to a greater potentiality for
superordinate control of both patients/relatives and subordinate work
groups, who work with the technology but do not 'own' it or determine
Its use (although they may negotiate its use in practice where they
possess countervailing philosophies, for example, the resistance of some
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midwives to routinely artificialy rupturing the membranes at 4
centimetres and applying a fetal electrode to the baby's head), -
I now propose to look in more detail at the wider conclusions that can
be drawn in these key areas of analysis.
,
The Biomedical Model 
ITU treats patients with life-threatening conditions, while
obstetricians care largely for well-women experiencing a 'natural' life
event. Since the medical profession dominate both areas, the dominant
ideology is that of the biomedical model. As we have seen, this
involves notions of pathology, positivism, Cartesian dualism and a
mechanistic approach to the body, birth and dying. This is a
cognitively male approach to methodology and the world (see Harding
1981, Keller 1985, Bordo 1986).
Despite the usually widely divergent health status of ITU and maternity
patients, there is some considerable commonality between the two in the
extensive use of drug technology and continuous electronic monitoring.
This appears related to obstetricians' concern with what Oakley (1980)
has termed the avoidance of avoidable death for which they might be held
responsible. Obstetrics, therefore, becomes essentially a damage
limitation exercise, concerned primarily with preventing death rather
than facilitating birth. In pregnancy, obstetricians try to make the
body work as a machine (Rothman, 1982); in critical illness they try to
repair it on the same basis. In both areas pain is generally seen as
the same mechanistic phenomenon: suitably treatable by drug technology.
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Rosengren and Devault (1963, p.202) have termed chemical pain relief a
"technical, mechanical and personally neutral means" of relieving pain.
I now turn to the operation of the biomedical model in relation to
childbirth, since this is an area where it has been hotly contested,
given the good health that most pregnant women enjoy.
Midwives and nurses, since they are both (to different degrees)
subservient to the medical profession, operate within the strictures of
this approach - which, as we have seen, they may in practice embrace or
seek to socially negotiate to varying extents (for example, in practice
reconstructing 'definitions' of fetal distress or ITU nurses appealing
to more experential epistemologies in assessments of whether it is
desirable for treatment to continue). Jocelyn Cornwall (1984) has made
the point that women's thinking about childbirth has been 'medicalized'
for over a century. It is small wonder then that the majority of
maternity patients interviewed subscribed to what may basically be
described as a biomedical model of birth,* i.e. they expected birth to
take place in hospital accompanied by medical intervention. Only three
sought to try and labour without pain relief technology and the majority
saw continuous electronic monitoring as 'safer' for the baby. As we
saw in general this remains scientifically unproven but the women's
views indicate that the battle remains won at an ideological level.
Overall, the women had no developed alternative image with which to
* All pregnant women in this study were white British. See, for
example, Currer (1986) concerning the different images that may be held
by ethnic minority women.
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combat the medical model of reproduction, although several wanted birth
to be as 'normal' as possible (Chapter 7 concerning the problems
attached to the notion of 'normal').
However, Graham and Oakley (1981) suggest that mothers and doctors do
have a qualitatively different way of looking at the nature, context and
management of reproduction - a different 'frame of reference' -
Obstetricians apply a pathological and women a natural biological frame
of reference. It was apparent that women did view pregnancy and
childbirth in a different 'context' to obstetricians in terms of its
'meanings' for their lives, for example, bodily, domestically, socially,
and occupationally and so on. 	 Thus, they have a different conception
of the ontological implications of childbirth from doctors. However, in
terms of the 'nature' and 'management' of birth, women generally
appeared uncertain and often anxious. Childbirth remained an area of
substantial ignorance (see Chapter 9) and still largely a taboo subject
in terms of detailed social unpacking. Although, women varied in the
extent to which they hoped to influence the management of labour, the
majority did not express themselves opposed to the routine use of
medical technology. At an epistemological level, therefore, they did
not express views substantially divergent to those of the medical
profession and, given this, the doctors were viewed as the 'experts'.
As a result, there appeared to be no articulated counter cultural model
in operation against the medical model. At the same time, obstetricians
generally put forward a more ambiguous view, than simply viewing birth
as 'pathological', maintaining simultaneously that birth is a
'natural' process but that nature is "imperfect" and, therefore, that
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the level of mortality and morbidity would be far greater left to its
own devices than with obstetric vigilance and interventions. Hence, we
return to 'pathological potential' (Haire, 1978) and the sub-text that
cognitively male science can better the procreative efforts of women's
chaotic bodies (see Easlea 1981, Smart 1991). In terms of cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957): obstetricians recognised birth as
'natural' but this is negated because the relationship between 'nature'
and the unproblematic or straightforward is seen as itself negative.
The biomedical model is associated with viewing people as objects. The
separation of the 'subject' from 'object' in sociological analysis,
medical practice or in other areas of social life, creates false
dichotomies which are cognitively male (Bordo, 1986). It is a
technical mechanistic analysis which over-values one type of knowledge
as 'objective', 'hard' data (see Chapter 3), while systematicbily mder-
valuing its perceived antithesis 'subjective' or 'soft' data.
Medical science constructs the patient (a person/subject) as an object
(of scientific investigation). This is a distinction which has ethical
significance. Viewed through the mechanistic-materialist gaze
'patients' may lose their humanity, personhood. Individuals have a
sense of self and others (Mead, 1934). This means that they have a
moral sense and are aware of duties to self and others. This raises the
issues of choice and conduct. Ledermann (1986) argues for existential
medical ethics. These are not 'abstract' ethics but relational to
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existence.* They are thus incompatible with a mechanistic, dualistic
approach based on internal organic pathological changes:
"In order to develop a medical approach which is existential in its
ethical content, it is necessary to give up the objective standpoint of
scientism and to re-discover man's (sic.) subjective world". (Ledermann,
1986, p.128)
By contrast, where the person is objectified, suffering and disease
reified, the 'solution' itself becomes objectified, or more
specifically (within capitalist society) commodified. Such
commodification (of coping) has undermined the autonomous power to cope
(Mich, 1976) with giving birth or dying; such that we give birth
drugged or paralysed, die sedated or paralysed. Perhaps the creativity
of birth or the prospect of mortality are too potentially subversive to
patriarchial capitalist values to be left unchecked, for example, the
experience of procreation could be empowering of women or contemplating
mortality might lead to an undermining of the 'American dream'
(archatypal capitalist aspirations) or a re-assessment of the work ethic
or its often psychologically unrewarding organisation, given the
acknowledgement of finite time. At the ideological level this involves
obfuscating : "the distinction between rational appearance and
irrational reality." (Marcuse, 1964, p.226): in such a way that the
'mad' appears sane and vice versa (see for example, Laing 1967). Such
*This is basically an existential phenomenological approach to
consciousness. That is to say, consciousness is not abstract but
intentional, 1. e. it is consciousness of something or about something
and, therefore, best understood as some relation between a subject and
object (for a discussion of this see Phillipson and Roche, 1971)
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that, commentators such as Easlea (1981) write:
u 
• • • modern science, despite its breathtaking theoretical,
experimental and practical achievements, has been and remains basically
irrational in so far as it has always been inextricably entangled in the
oppression of groups of people by other people." (Easlea, 1981, p.2)
In context, it may seem entirely rational, and indeed comforting (as ITU
ex-patient relatives and some nurses pointed out), to see the ITU
patient's condition apparently under control and the patient's distress
apparently resolved by sedation, but the patient may still die, often
after massive and successive traumatic interventions; and may have much
on-going disability to come to terms with if they do survive. Likewise,
In Obstetrics, women may look 'comfortable' (and the situation thus
controlled) labouring paralysed from the waist down but is this the
rational way to 'open up' to give birth, the bearing down of which in
second stage has been likened by some to an orgasm? The individual may
readily embrace such solutions rather than grapple with the uncertainty
and unpredictability of a non-technological way of proceeding. Thus
Buber (1970, pp. 85, 79, 126) asserts:
"What has to be given up is. • . that false drive for self-affirmation
which impels man to flee from the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting,
unpredictable dangerous world of relation into the having of things."
The latter may be seen as turning to 'commodified' solutions.
In the early Marx (1975) capitalism is portrayed as denying and
distorting basic human needs and potentials. Distorted through
ideology, these will not necessarily be seen as exploitative but may
seem natural or inevitable; technologies demanded by 'progress' are
part of this. Early Marx considers the relation of nature and self as
well as relations with others. He thus writes of "human sensuousness"
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and our need to use our senses in human labour and endeavour in order to
contribute to our individual and social development. Commenting on the
frustration of this impulse Willmott (1990, p. 371) envisages that:
u . . . human beings become trapped in a fetishised form of self-
consciouness in response to anxiety aroused by the experience of
separation from nature. . ."
This may be explored in the context of childbirth:
Capitalist shop floor assembly line production techniques and machinery
assume and reinforce the separation and antagonistic relationship
between mental and manual labour. The separation of 'the mental' and
'the physical' is not only a feature of capitalist production relations,
It is a feature of the biomedical model. Much chemical pain relief in
labour, therefore, operates on the basis of mind-body dualism either
dislocating the mind from the body (Pethedine) or the body from the mind
(epidural anaesthesia). This in effect represents a separation of
mental and manual labour. To build into a technical system the power to
substitute for the woman's ability to cope in labour (an epidural will
also reduce the chances of her delivering the child herself without the
use of forceps) is an expropriation of women's creative powers at a
fundamental level (see Oakley, 1981a, who associates high-technology
birthing with post-natal depression). This is not to imply that in
specific cases an epidural may not be desirable. Describing the
manufacturing shop floor, Cooley (1976, p.74) comments:
"Thus obJectivised labour in the form of fixed capital, emerges in the
productive process as a dominating force, opposed to living labour, . .
now this life no longer belongs to them (the worker) but to the owner of
the object".
Viewed within the context of childbirth, obstetric technology becomes
fixed capital and power and ownership devolves to the obstetrician.
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Such expropriation may lead to alienation, such that the woman may come
to doubt the integrity of her own body to 'know' how to give birth and
she may become alienated from the product of her labour: her own child.
As an early advocate of 'natural childbirth', Grantly Dick-Read (1972)
spoke of the orgasmic and spiritual nature of birth. By contrast
mechanical, empiricist explanations assert that there are no mysteries,
that all will eventually succomb to mechanical empirical explanation.*
Likewise 'death' becomes a matter of fulfilling a number of
physiological criteria. 	 Even Odent (1984) who argues that women must
achieve an altered state of consciousness in order to give birth with
satisfaction and without complication, speculates that eventually this
state will be described neurologically. However, mechanical, empiricist
explanations, rather than promoting non-intervention , lend themselves
to a dualistic proposition that the key dimensions of birth can be
monitored and regulated by machinery; that 'pain' is just the product
of a mechanical process and can be stopped chemically.
This is significant, since it involves a denial of self-definition and
autonomy in coping with pain. Thus, Illich (1976, p.150> argues:
both doctors and their potential clients are retrained to
smother pain's intrinsic question mark",
turning pain into a "technical matter" and depriving suffering of its
*See, for example, Stephen Rose (1973), 'The Conscious Brain', who
argues that in due course neurobiology will evolve to the extent that
scientists will be able to explain the 'mystic experience' in terms of
the mechanical explanatory framework.
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"inherent personal meaning" (Illich, 1976, p.140). This leads to a:
• . progressive flattening out of personal, virtuous performance".
(Illich, 1976, p.138)
This may be seen in the regulation of birth and death (described in
Chapter 7). Rothman (1982, p.39) also comments in relation to the
pathological orientation to childbirth: "When someone is sick, there is
no blame and no credit". Increasingly it becomes difficult to express
ones own values through conduct in the face of pain, death and declin'e
or in giving birth. In relation to death, for example, Fiefel (1963,
p.18) maintains that it is not only that "we do not even permit him
(sic.) to say goodbye to us" but we often fail:
. • • to assist the person to recreate a sense of significant being for
himself, whether it be existential, inspirational or transcendental - to
be an individual even through dying."
The human need to discover one's own ways of surviving (or, in some
cases, not surviving) is reproduced as n externally regulated
performance; in the process the cosmic, mythic, moral and existential
become obscured.
	
The precariousness of existence: critical illness,
death, pain, childbirth, is regulated and controlled by a model that
conceives of these primarily in terms of mechanical dysfunction. Such a
medicalization of social life has caused Illich (1976) to argue that a
de-skilling of the populace occurs when experts define human experience.
At the same time, the impersonal medical mode works against the
development of a wider compassion and a personal, tender response to
suffering on the part of the wider community: the latter possibility
Illich (1976, p.117) terms "compassionate tolerance" and may be compared
with "repressive tolerance" which Marcuse (1964) associates with the
technical mode.	 Buber (1970) discusses the relation between '1' and
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'you'. Easlea (1981) makes the point there can be no "responsive
reciproCity" and compassion between 'I' and 'it'. There is no
empathetic response from the technical mode. Illich feels our inability
to cope without resort to medical institutions has to do with the demise
of the mythic in society. That society has forgotten its myths and
dreams. A technological fix may be seen as the opposite to this; or
perhaps, more paradoxically, myths and dreams may be seen to have become
attached to technology.
Commodification 
n . • . the devaluation of the human
world grows in direct proportion to the
increase in value of the world of things".
(Marx, 1975, p.324)
,
I have argued that a positivistic, mechanistic approach to the body is
dialectically related to a patriarchial capitalist society*. Firstly,
because it enables the domination of 'chaotic' nature (Easlea, 1981)
which is associated with women (Bordo, 1986) . Secondly, it emphasises
'cure' rather than 'care' (Navarro 1976, Hart 1985) and sees cure as
something external to the individual which may be 'obtained' - like a
commodity - from the medical profession as, for example, pain relief,
surgery, drugs or assurances that 'nothing will go wrong' or absolution,
that 'everything possible was done', if it does.
t
Illich (1976) stresses commodification of health care which he
*Navarro (1986) defines the characteristics of capitalist medicine as:
biologism, positivism, mechanicism and individualism.
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associates with industrialization. His is essentially a technologically
deterministic model where society is seen as a technocracy, run by
bureaucrats and peopled by 'consumers'. Although I disagree with the
ascribed origins and prescribed solutions of Illich's cultural critique
of modern medicine, I do feel that many of his substantive criticisms
concerning patients' loss of autonomy and control, together with the
mystifiing and iatrogenic implications of much treatment remain valid.
Navarro (1976) extensively criticises Illich for locating the need for
consumption in the manipulative practices of bureaucracies (including
the medical bureaucracy).
	
Navarro maintains the aetiology of the need
for consumption lies in the demand of industrialized capitalist
societies that citizens have no control over the productive process but
are manipulated into consuming its products:
. . either a pill, a drug, a prescription, a car, or the
'prepackaged moon'". (Navarro, 1976, p.111)
Thus, Navarro argues, "commodity fetishism' derives not from
industrialization but is intrinsically linked to a system based on
commodity production which generates a demand for products while
simultaneously promoting pacification and passivity. Consumption becomes
a compensatory attempt to realise satisfaction not fulfilled in the
productive process.
Navarro's (1976, 1986) analysis, whilst locating the drive to
consumption in the relations of production, does not appear to view
health care as an area of production but merely as an area of
consumption. This leads him to assert:
"Thus, to understand the sphere of consumption we have to understand the
world of production (author's emphasis in both cases). . . (while
medical care is later ref ered to as). . • the non-work-place, in the
-302-
world of consumption" (Navarro, 1986, p.113, p.152)
This is presumably because he views health workers as 'unproductive
labour'. The problem follows that: health care is not seen as
sphere of production with its own labour process. However, in healtb
care, production and distribution occur simultaneously (Ehrenreich,
1978). Thus, although Navarro (1976, p.115) maintains:
. • . technology is not an independent force that fatalistically
determines all relations, including social ones but rather the reverse
is true, 1. e. the social relations (who controls what and how this
control takes place) determines the type of organisation chosen and type
of technology to be used."
he does not apply this insight to the health labour process. His
approach also leads him to see the 'patient' as merely a 'consumer' and
nothing else. This undermines the role of the patient in the division
of labour (see for example, Freidson 1961, Roth 1963, Hughes 1971,
Fagerhaugh and Strauss 1977, Strauss, et al, 1982, Stacey 1984) and
precludes examination of their (and their relatives') positive
contribution to the health care labour process. His work also omits any
notion of the power relations between health workers and users
(Carpenter, 1979). Gender is also largely absent. It is not, as
Navarro suggests, that dependency is created in the sphere of production
and then transported into the 'area of consumption' but that relations
of domination and subordination are constructed and reconstructed
throughout all patriarchial capitalist labour processes of which health
care is one. For precisely this reason, it is appropriate to apply
Marcuse's (1964) notion of 'technical rationality' and 'repressive
tolerance' (which Marcuse primarily locates in industrial production) to
the area of reproduction of health (and human reproduction).
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More generally, it is evident from employing a labour process approach
that control is not just related to the detailed control of work around
labouring in childbirth, being critically ill or dying in a
technological environment (as, for example, the work of Barbara Katz
Rothman, 1982, on birth) but relates to a more general subordination
located in societal relations of class, gender and ethnicity. The
production of health care and the regulation of birth and death,
therefore, has to do not just with the 'detailed' control of the
professionals concerned but wider relations of domination and
subordination in society.* Ehrenreich (1978) calls for a synthesis
between the 'cultural critique' and the 'political economy critique' of
medicine, arguably a labour process account provides that, since it is
concerned with 'form' and 'content', and social relations which span the
macro and micro level.
The commodification of health 'needs' is likely to increase further with
the application of market principles to the NHS (Department of Health
White Paper, 1989), whereby we are encouraged to take our 'disease' or
health 'problems' to the health 'market place' and, in effect, purchase
the best solution we can obtain for ourselves. Such an approach to
health care also provides a 'good fit' for capitalism in the guise of
*The distinction between these levels of analysis may be seen, for
example, in the work of Annandale (1989) where she argues there is a
disjuncture between the ability of obstetricians to control the
organisation of their everyday medical work (detailed control - micro
level - which she argues remains effective) and their inability to
protect their interests as a corporate body (macro level).
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the medical technology industry (see Waitzkin, 1990). This is also
mirrored by a commodification of body parts. The creation of a market
economy of health provision, whereby work practices within the NHS are
being exposed to market mechanisms which begin to regulate their conduct
within narrow economic criteria (including such regulators as
performance indicators) is associated with the major strategic
requirement to preserve the wage relation, of reducing the value of the
social reproduction of labour power represented by the production of
collectively consumed use values (Aglietta, 1979). Aglietta argues that
the restructuring of health provision will necessitate major
transformations of the labour processes involved, aimed at cutting the
cost of the 'social wage' (involving extracting 'surplus labour' from
the health workforce, see Carchedi, 1977) and maximising the return on
capital investment represented by fixed assets in the health sector. I
have argued that the politics of throughput, for example: the issues
surrounding the weaning of by-pass patients in the Specialised Unit (see
Chapter 6), is part of the intensification of productivity for employees
in the NHS, as is the 'extended role' (see Chapter 7) in both Intensive
Care and midwifery. It represents the use of a subordinate group
(predominantly female) to perform tasks under the 'ownership' and
control of an ajacent dominant group (predominantly male), for which
they receive no additional remuneration and which must be performed in
conjunction with their core role. The 'extended role' also involves a
further incorporation into the medical model for both subordinate
groups. This allows an extension of medical services at less expense
than providing extra doctors would entail. It is an interesting case of
'upskilling' (notwithstanding the political nature of 'skill'. see, foa-
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example, Rubery 1980, Pollert 1981) leading to an intensification of
work, since intensification has more generally been associated with 'de-
skilling' (see Braverman 1974). Paradoxically, despite "up-skilling",
a routinisation of work has taken place, in that routine technological
procedures have increasingly been adopted around the conduct of birth
and death.	 Intensification of work cheapens health 'commodities' on
the internal market being created currently in the NHS.
In contrast an area where staff reductions could be facilitated by
technology has so far been eschewed. In priciple staff could be 'saved'
or staff shortages more easily absorbed if all labouring women were
attached to electronic fetal monitors, relayed through a central console
staffed by a Senior Midwife. However, this option had been consciously
rejected by the Director of Obstetric Services at the hospital in the
study in favour of keeping the midwife by the bedside in the Delivery
Room (although this was not always achievable in practice). This
reflected the philosophy that monitor readings should be seen in the
context of the patient as a whole (this may not always be adhered to in
practice and is in tension, for example, with the biomedical model and
the high status attached to 'hard data'). This corresponds to the
conscious philosophy within ITU of retaining a one-to-one bedside nurse
and does not indicate any conscious effort to use technology as a cost-
cutting device to reduce staffing and thereby intensify work (Child, et
al, 1984, Harvey 1984). Nevertheless, monitors were used to alleviate
staff shortages on ITU (although not on the Specialised ITU, where beds
were closed if they could not be fully staffed for all shifts) and the
Labour Ward, covering for the temporarily absent nurse/midwife.
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Scientific Ceremonial and Technological icons 
"Paradoxically, the more attention
is focused on the technical mastery of disease,
the larger becomes the symbolic and non technical
function performed by medical technology."
(Mich, 1976, p.119)
Hospital 'worship' has been said to be unrelated to hospital
'performance'* (Illich, 1976, p.113), while "entire branches 4.medicine
continue to be financed because they have been invested with non-
technical, usually symbolic power" (Illich, 1976, p.119). It was
certainly evident that many ITU ex-patient relatives continued to extol
the virtues of ITU's, although their relative had either not survived
the experience, died shortly afterwards or remained terminally ill.
The Promethean image of scientific and technical power that is
projected suggests: that nothing is ultimately unaccomplishable
(Gouldner, 1976, p.260). Thus, we have:
n . . . the modern myth that personal tragedy and the uncertainties of
human existence can be resolved by technology." (Karpf, 1988)
ITU has been termed 'the medicalization of the miracle" (Illich, 1976,
p.123). We are , therefore, in the realms of the mythic and symbolic.
At the level of perception much technological intervention employed in
ITU and Obstetrics (for example, drug technology and electronic
monitoring equipment) serves to mask the uncertainty that remains
present in the situation. The imagery presented on the symbolic and
sensory level is that of 'projected instrumental certainty', a symbol
that: all is under technological and medical control. This is part of
the 'conjuring trick orientation' (Hart, 1985) but, at a deeper level,
it represents medical technology and the doctor as miracle worker.
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Medical technology has a kudos which derives from and reinforces the
mystical esteem in which doctors are held. Rather than society having
abandoned its myths and needing to re-discover them (Illich, 1976), it
appears that the mythic has become attached to technology and medical
technology in particular.
Here, however, we are not only concerned with the mythic and the
symbolic but the heroic. The heroic has always been an element of myth;
hence 'the heroes'. The heroic is classically male. Hence, the heroic
mortal struggle with 'nature' is a masculine goal and has much to do
with the achievement of masculinity (Easlea, 1981). Similarly, Gouldner
(1976, p. 260) talks of the "unlimited potency" of scientific and
technical power; where "potency" must be seen to have (male) sexual
connotations. The heroic is concerned with 'cure'; conversely 'care'
may be hypothesized as female. One might argue, therefore, not only for
a humanizing of health care and birth but a feminizing of these areas,
Odent (1984, for example, calls for a 'feminizing' of birth and
Dinnerstein (1977) argues that the suppression of the feminine is at
the deepest root of our current cultural troubles). The suppression of
the feminine has been associated with the denial of connectedness and
empathy. (I see these as existentially female qualities, rooted in
women's 'being in the world', rather than being 'essential' qualities of
women). The feminist/feminine, brings together subjective and objective
ways of knowing the world (see Rose, 1987, p.279). The management of
reproduction through history and in most cultures is a female concern
(Oakley, 1980) and should be reasserted. I would question, along with
Rothman (1982), Odent (1984) and Barbour (1986) whether the presence of
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a male partner is necessarily supportive to the woman in labour (see
Chapter 7) and share Rothman's concern that this may well replicate the
patriarchial power relations of wider society in the delivery room (in
the same way generally as do obstetricians). Help should be offered
woman-to-woman, as well as on a professional basis:
. • . women in labour are assisted not by men, but by other women who
have had children themselves. . . If the friend or sister has had a
spontaneous natural birth herself, she will bring her positive knowledge
of the experience to the event; if she has never had children, or if she
has had only cesarean births, she may well bring fear and anxiety."
(Odent, 1984, P. 43)
Lay-midwives in the United States hesitate to take on an apprentice who
has not had a baby (Devries, 1985). Some midwives in this study also
expressed this view: they saw this as "completing your training"/"at
least you know what they've been through". It must certainly afford
potentially a special empathy and connectedness.
In contrast to the personalized, empathetic approach, in practice, the
individual act of giving birth has been the subject of standardized 
and romtine intervention. But the routine application of mechanical
technology may disturb the interconnections of labour by fracturing the
ontological experience of the woman giving birth. 	 However, doctors
have seen greater regulation and more intervention in birth and death
as the best defence against malpractice claims (see Mariskind, 1980).
The virtues of non-intervention may not be appreciated by some
patients, since to appear to do nothing may be perceived as a non-
decision, non-treatment; even as un-caring. Essentially, they may equate
intervention with decisiveness, efficiency and modernity. As the
Registrar Obstetrician commented after the birth of my second child when
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he resisted a last-minute intervention: "Sometimes the most difficult
thing is to do nothing". Similarly, obstetrician Peter Dunn (1976)
comments:
"We must never forget that it takes more experience, more judgement and
courage often to stand back and do nothing." (cited by Inch 1982, p.35)
'
The push towards intervention was also evident in Intensive Care:
extensive and intense intervention is after all integral to its role.
One Consultant Anaesthetist felt:
"You're talking someone who about to die and nothing you do will make
anything worse. So it takes all the pressure off, paradoxically. If
you've got somebody who about to die, the worst that can happen is
that they will die and since they were going to anyway, it might be
thought you didn't do anything wrong. In fact, people rally round and
say, 'Well, you did your best, thank you doctor, for trying', this kind
of thing. In fact, you may have made the most awful balls-up of it."
This could be to confuse action with progress and to ignore iatrogenesis
and the psycho-social context of the event. Similarly, in withdrawal of
active support, the position to be justified was that of not continuing
to use technology or justifying why a patient was not admitted to
Intensive Care. In Obstetrics, litigation and dispute tended to centre
around why interventions had not been made, technology not
used (sometimes there is a dispute about why forceps were used, but
often this involves the contention that greater intervention should have
occurred, i.e. Caesarian Section). In both areas the pressure , on
doctors was to act, to intervene. The 'sins of omission' Were
considered greater, or at least more difficult to defend
retrospectively, than the 'sins of commission'. The burden of proof
therefore lay with those who wished to practice non or less-intensive
intervention. Arguably the opposite should be the case.
-310-
As Banta and Thacker (1979) have argued, an assessment of a medical
technology should include factors such as; health benefits and risks of
the technology, its financial effects and impact on social systems and
values. Complementary to this should be a consideration of how social
forces and social relations shape technology and its use. Social,
political and economic factors are central to the way medical technology
is used: in other words, the use of technology is not simply 'medically'
or indeed 'technologically' determined. This aids an understanding of
why some medical technologies are in regular, routine use, despite a
lack of confirmatory evidence of their health benefits and despite their
risks. At the same time, control (including the management of
uncertainty) by the medical profession as an occupational interest group
and as agents of State and male power, underlines the use of technology
as presently constructed.
-o0o -
This thesis grew out of Jonathan's birth and so at the end I return as I
began to the image of what birth can be, reproducing this most eloquent
plea for facilitating birth rather than being locked into a mortal
struggle with the spectre of death. It is a powerful evocation of life
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and freedom on which to end:
"I am overcome. There is nothing to teach her. She pushes for life on
her own. I am not to touch her. She shouts at me: "Stay back. I am
giving birth. Leave me alone!" She makes herself comfortable, and I
must accommodate myself to her position. She moves around. She is
creative, inventive, full of life. She looks for what she wants. She
is exhausted and yet so vital. As she throws herself upon me, I am
covered with her sweat. I am obliged to do as she wishes. But she is
beautiful, she is the life that she is about to bring forth. She no
longer asks me the time, the sex, the weight. Instead, she simply cries
out with pleasure. I leave the room, exhausted, full of her emotions,
her joy.
In ten years at Pithiviers, I have been taught: where women are free, we
will learn how they give birth best. They will show us. They will
trust us. Look at them. Listen closely. . . "
(Odent, 1984, p.113 - extract from an account of birth by Dominique
Pourre, a midwife at Pithiviers, France).
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APPENDIX I	 ITU - CONSULTANTS
1. What is your background in medicine and how did you come to decide
on your particular specialism? What is your role within the Unit?
2. What are the major technologies in use in the ITU? What tasks are
they able to perform?
3. What is the procedure for obtaining funding for new technology?
4. Who decides local policy around the use of ITU technology? (the
Consultant in Charge, the Region, DHSS, who?)
5. How is the various equipment in ITU used? Which staff use the
equipment?
6. Would it be fair to say there is a policy of bedside nursing in the
Unit? Would it ever be possible for the nurses to sit at a central
nursing station if the monitors readings were relayed to the station?
7. What sort of patients are referred to the Unit? Who makes the
decision to refer and what sort of criteria are used?
8. When a patient is in the ITU who plans his/her care is it: the
Consultant in charge of the ITU , the patient's original Consultant and
his/her team or a combination of the two? Who makes the ultimate
decision if there is a disagreement between the two concerning the best
course of action? Who decides when the patient is fit for discharge
from the Unit?
9. How do you decide how deeply to sedate a patient; what factors have
to be considered?
10. Do you, as the Consultant, get any notion of the patient-
personality (patient as a person/individual - given that the majority of
patients are semi- or unconscious but given that nurses do appear to
latch on to a patient personality)?
11. What about withdrawal of active support - what and who is involved
in the decision-making process?
12. How do you view the role of the ITU nurse? (Specialised Unit:
Where did the the initiative for the more active nurse management of the
by-pass patients come from?)
13. On what occasions and in what sort of circumstances does the nurse
refer to the Consultant in Charge of I.T.0 rather than a doctor from the
patient's original care team?
14. What significance do you attach to nurses saying they are 'not
happy' with the patient, when according to the monitors, etc., the
patient is fine?
15. What do feel are the main dilemmas facing ITU staff?
16. Do some sorts of deaths upset staff more than others?
17. How do patients' relatives cope with what is arguably the very
dramatic form of intervention represented by I.T.U.? How does the unit
seek to help them to cope? Do you think the ITU carries particular
strains for patients' relatives - what sort of thing? Brain death?
18. How closely are patients' relatives kept informed of the condition
of the patient?
19. What is your idea of an 'acceptable death'? (would you make a
distinction between: in the Unit and in the wider society?)
20. Had you ever been present at a death before becoming a Doctor?
21. How do you feel being a Doctor has modified any 'commonsense' view
of death you held before qualifying and practicing in this profession?
Has your association with ITU caused you to modify this view further?
22. How do you see ITU's developing in the future?
23. What are the main frustrations and satisfactions of ITU?
APPENDIX I	 DOCTORS
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your medical background, what is
your specialism, etc. What attracted you to that particular
specialism/or if still training: what do you intend to specialise in and
why?
2. How much contact do you generally have with ITU?
3. Have you worked on other Units, how do they compare?
4. Who decides which of your patients should be admitted to ITU? What
criteria are involved in this selection?
5. With what sort of information do you rely on ITU nurses to supply
you?
6. Sometimes nurses seem to say they are 'not happy' with a patient,
when for example, the monitor readings indicate the patient is fine,
what significance do you attach to this?
7. Under what circumstances do you have to be summoned to ITU to see
one of your patients - are certain perameters set for calling you?
8. What do you think are the main frustrations and satisfactions of
intensive therapy units?
9. How often do you usually visit your patients when they are on
I.T.U.?
Do you still manage to keep some contact with the patients' relatives
once the patient is on I.T.U.?
10. Do you feel that patients' relatives react differently in any way
if a patient dies on ITU rather than on the Ward - it is a particularly
crisis-ridden, dramatic and technological setting, after all, isn't it?
11. 'Brain death' - how do staff cope? How do patients' relatives
cope? How is it possible to help them cope with this situation?
12. What is your idea of an 'acceptable' death? (Would you make any
distinction between the unit and the rest of society?)
13. When you decide to withdraw active support from a patient, what
factors are taken into account and who is involved in the decision? Who
is responsible for communicating this decision to the patient's
relatives?
14. Had you ever been present at a death before you became a Doctor?
15. How/do you feel being a Doctor has modified any 'commonsence' view
of death you held before qualifying and practiting in this profession?
Has your association with ITU caused you to modify this view further?
16. Do you think there are any ways in which ITU's could be improved?
17. Will you continue to have a major involvement with ITU
(Anaesthetists)
throughout your career?
APPENDIX I	 ITU NURSES
1. What attracted you to the nursing profession in the first place?
2. How did you become involved in ITU nursing - what attracted you ?
3. How is ITU viewed, do you think, by 'the rest of the Hospital'?
4. How long have you been an ITU nurse?
5. Have you taken the special ITU qualification - what does this
involve?
(If a Student Nurse doing a placement on ITU - what do you think of it -
would you want to make it your specialist area? Why/Why not?)
6. What are your main duties as a nurse on ITU
7. Can you describe your last day on duty (or the duties you have
carried-out today - if towards the end of a shift - pick- up points)?
8. Have there been any changes in ITU's and ITU nursing during your
time in such Units?
9. Does practice vary much in different Units? (Worked on others?)
10. In what circumstances do you have to refer to a doctor - what
happens if one is not immediately available?
11. What are the main items of technology that you are involved in
using on ITU?
12. How do you think the patients' relatives view the technology?
13. Who decides what technology is installed? Who is consulted? Who
decides how it is used once installed?
14. How much do you rely on your traditional basic nursing skills and
how much on the technology? What happens if these are in conflict, for
e.g. what if the patients breathing and complexion colour look O.K. but
the monitor or blood gas result tell you something different?
15. When it is decided to withdraw active support from a patient, are
the nursing staff asked their view of the matter?
16. Can you get close to your patients, given the lack of consciousness
of many of them? How do you achieve this? Is it necessary? Do you
get closer to some patients than others, what does this depend on?
17. How is it decided how deeply to sedate a patient; what factors have
to be considered?
18. Some ITU nurses have mentioned to me the phenomenon of 'monitor
watching' do you think this is a very significant experience for
patients' relatives?
19. How closely are patients' relatives kept informed of the condition
of the patient?
20. How much responsibility do you have for preparing patients'
relatives for the likiihood of particular patients not surviving?
21. Have you nursed dying and critically ill patients on an 'ordinary' -
ward? Is this a different experience for the nurse from 'death' on an
ITU?
Is it a different experience of death for the relatives of the patient?
Is there a difference in reaction?
22. Are there particular strains for relatives do you think in having
a relative seriously ill or dying on an ITU as compared to other parts
of the hospital where there is perhaps less technology and less
emergency intervention - it is a very crisis ridden environment isn't
it?
23. What proportion of ITU patients die? How do you cope with this?
24. Do some deaths upset you more than others - what does this depend
on?
25. What do you consider to be an 'acceptable death'? (would you make a
distinction in this respect between the Unit and the wider society?)
i.e. features of an 'acceptable death'?
26. 'Brain Death' - how do you cope - how do you help relatives to
cope?
27. Had you ever been present at a death before becoming a nurse? Has
nursing changed your attitude to death and in particular has ITU nursing
changed your attitude to death in any way?
28. Do you think that there is anything about ITU that could be
improved, from the patient's point of view, from the relatives point of
view?
29. What about the nurses -is there an 1.T.U. nurse support group at
this hospital? If 'yes': do you attend it? Do you find it useful? If
'no': do you think it would be helpful for such a group to exist? Where
do you get your support from?
30. What do you feel are the main dilemmas facing ITU staff?
31. What do you like best about working on I.T.U.? What is the worst
aspect?
32. Would you like to see the role of the I.T.U. nurse extended in any
way?
33. Do you think you will continue to work in I.T.U.?
APPENDIX I	 ITU - RELATIVES
1, Occupation? Occupation of patient? Age of patient?
2. How long was your 	  in Intensive Care?
3. How did your 
	
 come to be a patient in ITU?
4. Can you tell me a bit about how you felt when you first visited your
---- in Intensive Care? Did your feelings about the situation change
over time? Were the staff able to prepare you in any way for your first
sight of 	  in Intensive Care?
5. Where you able to stay with them overnight?
6. Did you feel you were able to provide any of their care?
7. Was your relative actually conscious for any of the time they spent
on ITU?
8. How did you spend your time with them during visits to the Unit?
9. How did you feel about the staff?
10. How did you feel about the equipment? (prompt: monitors,
respirator)
11. Did you have any contact with the Unit after 
	
 Was
discharged/died?
12. Do you think the experience could have been made less painful in
any way?
13. What did you find to be the worst part of the experience of having
a relative in an Intensive Care Unit? Were there any aspects in which
you took comfort?
(14. (Where Death occured): Were there particular things you had to
reconcile yourself to because 
	  died in Intensive Care?)
15. Did you feel the staff helped to prepare you, as far as reasonably
possible, for events as they occured while your 	  was on the
Unit?
16. How easy was it to get information about what was happening? How
far did you know the reasons for certain courses of action being taken?
(If actions were not explained at the time, were they explained
afterwards?)
Did you feel fully informed and consulted about your 	
treatment?
17. Were you given some idea what the various machines on I.T.U. did?
18. Had you any image of what ITU looked like before 	  was
admitted? (Where 'yes': on what was this image based?	 Was this view
change after your visits to the unit?)
APPENDIX I	 CONSULTANTS, DOCTORS - OBSTETRICS
1. Can I start by asking you a bit about your own background in
medicine? How did you come to decide on your particular Specialism?
2. How would you describe your role in this Hospital?
3. Who is responsible for deciding what equipment and technology is
available on the Labour Ward?
4. Who decides local policy around the use of obstetrics technology?
(Individual Consultants, Region?, DHSS? Who?)
5. Does the Royal College of Obstetricians have any input into the use
of obstetrics technology, guidelines, etc.?
6. What should be the role of technology in childbirth?
7. Who decides what technology is used during birth (including
specifically electronic fetal monitors)? What sort of factors would
inform that decision?
8. Are there any procedures involving technology that you consider
crucial to the safe management of a labour that at that point appears to
be progressing 'normally'?
9. Under what circumstances during a woman's labour would you expect
Doctors attending a patient for whom you are responsible to refer to
you?
10. More generally, how do you view your role in relation to the
pregnant woman?
11. How do you view the role of the midwife? What should their
contribution be?
12, Do you think childbirth has improved from the woman's point of view
over recent years? (Why? How?) How could it be improved further? How
could this be achieved? Are there limiting factors to future improvement
- what are they?
13. How much choice does the pregnant woman/labouring woman have in
terms of the care/management she receives? What are the limits on this?
14. How would they describe labour to a woman who has never had a baby?
15. How would you seek to reassure a woman who is fearful of labour and
childbrith?
16. What's your idea of 'a good birth'? 'A good labour'?
17. What are your views on pain relief in labour?
18, How do you feel about the presence of birth partners? What role
should they play? Could/should this role be expanded?
19. How do you see obstetrics technology developing in the future?
20. Do you have children yourself? Were you at their births? As
births in which you were closely emotionally involved, did these cause
you to adapt any of your previously held views about the birth process?
(Man) (As for Midwives if woman)
21. Had you ever been present at a birth before you became a Doctor?
22, Ask them what they knew about/felt about birth before they became a
doctor and what this was based on, How do they feel their training has
modified this view?
(Can I just finish by asking you a bit about the profession of
Obstetrics?)
23. Is the profession of obstetrics changing? Has it changed during
your time in the profession?
24. What are the main dilemmas facing the Obstetrician?
25, What are the main satisfactions for you in being an Obstetrician?
APPENDIX I	 MIDWIVES
1. What made you become a midwife?
2. What were your hopes when you became a midwife?
3. Have these hopes been fulfilled.
4. How long have you been a midwife?
5. What do you see as the role of the Midwife?
6. Do you think the profession is changing?
7. Midwives work for all firms when they are on delivery? Does
practice vary much from one Consultant firm to another?
From one Doctor to another?
8. Have you usually met a woman before you attend the birth of her
baby? If not, how do you 'get close to her' and, indeed, is this
necessary?
9. Can you describe in some detail the last labour you attended to give
me some idea of the detailed work tasks you performed? (pick up on
point i as they . go along and use as a way in to query procedures,
accountability, sphere of competence, rat1ona6, etc.)
10. In what circumstances do you have to refer to a Doctor?
11. How closely do you work with the doctors? What about the
consultants?
12. Which items of technology does the midwife routinely use on the
Delivery Suite ie technology that is operated largely by the midwife
rather that the doctor? Who uses the results produced by such
technology?
13. How much do you rely on your traditional basic nursing skills and
how much on obstetrics technology? What happens if these two things are
in conflict, for example, if by laying your hand on the labouring
woman's abdomen you feel that the contractions are becoming very strong
but 'the trace' suggests differently , on which basis do you proce44?
14. What is the policy on monitoring in this unit ? Is there any
variation in monitoring policy between different Consultants?
15. If a woman expresses no preference, e. g. for/against electronic
foetal monitoring what happens?
16. What do you see as your role in relation to the labouring woman?
17. Do you think women's experience of childbirth has improved over the
years? Why do you think this is? How has this come about?
18. How would you describe labour to a woman who has never had a baby?
19. How do you seek to reassure a woman who is fearful of labour and
childbirth?
20. Do you get more involved (emotionally) in some births than others?
What does this depend on?
21, How do you feel about the presence of birth partners? What should
be their role? Can this role be extended?
22. Who decides what pain relief is necessary during labour? How do
you handle this area with the labouring woman and her birth partner (if
present)?
23. Does the woman have a choice over how her labour is managed? What
are the constraints on this?
24. What information is available in this hospital to the pregnant
woman concerning the birth process and how it will be managed? Is this
given automatically or does the patient have to specifically request it?
25. What's your idea of what constitutes a 'good birth'? A 'good
labour'?
26. Could the childbirth experience be improved? In what ways? Are
there limiting factors?
27. Is there a possibility of extending the role of the midwife - how
could this develop?
28. What are the main dilemmas facing the midwife?
29. Do they have children?
If 'yes': What sort of labour(s)/birth(s) did you have? Did it
change your view of birth or the practices you adopt around birth?
If 'no':	 What sort of birth would you like?
30. Had you ever been present at a birth before you became a midwife?
31. Can you remember what you knew and felt about birth before you
became a midwife - what this was based on, and how your professional
training has modified this view?
32. Just as a 'background' question, I'm asking respondents whether
they know anything about their own birth?
33. What are the characteristics of the type of birth you enjoy most?
APPENDIX I 
	
WOMEN GIVING BIRTH
1. Age?
2. Other children?
3. Do you want a boy or a girl?
4. Occupation or previous occupation?
5. How did you come to be at this hospital? How did you choose your
Consultant? Do you know or have you heard anything about the way that
particular Consultant tends to manage her/his patients?
6. How is your pregnancy progressing, any problems, etc. How you feel
about the hospital, staff, Consultant, etc.
7. Have the hospital asked you what you want to do in labour? Have you
been asked if you want to draw up a birth plan? Are you planning to do
this? Can I ask you what you want in it?
8. Have you toured the delivery suite? How do you feel about it?
9. What do you hope to experience from the birth?
10. What do you think labour (or this labour if not first pregnancy)
will be like? What's this view based on? What would your ideal labour
be like?
11. What were your other labours like (if appropriate). Why do you
think it (they) turned out the way it (they) did?
12. What sort of factors do you think will affect the sort of labour
you have?
13. How are you preparing for the birth?
14. Will your husband, partner or someone 'close' to you be with you at
the birth? How do you want this person to help you in the birth?
15. How do you want the midwife to help you at the birth? What about
the Doctor, what sort of help do you see him/her giving?
16. How do you think you will deal with the pain?
17. Can I ask you if there's anything about the forthcoming birth that
particularly worries you?
18. Is there anything about the forthcoming birth that you're
particularly looking forward to?
19. Do you think childbirth has improved for women over the years? If
yes: How? Why? If no: Why?
20, Have you ever been present at a birth or with a woman in labour? If
so, what was your relationship to the woman giving birth and how did you
feel about the experience? Did it change any view you held about
labour/birth before this?
21. Do you know anything about your own birth?
*If they do not mention monitoring during the course of the interview,
ask what they feel about electronic monitoring techniques.
Later on - re-establish contact again before the birth and check how
things are progressing and that they are still happy for me to attend
the birth. Ask how they feel about the environment in which you will
give birth (if they have seen it) i.e. the delivery suite. Whether have
any more thoughts on the delivery now they are nearer to it? How are
they now preparing for the birth? How they feel about the hospital
after subsequent visits there. What do you hope to experience from the
birth? Have they thought any more about dealing with pain or how they
want to delivery (birth position etc.).
After the Birth:-
1. Could you describe in some detail your labour and birth (including
any images and sensory data).
2. Likes/dislikes -	 Pleasures/disappointments
3. Helpful/Unhelpful events, attitudes, equipment
4. Anything you would have liked to have been different?
5. What degree of pain relief was necessary? How was this issue
handled and what did you feel about it?
6. Ask about why they felt various decisions were made in the course
of the 'abate and how they felt about these. How they felt at the
point of birth and immediately afterwards?
7. Did anything suprise you about what happened?
8. Did you feel you were consulted enough during the labour and birth,
sufficient explanations given for courses of action, etc.?
9. How would you sum up the experience of the birth of your
child?
10. Has this birth changed your attitude towards childbirth?
11. How would you describe childbirth, in the light of your own
experience?
12. Have you talked much about your 'birth experience' to your friends?
What's been the reaction/ level of interest?
13. Do you think you'll have another baby?
APPENDIX It 
Interviews conducted:
40 Intensive Care Nurses (20 at each Unit, representing approximately
half of the establishment of Intensive Care nursing staff at each site).
10 ITU Doctors (Half of whom were Intensive Care Consultants, 6
interviews at one Unit, four at the other - this represented
interviewing the majority of doctors with a contracted commitment to
Intensive Care at both establishments),
30 Intensive Care ex-patient Relatives (20 at one site [to mirror the
number of nurses interviewed] and 10 at the other. At this point, time
constraints were making themselves felt and I already felt that I had
considerable data from the ex-patient relative point of view from the
first site).
20 Midwives (This represented approximately half of the total number of
midwives working for the Unit - given that some worked varying amounts
of part-time hours - the figure also mirrors the number of Intensive
Care nurse interviews),
4 Consultant Obstetricians (This represents half of the Consultant
Obstetricians at the hosptial)
20 Maternity Patients (This was intended to mirror the Intensive Care
ex-patient relative sample, Since I was conducting multiple interviews
and over a period of time, 30 women were initially selected to allow for
a one third drop-out rate due to my logistical difficulties in
recontacting some women and the fact that it had been agreed with the
hospital that should women develop severe problems during the pregnancy,
for example, severe pre-eclampsia, diabetes, known fetal abnormality,
they would cease to take part in the study).
APPENDIX III	 Selection of Pregnant Women - criteria 
Age: 18 years and over
Primigravida or multigravida (first-time mothers or mothers having second or
subsequent babies).
First interview: at antenatal visit - early third trimester. + one other
contact interview.
Fxclude at first antenatal visit: 
Known fetal abnormalities
Known Caesarian Sections
Known maternal medical conditions (eg heart disease, diabetes etc)
Ethnic Minority women
Don't follow up: 
if deliver before 36/40 weeks
if baby abnormal or > SCBU (Neo-natal Intensive Care)
severe pre-eclampsia
Post natal interview at their home three weeks following delivery.
Signed Date
APPENDIX IV 
Consent Form - Obstetrics
Title: Perceptions and Expectations around Labour, Birth and Obstetric
Technology
Purpose of study and brief description of procedures. (Not a legal
explanation but a simple statement).
The purpose of this study is to talk to you and to ask you a few
questions about your forthcoming birth and what you expect it to be
like.
I should like to talk to you twice before the birth (at the Antenatal
Clinic) and once about three weeks after the birth (at your own home).
At our meeting after the birth, I would like you to tell me about your
birth and what you felt about it. Again, I would ask you a few specific
questions abour your labour and birth.
I am hoping that some of you will allow me to be present when you are
giving birth. (I have been present at births before and have two
children of my own). If you feel able to share your birth with me, I
should be there simply as an observer and would not ask you any
questions at all at that time. If you do not feel able to have me at
your birth, I quite understand and hope that you will still take part in
my study.
I 	  am willing for Janet Harvey to be present during my
forthcoming labour and birth. I understand that should I at any time
wish her to leave, that she will do so without any need for explanation.
*I fully understand what is involved in taking part in this study. Any
questions I have about the study, or my participation in it, have been
answered to my satisfaction. If I decide to withdraw I understand that
it will not affect my future treatment or care.
Signed 	 	 Date 	
*(This section was required in this format by the Research Ethical
Committee).
APPENDIX IV	 INTENSIVE CARE TECHNOLOGY STUDY 
This piece of research is part of a study being carried out at
Warwick University looking at high-technology medical situations.
The purpose of this study is to talk to you and to ask you a few
questions* about the time you spent visiting the Intensive Care Unit at
I would meet with you on only one occasion, when I would like to hear
about your experiences and feelings about your relative's stay on the
Intensive Care Unit.
Those taking part will not be identified in any way in any findings
produced.
Please sign if you wish to take part.	
* If you agree but later find at our meeting that there are questions
you would prefer not to answer, please just say so (no explanation would
be necessary).
APPENDIX V 
Selection Criteria - ITU ex-patient relatives 
The patient to whom the interviewee is related must:
i) have spent at least 24 hours on ITU (otherwise relatives may not
have visited),
ii) have received treatment, not simply electronic monitoring (this
implies that they will have received full-technological support and
Intervention).
The patient's close relative for interviewing purposes was taken to be
that relative who was shown as the 'next-of-kin' in the hospital
records. In a very few cases this contact ref ered me to another
relative who had been more involved in visits to the Unit.
APPENDIX VI 
Dear
I am a Researcher in the Sociology Department at Warwick University
and at present I am studying Intensive Care Units.
One of the hospitals helping me with this research is the
and since I understand that your husband
was a patient in the Intensive Care Unit there recently, I wondered
whether I could arrange to talk to you about this.
I would need to meet with you for about half an hour, either
at 	  or in your own home, when I would like to
hear about your experiences concerning your husband's stay on the
Intensive Care Unit, for example, how easy was it for you to get
Information about his condition and treatment on the Unit?
I will telephone in a few days' time to see whether you are willing
to participate and to answer any questions you might have about the
study.	 Please do not feel at all obliged to take part if you would
prefer not to.
If you do agree, it would be necessary for me to confirm with
	  (the patient) that he has no objections to this. Those
involved in the research will not be identified in any way in the
findings produced.
Finally, may I say, that I hope you do feel able to take part in
this study, as we hope its conclusions will prove of some benefit to
other relatives of Intensive Care patients in the future.
Yours sincerely,
JANET HARVEY.
APPENDIX VI No 'phone number 
Dear 	
I am a Researcher in the Sociology Department at Warwick University
and at present I am studying Intensive Care Units.
One of the hospitals helping me with this research is the
	  Hospital and since I understand that your 	  was
a patient in the Intensive Care Unit there recently, I wondered whether
I could arrange to talk to you about this.
I would need to meet with you for about half an hour, either at the
	
 Hospital or in your own home, when I would like
to hear about your experiences concerning your 	  stay on the
Intensive Care Unit, for example, how easy was it for you to get
information about his (her) condition and treatment on the Unit?
If you would consider taking part please write to me or telephone
me suggesting a time, date and place to meet. I would be glad at that
time to answer any questions you might have about the study.
If you do agree, it would be necessary for me to confirm
with	  (the patient) that he (she) has no objections to
this. Those involved in the research will not be indentified in any way
in the findings produced.
Finally, may I say, that I hope you do feel able to take part in
this study, as we hope its conclusions will prove of some benefit to
other relatives of Intensive Care patients in the future.
Yours sincerely,
JANET HARVEY.
APPENDIX VII 
Dear
I am a Researcher in the Sociology Department at Warwick University
and at present I am studying Intensive Care Units.
One of the hospitals helping me with this research is
	 . I understand that
your 	
	  was a patient in the Intensive Care Unit
there recently, and regretfully passed away on that Unit.
Since it is our hope that the findings of this study will prove of
some benefit to Intensive Care relatives in the future, I am writing to
ask you whether you would feel able to discuss with me your experience
of the Intensive Care Unit. I realise that this may be too painful to
consider and if you would prefer not to, I think this is wholly
understandable. If, however, you do feel this would be possible, I
would need to meet with you for about half an hour, either at
	  or in your own home. The sorts of questions
that I would like to discuss with you are: how easy was it for you to
get information about your husband's condition and treatment on the
Unit?, how far you feel the staff prepared you for the eventual outcome?
I will telephone in a few days' time to see whether you feel able
to participate and to answer any questions you might have about the
study.	 Please do not feel at all obliged to take part if you would
prefer not to.
I would emphasise that those involved in the research will not be
identified in any way in the findings produced.
Finally, may I say, that I hope that you do not object to my
writing to you in this way and that this letter has not in any way added
to your distress. We did consider the situation very carefully before
contacting bereaved relatives and if you feel we took the wrong decision
in contacting you please accept our sincere apologies.
Yours sincerely,
JANET HARVEY.
APPENDIX VIII 
Types of Pain Relief available at the Obstretric Hospital 
Transcutaneous Nerve Stimulation (T.N.S, or TENS) - TENS involves the
application of pulsed electrical energy into pads placed strategically
on the woman's back. Electrical energy is transmitted to the nerves
that supply the uterus, cervix and pelvic floor, Women are able to
mobilize whilst using TENS since it is operated by the women herself
using a lightweight portable unit which she carries in her hand. TENS:
a) stimulates the production of 'endorphins' the body's own natural
analgesic, b) it helps to block the painful stimuli being relayed by the
nervous system from the receptors in the uterus. It also provides a
counter-stimulus to that of the uterine contractions.	 During
contractions the labouring woman presses the 'boost' button to intensify
the pulsating frequency.	 It is possible to 'boost' continuously
during the later stages of labour. TENS can be used in conjuction with
Pethedine or Entonox or with other 'coping skills' learned antenatally.
It is non-invasive and has no known side-effects on mother or baby.
Entenox (Gas and Air) - Entonox consists of two gases: 50% nitrous oxide
and 50% oxygen. It is self-administered by the mother who breathes in
gas throught a mouthpiece or face mask to co-incide with the uterine
contractions. Entonox will cross the placenta but has no known effect
on the baby, although the baby may benefit from the higher concentration
of oxygen it contains. Some mothers tend to hyperventilate (overbreath)
using Entonox, which may produce a tingling sensation, usually in the
fingers. Entenox remains in the system only while it is being breathed
and the effect wears-off approximately one minute after use ceases.
Pethedine - Pethidine is a synthetic narcotic analgesic derived from
morphine (a narcotic is a drug which induces drowsiness or sleep, an
analgesic is a drug which relieves pain without causing
unconsciousness). It is usually administered by intramuscular
injection.	 Pethidine reduces the mother's awareness of pain, but may
cause drowsiness or nausea and she may become less able to be actively
involved in the labour. In may slow down the labour and, since it
crosses the placenta, it may depress the baby's.heart rate and
breathing. If Pethedine is given too near to the delivery (preferably
not more than 2 hours, some literature argues 4 hours before delivery),
the baby may be born seriously sedated and will need to be given an
antedote drug such as Naloxone. Babies whose breathing is not quickly
and satisfactorily established will need to be intubated (this happened
to a baby during a birth I attended). The baby may have to be taken to
a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.
Epidural anaesthesia (lumbar epidural block, extradural or peridural
anaesthesia) - an anaesthetic drug is injected into the space
surrounding the spinal cord, the epidrual space. This blocks
transmission of messages to the brain about pain occuring in these and
associated nerves.
	
The insertion of an epidural is a sterile procedure
which takes between 10 and 20 minutes to perform. Following an
injection of local anaesthetic, a long needle is inserted into the
ligaments between the vertebrae. A syringe containing saline or air is
attached. The needle is then pushed into the epidural space. A fine
plastic tube (catheter) is then inserted and the needle withdrawn. The
catheter is taped to the back and over the woman's shoulder. Doses and
top-up doses are fed through this mechanism. A woman in labour may be
offered an epidural either for pain relief or when the method of
delivery (e. g. forceps or Caesarean section) requires the removal of all
painful sensation or in the presence of certain 'indications', for
example, following inco-ordinate uterine action, hypertension (high
blood pressure), cardiac or respiratory disease, diabetes, twin births,
breech and premature births.. Lumbar epidural anaesthesia is the form
of block most used in Britain. It blocks the nerves in the lower
thoracic and lumbar regions, supressing pain from the uterus, cervix,
vagine and perineum.	 The mother remains conscious and painfree or
largely-painfree (depending how well the technique works in the
individual case ). She does, however, loose physical control over the
labour being paralysed from the waist down (obviously she will be
imobile). She will need an intravenous infusion (drip) set-up to infuse
fluid should she become hypotensive (abnormally low blood pressure) due
to the procedure. Hypotension affects both mother and baby when it
occurs, since if the mother's blood pressure falls and baby's heart rate
may become depressed (continuous electronic fetal monitoring usually
accompanies this procedure for this reason). This effect may be
worstened if intravenous oxytocin is used to augment the labour causing
more frequent and powerful constriction of the placenta (Lieberman, et
al, 1979) (This may well happen, since an epidural may slow down the
labour [Rosen, 1977]). Bladder catheterisation is more likely, since
the woman will have no urge or ability to pass urine. 	 Epidural
analgesia prevents reflex stimulation of the perineum and reduces or
eliminates the mother's urge to push in second stage. It also causes
the pelvic floor muscles to become flaccid so that they do not guide and
rotate the baby's head towards the correct position for birth, natural
rotation and decent is, therefore, inhibited and the need for forceps
assistance is greatly increased, I. e. 70% of women having their first
baby and 40% having subsequent babies were delivered by forceps (Hoult,
et all, 1977, Studd, et al, 1980). Goodfellow, et al (1983) argues that
an effective epidural also inhibits the stimulation of the pelvic
autonomic nerves as the birth canal is distended, reducing the natural
release of oxytocin, thereby reducing the force of uterine contractions.
Other possible adverse effects of epidural include: increased risk of
thrombosis in the leg and pelvic veins (Waldron, 1983), increased blood
loss after delivery (Lieberman, et al, 1979), bladder infections
following catheterisation, accidental lumbar puncture (1%-2% Rosen,
1977, Moir, 1982), accidental subarachnoid injection (0.1% Moir, 1982).
There may also be very rare toxic reactions to the local anaesthetic or
very rare post-delivery neurological complications. Other research
indicates a higher incidence of jaundice in babies whose mother have
been given epidural blocks (Lewis and Friedman, 1979) and trauma
resulting from the higher incidence of forceps deliveries (Rosen, 1977).
Definitely not wanting 
an epidural 
8
Aspirations 
9
3*
'Don't know' 5
20
APPENDIX IX 
The following depicts in aggregate terms the 'aspirations' and outcomes
for the twenty pregnant women in the study in relation to monitoring,
pain relief, and use of Syntocinon (since these are all inter-related:
* Type of Delivery 
'Normal Delivery'
	
11
Forceps
	
7
Caesarian Section*
	
2
Total
	
20
2
2
Type of Pain Relief* 
No artificial pain relief
	
0
TENS	 3
Gas and Air
	 5
Pethedine	 3
Epidural	 11
General Anaesthetic	 1
Total	 20
(3 TENS technique used in
conjunction with another method)
*Where more than one method of pain
relief was used the 'strongest' method
employed is recorded.
Type of Monitoring 
External Fetal Monitoring	 2
Internal Fetal Monitoring
	 17
No record	 1
Total
	 20
(12 first-time mothers)
Accelerated 
Induced 
Aspirations 
3
3
5
2
4
'Don't know'
	
5
No record
	
1
20
*These were three women who
felt that internal E.F.M.
had 'saved' their babies
in previous births.
APPENDIX X The 'Exception' to the 'Rule'
A very few Midwives were able to communicate something of a 'feeling' of
labour (given that, a highly medically managed labour incorporating an
epidural will not 'feel' like this), for example:
"To start with you will feel your tummy tightening or maybe your back.
Initially its not painful, 'though you might feel uncomfortable. . . and
it's nothing that you could ever explain.	 And as time goes on you'll
find those tightenings getting stronger, then it'll actually start
getting painful. I might say uncomfortable, but, yes, you've got to
introduce 'pain'. So they start off, but later on when they become
painful you're progressing, usually, and you progress by the dilation of
the cervix and the baby coming down. And you're going to feel pressure
on the back passage. Some women get backache. And these are all signs
of progress. . . Now, it does get painful, but you mustn't get
disheartened. As long as you know it's painful, you're expecting the
pain. Then it's a lot easier to go along with the pain. And you'll get
to a stage where it doesn't necessary get more painful. Because ladies
have this feeling that labour gets so painful that there's nothing else
you can do. You either want to die or everything else. But it will get
to a stage where it doesn't get more painful but the sort of pain you
get will change. And with the change, you will get this sort of
sensation, the bearing down thing, like you want to go to the toilet.
Now most people are frightened by that. They think 'Oh my God, I'm
going to pooh myself and it's going to be embarassing'. But you will
get that sort of sensation. There's nothing wrong with it. It's just
that when baby's head comes down it presses on your back passage and
that's to stimulate you, so that you get the idea of pushing. Now when
you actually start pushing and the baby's head comes down further, you
get the feeling that you're going to rip open. You must never be
frightened of that. That's just your muscles stretching but, the harder
you push the quicker that feeling's going to go away because once baby's
head's out, you're never going to experience that again. . ." (Senior
Sister Midwife)
APPENDIX XI 
'Birth Stories' 
These extracts of women's birth accounts were recorded verbatim in their
homes, approximately three weeks after the birth. They tell in their
own words something of the women experiences:
(TENS, Gas and Air, Normal Delivery, first baby) ". . . it wasn't that
big an ordeal, as you hear about, it wasn't for me anyway. I'm much more
positive about it now. . . It wasn't that painful, I just felt
uncomfortable. . . the whole 9 months I'd felt so poorly and faint. . .
I felt I'd never have another baby, never, but as soon as I had him, I
thought 'I'd go through that again'. . . I was so surprized how
overwhealmed I felt afterwards about him. I couldn't believe how I
would feel about him. . . I didn't sleep at all that night. I Just lay
thinking about him and thinking how wonderful it is."
(Gas and Air, normal delivery, first baby, aged 18 years) - "Not very
painful. A wonderful experience and also something that I wouldn't mind
doing again. . . I enjoyed it, strangely enough. It's all turned out
very different from what I'd expected. I didn't find it painful. . .
painless, very enjoyable and I'd do it again. . . it was really easy,
really easy. , . I used to hear a lot of girls saying 'I'm never going
to go through that again' but I actually turned round and said 'I
wouldn't mind going through it again' because I really enjoyed it. It
was a great experience. And afterwards I Just fell in love with her,
totally, as soon as I saw her. I just fell in love with her."
(Pethedine, Normal Delivery - first baby) "How you go through it and how
it all happens, I just think it's one of the, I don't know, I can't
think of words to describe it. The most indescribable experience that
anyone could have I'm sure. I've never experienced anything like it. .
. I think that any fear is just outweighed by everything else that is
going on. Despair when she told me I had another 12 hours to go. . . .
They came to examine me and I still hadn't changed, I was still only 2
centimetres dilated. I was absolutely so shocked. I thought, I've been
through 10 hours of this and I'd really tried to keep calm and I was
getting really strong contractions and I thought I can't go on much
longer. I was Just devastated when they said that. . . I think I'd got
all these visions of me choosing what position I would be in when I gave
birth, you know, but honestly I didn't care what position I was in when
I had the baby. . . I Just wanted to get it over and done with, you
can't do anything like that when you're in absolute agony, Just pushing
for all you're worth. . . I know I was awfully worried, the thing that
stuck in my mind and almost outwieghed the pain was the embarrasment of
emptying my bowels, you know what I mean, when I was pushing. And I all
I could say to John (birth partner, father of baby) was 'I'm going to do
a pooh, I'm pushing too hard'. And it almost outweighed the pain. I
was so embarrassed by it, I remember thinking that that was formost in
my mind. . . Once his head came out, how easily all the rest came out.
That just shocked me, the head took a lot of energy and effort but all
of a sudden the rest Just went i blub'. . . It's been happening for
thousands of years and everyone goes through it. . . . or virtually
everyone, all the people you know who've got families must have gone
through it and yet you feel very special because you've been through it.
. . I think it's so hard to explain to anyone, even having gone through
it, you can't explain it either. . . until you've been through it, it
don't think you can imagine it. . . I get really excited everytime I
talk about it. I relive it all. . . I think it was worse than I 
imagined and better than I imagined. At the time it was the most
excruciating pain and I thought I couldn't go on any more. It was far
worse than anything I had ever experienced. But then once it had gone,
within seconds of him being born it was wonderful and not half as bad as
I'd imagined it was going to be. . . I Just think it's the strangest 
experience I'll ever have, perhaps the worst but also the best." 
(Gas and air, normal delivery - first baby) ". . . you're just totally
gone from the planet. You're totally out of control your body's gone
somewhere else. You can't do anything about it. I felt I was going to
die, that's it! Gone! . . . I Just felt frightened at second stage
because I think that was pain (her emphasis). The fact that you've lost
control of your body, I mean, that was what I was frightened of. . . It
was rapid. Rapid. Painful. But pleasurable. It was exciting. . . I
felt once the baby was born I'd want to have her and I did want her.
But I was still on another planet. It did take me quite a while to come
down and realise she was mine. I mean, I held her straight away but
they could have given me a doll. . . But I don't think I'll ever forget
the feeling just before you start to push. The baby's head comes down.
. . I'll never forget that one, but then, I wouldn't know how to
describe it. I think that's the point where your soul leaves you. For 
a minute! (laughs)" (this woman is also a Midwife)
(Pethedine and Gas and Air, 'Normal' Delivery - first baby - working
class woman, aged 18 years - youngest woman in the sample) ". . . they
rushed me to the Admission Room and gave me an internal. And I'd
actually dilated to 7 centimetres. I was shocked because I thought they
were going to tell me I'd only dilated 1 centimetre. . . they gave me
'the gas'. . . it really made me giggle. I was really breathing it in
heavily because they were quite strong. And after that they burst my
waters and after that they were even stronger. And I'd dilated then the
whole 10 centimetres. The birth was very, very easy. . . I would have
liked to have touched her as she was coming out and I would have like to
have watched her. I wish now that I'd watched her. . . (she didn't feel
she wanted to at the time) and they were saying 'Do you want to touch
the head?' and I was going 'no I don't!'. I was just wanting to get her
out and that was all I wanted to do . (This sentiment was echoed in
several of the accounts around touching or seeing the baby before it was
fully born.) But I wish now I'd Just took the time and touched her head
because I would have liked to have known what it felt like when it was
coming out and I would have liked to have seen it. . . And I could feel
her head slipping back in and coming down when I was pushing. And I'd
have to start pushing again and I'd make her come even further. It was
a lovely feeling. The best part of it, I thought, was after her head
came out. . . to feel her body, at the side of my vagina. It was a
lovely feeling. I really loved that feeling. I can't describe it, it
was like something soothing and warm coming out, you know, it was a
really lovely feeling. That was the best part I thought, when the head
had come out and the body slipping out, I loved that feeling. . . I was
surprized about everything because it was my first time. . . it all made
sense afterwards. . . when people used to describe their births to me,
I used to try and picture it in my head, but I couldn't, but afterwards
I could make sense of what they were talking about",
(Gas and Air late first stage, 'Normal Delivery' - second baby) ". . . I
felt the head and she (the Midwife) said 'the head's through'. And I
could actually feel her (Midwife) working round the shoulders and she
said 'the baby's actually coming now, can you look?' and Alan (birth
partner and father of the baby) put me forward a bit more and I didn't
see the head come through but I actually saw from the neck, I saw the
rest of her come. And she (Midwife) brought her straight up and put her
on my chest. . . It was so quick I couldn't believe it. There was pain
obviously at one point but there was so little of it. , . and I thought
'I wouldn't mind doing that again!'. . . As the contractions went I felt
quite good but when they came back I though 'God I'm an idiot' but
actually I was feeling I was enjoying it. . . the sensation when she
slithered out was very good because I was seeing her come and the breast
feeding was great, it was almost a physical pain, seeing her suck. . .
that sucking sound was the lovliest noise I've ever heard."
Some women whilst, not actually identifying the experience as enjoyable,
nevertheless, remained positive about the experience overall:
(Entenox, Pethedine, Forceps for fetal distress in second stage - first
baby) ". . . sort of surprizing in a way (this woman is middle class,
aged 44 years). I suppose the absolute amazement. . . I just don't
believe it. But she's there. I don't know. I just don't know. I
can't think of words to describe it. It's like nothing I've ever
encountered before really. It was very, very painful. I don't know
whether it was an enjoyable experience but the end result is certainly
worth having (laughs). I suppose you surprize yourself in a way, that
you get through all this."
(Gas and Air, Epidural, Normal Delivery - Second Baby) ". . . you forget
the pain and remember just the thrill of everything. . . I enjoyed my
waters going and the excitement. . . we were really excited (she and her
husband), we were laughing all the way to the hospital and I was
laughing walking down to the labour ward. . . really, it was only when
it went down-hill (anterior lip, she pushed against this, it became
swollen, the birth was delayed and she was advised to have an Epidural).
. . when I think back to when I had that urge (to push) earlier, I
thought that was a lovely feeling . . .I mean, I'd Just never, people
had told me it was like going to the toilet and not being able to stop
it but I don't think you can prepare anyone for how overwhelming that
is. , . I should imagine it must make the delivery that much easier
because your body has taken over from you, whereas I was having to do it
for my body. (J.H. The difficulty of that urge is trying to resist it,
as you had to try to do?) Yes, not going with it." (She delivered
'normally' but with an Epidural. She managed to push the baby out
although: "I couldn't feel where I was pushing". Her first baby was a
'normal' delivery too but again with an Epidural fitted).
Others felt overall varying degrees of negativity towards the birth
experience but saw it as a means to an end, while valuing the outcome
(the baby), they expressed varying degrees of disappointment to horror
about what they had felt and what had transpired during the labour:
(Induction, Pethedine, Gas and Air - First Baby) "I was quite surprised
really, pleasantly surprized. I mean, it's bad but it wasn't as bad as
I expected. . . It was very painful at the end, when the actual head
comes out. I just kept thinking 'Oh God, I'm going to split open any
minute'. . . I don't think I could say I really enjoyed any of it. . .
I'm not going to say it's bad because it is, but it's worth it."
(Gas and Air late first stage, normal delivery [fetal distress
registering on monitor] - second baby) "I was really worried, she was
so blue. I kept saying, 'Is she alright?'.	 I don't think I enjoyed
it, no. . . I went into hospital thinking I would have the baby in a few
hours and they said 'it could be 24 hours'. I was disappointed. . . I
think it's very, very painful and immediately afterwards you say 'never
again' but within a short period you do forget and it all seems worth
it, but it hurts"
(Epidural, Rotational forceps for fetal distress - first baby) "Oh my
God it was horrible! Really horrible. . . when I was waiting for the
epidural to take, they said 'Your mum can pop in if you like and have a
chat'. And she said 'You're sitting there as if nothing's happening',
and it is, it's a beautiful thing (an epidural) .	 . Afterwards you
couldn't feel your legs and everything, that was the annoying part"
(Induction, Epidural, forceps delivery for fetal distress) "Traumatic.
I really can't think of a lot to say in its favour. I'll never have
another one (baby). I don't know whether I'll change my mind. . . It
was awful, the actual birth. I mean, Thomas is great but the actual
birth was awful. I mean, I don't think my husband could quite believe
how bad it was really. I don't know if it's just me because they say
everyone has different kinds of pain thresholds and I kept thinking mine
must be low. . . (She was induced for raised blood pressure. She was
advised to have an Epidural to help keep her blood pressure down during
labour and to counteract the more painful labour resulting from
induction.) I thought it was horrendous but I'm glad they used all the 
technology, otherwise they wouldn't have known Thomas (the baby) was 
distressed." (Postnatal Interview)
(Pethedine, Epidural, Acceleration, forceps lift out for delay in second
stage - Second baby) "It was terrible but it was still nice seeing her
born, you know. . 	 I didn't know what to do (pushing).	 I couldn't
Teel the pushing. I hadn't got a clue what to do. It was terrible. . .
When I had Adam, I thought 'gosh', that was a real big thing having a
Caesarian. But this was even more real because I actually seen her
born, which was really different to what I thought it would be actually.
When I had Adam, I thought, I don't care that I didn't see him
<Emergency Caesarian). He was there at the end and that was it. But it
was more amazing this time seeing her born, seeing her straightaway. It
was quite frightening but it was nice. , . I know what it's like now. I
really know. I like that because I really know what it's like now.
It's a nice feeling, knowing."
(At patient's request: epidural within 30 minutes of reaching hospital
(3 cms. dilation) forceps for delay in second stage.)
"I couldn't sleep at all. It was all just too much to sleep really. I
mean, it was night-time and I could have slept really, my husband slept
but I Just couldn't sleep. They dimmed the lights but I just couldn't
sleep (it seems she would have preferred to not acknowledge that
anything was happening). 	 When she was delivered that was the best
thing. I don't know about the rest of it. . . you were always worried,
you know, something can go wrong. It's always in the back of your mind.
I wouldn't say I enjoyed it. It was 0  K 	 Afterwards was worst
once the epidural wore off, that was absolutely awful. That was just
dreadful. It was ten times worse than the birth„ . it was absolutely
excruciating, it was absolutely awful." (The mother describes this as a
'nice birth' , "straightforward" and "nice staff").
(Postnatal interview, epidural, forceps delivery for fetal distress in
second stage) "I was really scared because I thought second stage is
going to be absolutely terrible and the epidural won't be able to cover
it up. And I was just so scared about it and I couldn't stop shaking
(' Marcain shakes' from epidural). But I did feel terrified. I don't
know why. I did have this fear about actually having him. . 	 I was
upset when they said I was 5 centimeters. I'd been through all that and
I didn't want to do it and I would have wanted the epidural
straightaway.	 . I'd just say it was painful and that's the only thing,
the overwhelming thing that I remember because most of it is a blur to
me. I didn't feel a rush of emotion or anything. When they put him on
my lap I just thought 'Oh go and take him away!' I was so tired and I
couldn't even go to sleep when it was finished, I had to have stitches.
I don't know whether it's me or not but I wouldn't describe it as a
pleasurable experience at all, it was traumatic"
Some expressed strong ambiguities:
(epidural - which failed - remainder of labour without chemical pain
relief, 'normal' delivery - first baby) "It was nothing like I thought
it would be, nothing at all. I think it was worse because I thought
that the Epidural, when it did work for half an hour, it was great. I
thought I am going to have this all the way through, I'm not going to
feel nothing. And then all of a sudden I could feel
everything, it was terrible. . . (But) I can't wait to have another one
(baby). It's that exciting when you go through it and then all the pain
goes once they come out. It was really good. I can't wait to have me
next one. It's very painful but I can't wait to go through it again.
You can't explain it can you? The contractions I could cope with, they
were painful but it's that they keep coming all the while. .	 The worst
part was getting the head out. That was the painfulist."
The essential ambiguity : "It's very painful but I can't wait to go
through it again". A Sister Midwife commented in relation to the birth
of her own baby: "I remember looking forward to it, dreading it. You
look forward to it but you dread it. And you don't put it into
perspective.",
